The Japanese Public Policies on Tax, Wages, and Standard Work Hours - Evidence from Micro Data. by Yokoyama, Izumi
THE JAPANESE PUBLIC POLICIES ON TAX,
WAGES, AND STANDARD WORK HOURS—
EVIDENCE FROM MICRO DATA
by
Izumi Yokoyama
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Economics)
in The University of Michigan
2013
Doctoral Committee:
Professor Charles C. Brown, Chair
Professor Mary E. Corcoran
Professor James R. Hines Jr.
Associate Professor Melvin Stephens Jr.
c© Izumi Yokoyama 2013
All Rights Reserved
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my committee chair, Professor
Charles Brown, who has served as my primary advisor, supporting me since the ear-
liest steps of each project that comprises my dissertation. He devoted a tremendous
amount of guidance, patience, and time to this dissertation, and I wish to thank
him sincerely for all of his support. I would also like to thank my dissertation com-
mittee members—Professor Melvin Stephens, Professor James Hines, and Professor
Mary Corcoran—for their many invaluable comments, and also for the time and pa-
tience they devoted to me as I wrote my dissertation. Without their support, this
dissertation would not have been possible.
I also wish to extend special thanks to Professor Jeffrey Smith, Professor Martha
Bailey, and Professor Michael Elsby for the many invaluable comments they offered
me at meetings and seminars. At conferences and seminars in Japan, I also received
many helpful comments from Professor Fumio Ohtake, Professor Hidehiko Ichimura,
and Professor Miki Kohara, to whom I would like to express my gratitude. Chapter III
was originally developed from my master’s thesis, and I am also grateful to Professor
Isao Ohashi, my academic advisor from my master’s program, as well as Professor
Ryo Kambayashi, and Professor Hiroyuki Odagiri who provided insightful comments
on the preliminary version of this paper. I would also like to thank Professor Daiji
Kawaguchi and Professor Hisahiro Naito for supporting me throughout the process of
writing my dissertation by serving as my advisors and by contributing their expertise
as coauthors of Chapter IV.
ii
The analyses in Chapters II and III were made possible by the data from the
Keio Household Panel Survey, and I would like to thank the 21st Century Center
of Excellence Program at Keio University for providing me with the data set. The
study in Chapter IV was conducted as part of the research program by the Economic
Social Research Institute (ESRI) of the Cabinet Office and partially supported by
a Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (A) (20683003). I would also like to thank the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications for granting special permission to




ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
CHAPTER
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. The Impact of Tax Reform in Japan on the Income Distribu-
tion of Married Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Tax System in Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.1 Income Tax and Residential Tax . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.2 Spousal Exemptions in Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.3 Factors that Could Potentially Induce Labor Supply
Adjustment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.2 Japanese Labor Market Trends: 2003-2006 . . . . . 22
2.3.3 The Effect of the Husband’s Income Increase vs. the
Effect of the Spousal-Exemption Cut . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.1 The Tax Reform’s Effect on the Optimal Income . . 26
2.4.2 Introducing a Flexible Hourly Wage Rate . . . . . . 38
2.4.3 The Tax Reform’s Effect on Labor Participation . . 38
2.5 Empirical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5.1 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.5.2 CQR vs. UQR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.5.3 Basics of FFL Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.5.4 FFL Decomposition Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
iv
2.5.5 DFL decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.6 Regression Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.7 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.7.1 Difference-in-Difference Regression Results . . . . . 51
2.7.2 FFL Decomposition Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.7.3 DFL Decomposition Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
III. Why Do Wages Become More Rigid during a Recession Than
during a Boom? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.2 The Basic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.2.1 Model Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.2.2 Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.2.3 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.3 Promotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.4 Empirical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.4.1 Layoff Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.4.2 Wage Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.4.3 Restricting the Sample to Experienced Workers . . . 112
3.4.4 Sample Selection Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.5 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.6 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.6.1 Layoff Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.6.2 Wage Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
IV. Labor-Market Responses to Standard Hours Reduction: Ev-
idence from Japan (with Daiji Kawaguchi and Hisahiro Naito)138
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.2 Legal Institution on Standard Hours in Japan . . . . . . . . . 141
4.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
4.4 Estimating Local Average Policy Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
4.4.1 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
4.4.2 Choice of Regression Function . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
4.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
4.5.1 Possibility of Establishment-Size Manipulation . . . 150
4.5.2 Effect on Hours Worked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
4.5.3 Effects on Wage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
4.5.4 Effects on Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
4.5.5 Effects on Full- and Part-time Compositions . . . . 157
4.6 Why hours did not respond much . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
v
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180




2.1 Factors that Could Potentially Induce Labor Supply Adjustment . . 62
2.2 Reasons for Labor Supply Adjustment among Female Part-time Work-
ers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.3 Spikes in the Annual Income Distribution of Married Women (2003) 64
2.4 Impact of Tax reform on Household Budget Line . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.5 Impact of Tax reform on Labor Supply of Married Women (Without
Change in Exogenous Parameter) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.6 Change in Labor Supply of Medium- to High-income Married Women
in Response to both Tax Reform and Increase in Husband’s Income 67
2.7 Decomposition of the “Income Jump” into “Tax Reform Effect” and
“Husband’s Income Effect” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.8 Interpretation of CQR Estimate for β3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.9 Interpretation of UQR Estimate for β3 [Change in Income Distribu-
tion When Increasing Proportion of the Treatment Group] . . . . . 70
2.10 Interpretation of FFL Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.11 Coefficients for Interaction Term in the Difference-in-Difference Esti-
mations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.12 Composition Effect Attributable to Husband’s Income in FFL De-
composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.13 Actual Income Distributions and Counterfactual Distribution (DFL
Decomposition Result) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.14 Changes in Histogram of Income among Married Women . . . . . . 75
A.2.1 Tax Reform Effects for Higher Husbands’ Tax Rates . . . . . . . . . 87
A.3.1 Graphical Explanation of p2t+1/4 + C and U(pt+1) . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.1 Weighted Average of the Standard Hours and Hours Worked in 4 In-
dustries (Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, and Electricity, Gas,
Heat Supply, and Water), 1989-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
4.2 Distribution of Hours Worked, 1989 and 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
4.3 Distribution of Establishment Size, 1989, 1992, 1996, and 2000 . . . 166
4.4 Impact of Standard Hours on Weekly Hours Worked, 1989-2002 . . 167
4.5 Impact of Standard Hours on Weekly Hours Worked by Production
Workers, 1989-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
vii
4.6 Impact of Standard Hours on Log Monthly Wages, 1989-2002 . . . . 169
4.7 Impact of Standard Hours on Log Annual Bonus, 1989-2002 . . . . 170
4.8 Impact of Standard Hours on the Ratio of the Number of Newly Hired
Workers to the Number of Existing Workers, 1989-2002 . . . . . . . 171
4.9 Impact of Standard Hours on Fraction of Part-time Workers (%),




2.1.A Employment Income Deduction Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.1.B Tax Rate Schedule for Income Tax (1999-2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.1.C Tax Rate Schedule for Income-Based Component of Residential Tax
(1999-2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.2 Spousal Exemptions of Income Tax and Residential Tax (Unit: Mil-
lion Yen≈10,000 USD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.3.A Japanese Labor Market Trends in the Period 2003-2006 . . . . . . . 78
2.3.B Changes in Total Spousal Exemption Amount (Unit: Million Yen≈10,000
USD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.4.A Impact of Tax Reform with an Increase in Husbands’ Incomes on
Wives’ Optimal Income Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.4.B Probability of “Income Jump” among High-Income Married Women
(%) by Husband’s Income Increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.4.C Impact of Tax Reform with an Increase in Husbands’ Incomes on
Wives’ Optimal Income Choice (Counter-factual Realizations Included) 82
2.4.D Probability of “Income Jump” among High-Income Married Women
(%) by Husband’s Income Increase and Change in Wife’s Hourly Wage 83
2.5 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.6 Difference-in-Difference Estimation: Effects of Tax Reform on Labor
Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.7 FFL Decomposition Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
A.2.1 Check for Selection Issue due to Attrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.1.A Changes in Consumer Price Index by Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.1.B Descriptive Statistics for Estimation Sample of Layoff Regression . . 132
3.1.C Descriptive Statistics for the Estimation Sample of Wage Regressions 133
3.2 Layoff Regression (Probit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.3 Regular Pay Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3.4 Bonus Pay Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.1 History of Standard Hours by Industry and Establishment Sizes In-
cluded in the Analysis Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
ix
4.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Analysis Data, 1989-2002, 4 Industries:
Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, and Electricity, Gas, Heat
Supply and Water, All Employees in Establishments with 30 or More
Employees, 1989-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
4.3 Cross-validation Functions and Optimal Bandwidth for Local Linear
Regressions of Hours Worked on Size of Establishment . . . . . . . 175
4.4 Distribution of Establishments among Establishment-Size Regions
(1989, 1992, 1996, and 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
4.5 Impact of the Reduction in Standard Hours on Firm’s Employment
Decision, 1989-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
4.6 Impact of Standard Hours on Weekly Hours Worked, Earnings, and
Employment, 1989-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
4.7 Impact of Standard Hours on Total Employment, 1989-2002 . . . . 178
4.8 Impact of Standard Hours on ln(Straight-time Hourly Wage Rate),




This dissertation theoretically and empirically examines several topics relating to
the Japanese labor market: the impact of the 2004 tax reform on the female labor
supply, the possible source of wage rigidity, and the impact of Japan’s reduction of
weekly standard work hours on labor-market outcomes. Although Chapters II, III,
and IV in this dissertation focus on different topics, they all explore new evidence
regarding the Japanese labor market during the 1990s and the 2000s using Japanese
micro data. Chapters II and IV examine how the reforms in the Japanese public poli-
cies, such as the spousal exemption system and standard work hours, affected labor
market outcomes, employing relatively novel empirical tools, such as unconditional
quantile regressions, Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux decomposition, DiNardo, Fortin,
and Lemieux decomposition, and regression discontinuity design. Chapter III focuses
more on theory, and it provides a new type of efficiency wage model, exploring the
impact of the performance-based layoffs on wage rigidity. The details of each chapter
are presented below.
Chapter II explores how the 2004 tax reform in Japan affected the income distri-
bution of married women: In Japan, there is a spousal exemption system whereby
the income exemption amount that a husband can claim is reduced as his spouse’s
income increases. In 2004, part of this spousal exemption was abolished. Although it
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was expected that this tax reform would increase the labor supply of married women,
both the average work hours and annual incomes of married women slightly decreased
after the reform was introduced. To explore the real effect of the tax reform on the
female labor supply, this paper theoretically and empirically examines the effect of
the tax reform on the income distributions of married women. Quantile difference-
in-difference estimations and FFL and DFL decompositions indicate that i) the tax
reform contributed to increasing work hours (and hence the incomes) of low-income
married women, and ii) the kink at 1.03 million yen in the budget line, which was
made more conspicuous by the tax reform, dragged even medium- to high-income
married women, who were not presumed to be affected by the tax reform, toward
the center of the income distribution in response to an increase in their husbands’
incomes. Consequently, the conventional distortion at 1.03 million yen in the income
distribution became stronger after the reform.
Chapter III suggests a new explanation for the source of wage rigidity during
recessions: The theoretical model discussed in this chapter is a new type of efficiency
wage model in which performance pay is assumed, and a firm can choose how much
weight to assign performance and seniority as layoff criteria. Firms’ decisions follow
an over-lapping generation model structure, dividing the workers into two types: new
employees and experienced employees. In this setting, new employees will be able to
receive wages scheduled to be paid to experienced employees in a recession only when
they work hard in the first period and avoid layoffs. In contrast, wages scheduled to
be paid to experienced employees in a boom do not affect incentives of new employees
because they will receive the wages in the second period without being laid off. Thus,
the high wages scheduled to be paid to experienced employees during a recession
encourage new employees to work hard, and it becomes optimal for a firm to pay the
higher fixed component of wages during a recession than during a boom. In addition,
during recessions, firms are discouraged from maintaining workers’ current incentives
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at a higher level due to the lower value of productivity, which results in the bonus
that moves proportionally to the output price. Thus, the theoretical model predicts
that wages during recessions become both “downwardly rigid” and “rigid” (inflexible)
with respect to performance. These implications are tested using Japanese panel data
from the Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS). The empirical results support the
model’s predictions.
Chapter IV assesses the impact of Japan’s reduction of weekly standard work hours
(from 48 hours/week in 1988 to 40 hours/week by 1997) on labor-market outcomes
using the regression discontinuity approach: Although the reduction of standard hours
reduced total hours worked, the monthly wages of existing workers did not decrease
in response to the policy change. As a result, overall labor costs per hour increased,
and we do not see any evidence of job creation. Even in Japan, where wages are
determined flexibly, we observe evidence similar to that in European countries such
as Germany and France, where pay is largely determined through union-employer
bargaining.
Chapter V concludes this dissertation.
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CHAPTER II
The Impact of Tax Reform in Japan on the
Income Distribution of Married Women
2.1 Introduction
There is a spousal exemption system in Japan in which the amount of income
exemptions a husband can claim reduces as his spouse’s income rises. This spousal
exemption system has been criticized for discouraging married women from working
long hours. As female labor participation has increased, criticism of the spousal
exemption system has likewise escalated. As a result, part of this spousal exemption
system was abolished in 2004 for taxpayers whose spouses earned annual earnings of
1.03 million yen (≈USD 10,300) or less.1
The original purpose of this tax reform was to mitigate the distortion it might
1More strictly speaking, part of the spousal exemption was abolished for taxpayers whose spouses’
annual total income is 0.38 million yen or less, where total income is calculated as the total earnings
minus the employment income deduction for employees and the total earnings minus necessary ex-
penses for other workers. If we consider only employees, the annual total income of 0.38 million yen
corresponds to annual earnings of 1.03 million yen. Since the amount of necessary expenses varies by
individual, it is not possible to accurately relate the amount of the total income to the total earnings
for workers other than employees without taking into consideration information about the necessary
expenses applicable to each worker. In contrast, the amount of the employment income deduction
is defined for each category of annual earnings and, hence, it is possible to relate the amount of
the total income to the amount of annual earnings for employees. (The details will be discussed in
Section 2.2.1.) For this reason, I will discuss the impact of the tax reform in the context of employ-
ees, using the amount of annual earnings, rather than the amount of the total income because the
amount of annual earnings is more intuitively understandable. Thus, hereafter, the term “income”
means annual earnings of employees.
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have caused to the women’s labor supply, and thus was expected to increase married
women’s labor supply. However, statistics show that both the average work hours for
married women and their annual incomes slightly decreased after the tax reform; these
trends are not observed for single women. If this is the only evidence we consider, we
might be driven to conclude that the tax reform did not increase married women’s
labor supply. However, further considerations are required to understand the reform’s
real impact.
First, in the years following the 2004 tax reform, there was a trend in which the
incomes of married men in Japan increased in response to the recovery from a recession
that started in the late 1990s; that increase could potentially decrease the income
earned by married women and, hence, conceal the reform’s real impact. Therefore,
it is important to estimate the impact of the tax reform on married women’s labor
supply after controlling for changes in exogenous variables, particularly an increase
in their husbands’ incomes.
Second, the impact of the tax reform should be heterogeneous across income
groups among married women. Since the tax reform directly affected only low in-
come married women2, estimating only the mean impact among all women would be
misleading and might result in missing a change in labor supply due to the tax re-
form. This paper explicitly takes this into account and examines the reform’s impact
on income distribution rather than focusing on the mean.3
Third, people can adjust their incomes not only by work hours/labor participation,
but also by their effort at work, their job choices, and their manner of earning income
(e.g., salary, dividends, or capital gains). As is often argued in the public finance
2More strictly speaking, individuals who claim spousal exemptions could be either husbands or
wives, but here it is assumed that husbands claim the spousal exemptions. The details about the
spousal exemptions rule will be discussed in Section 2.2.2.
3This point is very similar to that of Bitler et al. (2006), who analyzed the impact of recent
welfare reforms in the United States on labor outcomes, using a random-assignment experiment. By
estimating quantile treatment effects, they showed what mean impacts miss when we examine the
impact of recent welfare reforms and how important it is to analyze distributional effects.
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literature, people can also control their after-tax incomes by changing behaviors other
than work hours in order to reduce their tax liability. “New tax responsiveness”
literature holds such a general view on the concept of labor supply and uses the
response of taxable income to the marginal tax rate as a summary statistic of the
behavioral response to taxation (Meghir and Phillips, 2008; Feldstein, 1995). Using
incomes rather than work hours to analyze the impact of the tax reform circumvents
the concern that the tax reform affected people’s behaviors other than their hours of
work. Thus, in this paper, I mainly focus on the tax reform effect on incomes.
There have been many studies that examine the impact of the spousal exemption
itself on female labor supply (Abe and Otake (1995); Higuchi (1995); Kantani (1997);
Akabayashi (2006); Takahashi (2010a,b), etc.). However, only a few studies have
examined the impact of the 2004 Japanese tax system reform on the female labor
supply and no critical consensus has arisen concerning the real impact of the tax
reform: Sakata and McKenzie (2006) found that the tax reform had no impact on the
labor-participation decisions and a slightly positive effect on the number of work hours
for female part-time workers who worked less than 35 hours per week. In contrast,
Sakata and McKenzie (2005) found that the tax reform had a negative and statistically
significant impact on both the decisions of female spouses to enter the labor market
and on the number of hours they worked, conditional on their participation in the
labor market.
Furthermore, these studies examine changes in labor supply at the mean, and no
study has analyzed the overall distributional change due to the tax reform. However,
if the tax reform had any side effects on high-income married women who were not
presumed to be affected by the tax reform, restricting the sample to only female
workers who were directly affected would result in missing those unexpected impacts.
For example, the way high-income married women decrease their incomes in response
to some exogenous shock could have been altered by the tax reform due to the fact
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that the tax reform changed the shape of their budget line (which could also alter their
potential labor supply choice). Therefore, this paper examines what happened to the
overall income distribution among married women without restricting the sample to
only those female workers who were directly affected by the tax reform.
Concerning tax reforms in other countries, there have been many studies that
examined the impact of tax reform on female labor supply. For example, Eissa and
Liebman (1996) examined the impact of the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA
86), which included an expansion of the earned income tax credit on female labor
supply. They used the difference-in-difference estimation to compare the change in
labor supply of single women with children with the change for single women without
children, and they found that the Tax Reform Act increased labor force participation
among single women with children. Furthermore, Blundell et al. (1998) examined the
impact of the tax reforms in the United Kingdom on labor supply during the 1980s by
comparing the labor supply responses over time for different groups defined by cohort
and education level. They found positive and moderately sized wage elasticities and
negative income effects for women with children.
Before moving to the detailed discussion of the 2004 tax reform, I will note impor-
tant characteristics in the Japanese tax system: First, married people in Japan file
separate tax returns. Second, capital income is taxed separately from labor income.
Therefore, in this paper, I will examine only labor income and the tax on it, and
the term “income” hereafter means only income from labor earnings, which excludes
income from assets. Third, there also exist complicated income exemption schedules
and policy-related customs that create kinks on the household budget line, making
it nonlinear. The most important factor to note about the Japanese tax system is
that 1.03 million yen (≈USD 10,300) has historically been a critical income threshold
for many married women as their husbands will lose the standard spousal exemption
once their annual income exceeds that threshold. Given that the income threshold for
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the standard spousal exemption in tax is 1.03 million yen, many firms set this amount
as the critical income threshold at which the spousal allowance vanishes. Thus, in
many cases, husbands will lose not only the standard spousal exemption but also the
employer-provided spousal allowances once their spouses’ annual (before-tax) income
exceeds 1.03 million yen. Furthermore, 1.03 million yen of annual earnings is the
point at which all employees begin to pay income tax. (Up to 1.03 million yen in
annual earnings, employees pay zero income tax because all employees are eligible for
the deduction of 1.03 million yen.) These facts give an incentive to many married
women to adjust their work hours so that annual incomes do not exceed 1.03 million
yen. As a result, there exists a mass point in the income distribution of married
women at incomes slightly lower than 1.03 million yen.
The theoretical model in this chapter first shows that the tax reform made the
kink at 1.03 million yen in the budget line more conspicuous than it had been before,
which produces the following testable implications: (1) the tax reform increases work
hours (and hence the incomes) for married women who earned 1.03 million yen or less
but has no impact on married women who originally earned more than 1.03 million
yen, when there is no change in exogenous parameters; (2) however, if an increase in
a husband’s income is considered, there are cases in which medium- to high-income
married women greatly decrease their incomes to 1.03 million yen; (3) even in this case,
the “tax reform effect” cannot be negative; (4) this “income jump” among medium-
to high-income married women can be explained mostly by a negative “husband’s
income effect”; and (5) in some cases, this “income jump” is mitigated by a small
positive “tax reform effect.”
These implications are tested using Japanese panel data from the Keio Household
Panel Survey (KHPS). The sample consists of 3,206 observations in the panel over
the period 2003-2006. In the empirical investigation, I first conduct a difference-in-
difference estimation within a framework of the quantile regressions. Both results
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from the conditional and unconditional quantile regressions show that the tax reform
increased incomes among married women who earned 1.03 million yen or less. If we
estimated the impact of the tax reform at the mean, we do not see any significant
impact, implying that it is important to estimate the impact of tax reform for each
quantile. These findings support the theoretical implications described above. In
contrast, the tax reform effects on married women at high quantiles in the income
distribution are insignificant. This is also consistent with a theoretical implication
that the tax reform has no impact on high-income married women in a setting in
which there is no change in exogenous parameters.4
Next, to introduce changes in exogenous variables, I employ a relatively new de-
composition technique proposed by Firpo et al. (2007, 2010), which enables us to
examine whether the “income jump” among medium- to high-income married women
actually occurred in response to an increase in husbands’ incomes after the tax re-
form. The idea in the Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux decomposition (hereafter “FFL”)
is to combine the DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux decomposition (hereafter “DFL”)
proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996) with Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to make it
possible to estimate the contribution of each covariate to the structure and compo-
sition effects when analyzing distributional change. This is made possible by using
the recentered influence function (hereafter “RIF”) of Y as the dependent variable.
In the first stage of the FFL, distributional changes in incomes are divided into a
distributional change due to changes in β, i.e., a structure effect, and a distributional
change due to changes in X, i.e., a composition effect, using a reweighting method
proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996). In the second stage, the two components are
further divided into the contribution of each explanatory variable using novel RIF re-
4Note that the settings of the difference-in-difference estimation corresponds to the case in which
there is no change in exogenous parameters, since the husband’s income and many other exogenous
variables are controlled for in the estimation and the coefficients of these explanatory variables,
except for the treatment dummy variable that estimates the impact of the tax reform, are also
assumed to be the same before and after the tax reform.
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gressions. These regressions estimate directly the impact of the explanatory variables
on the distributional statistic of interest.
The results from the FFL suggest that the tax reform contributed to increasing
incomes among the low-income married women. In contrast, the magnitude of the
composition effect attributable to husbands’ incomes is greatest among medium- to
high-income married women. This indicates the possibility that the “income jump”
among medium- to high-income married women in response to an increase in hus-
bands’ incomes actually occurred because this “income jump” can be explained by a
large negative “husband’s income effect.”
Lastly, utilizing the DFL decomposition method, I visually examine how the be-
havioral changes confirmed in the difference-in-difference estimation and the FFL
decomposition affected the overall income distribution. In this decomposition, we
reconfirm the results obtained from the FFL; low-income married women and high-
income married women gathered to the center of the distribution after the tax reform,
given the facts that low-income married wome increased work hours because of the tax
reform and that high-income married women decreased work hours in response to an
increase in their husbands’ incomes. Accordingly, the mass point at 1.03 million yen in
the income distribution became more conspicuous following the reform. Furthermore,
the DFL results also indicate that incomes would have decreased more in response to
the increase in husbands’ incomes if the tax reform had not occurred. These results
from the FFL and DFL decompositions support theoretical implications.
The interpretation suggested for this trend is as follows: Although the kink at
1.03 million yen in the budget line had originally been an attractive option for many
married women, due to the characteristics of the Japanese tax system, the tax reform
made this option more attractive than before. As a result, the kink at 1.03 million yen
in the budget line, which became more conspicuous after the tax reform, dragged even
medium- to high-income married women, who were not presumed to be affected by
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the tax reform, to the mass point when there was a negative shock in an exogenous
variable that could potentially discourage them from working long hours, i.e., an
increase in husbands’ incomes. Therefore, the increase in income among low-income
married women was offset by the decrease in income among medium- to high-income
married women, which resulted in the slight decrease in the average income among
married women.
However, we must not forget that the tax reform still mitigated the decrease in
incomes even when the “income jump” (i.e., the discontinuous income decrease from
1.41 million yen or more to 1.03 million yen among medium- to high-income married
women in response to the increase in their husbands’ incomes) occurred: the tax
reform contributed to reducing the dispersion in the income distribution, making the
mass point at 1.03 million yen in the income distribution more conspicuous than
before.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 describes the tax system in Japan,
and Section 2.3 gives some information about trends in the Japanese labor market
over the period 2003-2006. Section 2.4 sets forth a simple theoretical model and
theoretical implications. Section 2.5 describes a strategy to test the implications of
the theoretical model. Section 2.6 outlines a brief description of the data, and Section
2.7 discusses the results from the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 2.8 sets forth
the conclusions.
2.2 Tax System in Japan
In this section, general information about the Japanese tax system is provided.
First, married people file separate tax returns and two-earner couples are taxed as
separate individuals. For one-earner couples with several dependents, the head of
the household is treated as a single taxpayer. Second, income from assets is taxed
separately from earnings. Thus, the incomes analyzed in this paper refer only to
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income from labor earnings. Third, there are income exemption systems and policy-
related customs that could potentially discourage married women from working long
hours. In particular, 1.03 million yen (≈USD 10,300) has historically been a critical
income threshold for many married women, which is discussed in Section 2.2.3.
2.2.1 Income Tax and Residential Tax
Before moving on to the explanation of the spousal-exemption system in Japan,
I will first introduce the income tax and residential tax, both of which have spousal
exemption systems.
Income Tax
The income tax is a national tax, which is levied based on total earnings during
the year minus certain exemptions and deductions. More specifically, the income tax
is calculated as follows: {total earnings − employment income deduction (in Table
2.1.A) − basic deduction (of 0.38 million yen) − other deductions/exemptions (if
applicable)5} × tax rate (in Table 2.1.B) −deduction in Table 2.1.B−tax credit (if
applicable)6.
The amount of the employment income deduction can be formulated as aY + b,
where Y is the annual earnings, and its tax deduction schedule is listed in Table 2.1.A.7
5Other deductions/exemptions include the following: exemptions for spouse; exemption for de-
pendents; deduction for casualty losses; deduction for medical expenses; deduction for life insurance
premium; deduction for social insurance premium; deduction for fire and other casualty insurance
premium; deductions for small-scale business enterprise mutual aid premiums; exemptions for hand-
icapped person, widow, widower, or working student; exemption for aged person (abolished in 2005);
and deductions for donations.
6If any tax credit is applicable, we can subtract the tax credit(s) directly from the income tax.
The tax credits during the period 2003-2006 include tax credits for dividends; a foreign tax credit;
and a special credit for acquisition of dwelling house. In 2006, a special deduction for residence
seismic retrofitting was added to these tax credits (National Tax Agency, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006).
7If the employed workers have made the following specified expenses during the year and if the
total amount of the expenses exceeds the amount of the employment income deduction, the excess
amount can also be deducted from the total income: (1) commuting expenses, (2) moving expenses
upon job transfer, (3) study and training expenses, (4) expenses in acquiring qualifications, and (5)
home visiting expenses for workers living away from home.
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All employees are eligible for the employment income deduction of 0.65 million yen.
If the deduction amount calculated in Table 2.1.A is less than 0.65 million yen, it is
set at 0.65 million yen.
Furthermore, all workers in Japan are also eligible for the basic deduction of 0.38
million yen, and thus the total amount of deductions that can be applied to any
employed worker is calculated as the minimum employment income deduction of 0.65
million yen plus the basic deduction of 0.38 million yen. Due to this deduction sched-
ule, employees begin to pay income tax only after their annual earnings exceed 1.03
million yen.
Although I have focused on the discussion of employees due to the simplicity
of the corresponding tax calculation, workers other than employees, of course, pay
income tax. For these workers, the employment income deduction is replaced by the
necessary expenses. To consider both types of workers, tax-exemption schedules and
the limit of nontaxable income are usually defined by the amount of the total income,
which is calculated as the total earnings minus the employment income deduction for
employees and the total earnings minus necessary expenses for other workers. If we
use the measure of total income instead of the total earnings, the limit of nontaxable
income for the income tax is 0.38 million yen (=1.03 million yen − the minimum
employment income deduction of 0.65 million yen).
Residential Tax
In addition to the income tax, residents in Japan are required to pay “residen-
tial tax,” which consists of prefectural inhabitant tax and municipal inhabitant tax.
Japanese residents pay these taxes to the municipality of residence. The residential
taxes are divided into an income-based component and a uniform per-capita com-
ponent. The income-based component of the residential tax is levied based on the
previous year’s income, and its tax rate schedule is presented in Table 2.1.C. The
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taxable income is calculated in the same way as the income tax, but the amount of
the basic deduction for the residential tax is 0.33 million yen instead of 0.38 million
yen. While the limit of nontaxable income for the income tax was 0.38 million yen
of the total income, the limit of nontaxable income for the income-based component
residential tax is 0.35 million yen (which corresponds to 1 million yen of annual earn-
ings). Although the amount of the per-capita component varies among municipalities,
the standard amount is about 4,000 yen (≈USD 40) per year.8
2.2.2 Spousal Exemptions in Japan
Both the income tax and the residential tax in Japan have spousal exemptions.
Within each spousal exemption system, there are two types of spousal exemptions:
the standard spousal exemption and the special spousal exemption.
The head of the household is eligible for the special spousal exemption if his/her
own total income is 10 million yen or less per year and his/her spouse’s total income
is below certain thresholds.9 For the sake of simplicity, in this paper I will assume
that the head of household is a husband and the spouse is a wife.10
Table 2.2 shows the amount of spousal exemptions by the amount of spouse’s
annual earnings.11 The un-parenthesized numbers represent the income-tax spousal
exemptions and the parenthesized numbers represent the residential-tax spousal ex-
emptions. The standard spousal exemption of income tax is fixed at 0.38 million yen
8The limit of nontaxable income for the per-capita component also varies among municipalities.
9There is no rule about whether the husband or the wife should claim the spousal exemption,
but to be eligible for the exemption, the spouse’s earnings should be lower than the threshold (1.41
million yen≈14,100 USD). Thus, in most cases, the spouse who has the highest income claims the
spousal exemption, as this person is more likely to be eligible for the spousal exemption if he or she
does so.
10According to the Keio Household Panel Survey conducted between 2004 and 2007, 96 % of
married couples listed the husband as the head of the household for tax purposes.
11The schedule of the spousal exemption by “spouse’s annual earnings” is applicable only for
employees. The schedule applicable to all workers is defined by total income, not by the total
earnings, which is calculated as the total earnings minus the employment income deduction for
employees and the total earnings minus necessary expenses for other workers. For simplicity, here I
just present the schedule for employees.
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(≈USD 3,800) and ceases immediately if a wife’s earnings exceed 1.03 million yen
(≈USD 10,300). In contrast, the special spousal exemption declines gradually as the
wife’s earnings increase.
As illustrated in Table 2.2, the spousal exemption system for the residential tax is
almost the same as that for the income tax, except that in the case of the residential
tax, the starting amount of the spousal exemption is 0.33 million yen instead of 0.38
million yen.
Historically, the standard spousal exemption was established in 1961 to support
households that have full-time housewives by offering more spousal tax exemptions
to a husband whose wife worked less. However, because of the characteristic of the
standard spousal exemption that it ceases at a certain threshold of the wife’s income,
there was a problem, in that after-tax incomes of a household in which the wife earned
slightly above the threshold would be less than those of a household in which the wife
earned slightly less than the threshold. This created a “dip” at the threshold on the
household budget line.
To fix this “reversal” phenomenon in after-tax incomes around the threshold, the
special spousal exemption was introduced in the late 1980s. As a result, the dip
on the household budget line that was caused by the standard spousal exemption
was removed (Abe and Otake, 1995). However, the dip on the household budget
line at the threshold, currently at 1.03 million yen, actually still exists because most
firms set the income threshold for losing spousal allowances at 1.03 million yen. This
point will be discussed in Section 2.2.3. Note that both the standard and special
spousal exemptions have characteristics that could potentially discourage married
women from working long hours. This aspect of the spousal exemption system has
been under a criticism for a long time, and the criticism has escalated together with
the trend of an increase in the female labor participation rate.
As a result, at the end of March 2003, the Japanese Diet passed legislation to abol-
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ish part of the spousal exemption for taxpayers whose spouses had annual earnings
of 1.03 million yen or less (≈USD 10,300). This legislation took effect in the 2004 tax
year. (There was no change in the standard spousal exemption.) In the tax reform
of 2004, the upper block of the special spousal exemption schedule in Table 2.2 was
abolished. This abolition of part of the special spousal exemptions took effect from
the 2004 fiscal year for the income tax and from the 2005 fiscal year for the residential
tax, respectively.
2.2.3 Factors that Could Potentially Induce Labor Supply Adjustment
In Japan, there are several income- and work-hour thresholds at which people
lose/gain some benefits, such as tax-waivers, exemptions, and allowances etc. These
income- and work-hour thresholds potentially create incentives for people to adjust
their incomes or work hours to just below or above the thresholds. In this section, I
will review the major factors that could potentially cause people to adjust their labor
supply and demonstrate how these factors affect income distribution.
A. Limit of Nontaxable Income
As was confirmed in Section 2.2.1, all employees in Japan begin to pay income tax
only after their annual earnings exceed 1.03 million yen. This implies the possibility
that some employees adjust their work hours so that their annual earnings do not
exceed 1.03 million yen.12
12Although the limit of nontaxable income for the residential tax (i.e., 1 million yen) could also
induce labor supply adjustment, the amount of the residential tax is smaller than that of income
tax due to its smaller tax rate, and hence, if people mind a limit of nontaxable income, that for the
income tax, in general, matters more. Thus, the case in which people adjust labor supply to avoid
residential tax payments is considered to be a minor case, and hence it is included in the “F.Other”
category, rather than in Factor A.
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B. Spousal Exemption
As was confirmed in Section 2.2.2, husbands lose the standard spousal exemption
once their spouses’ annual earnings exceed 1.03 million yen. Additionally, since the
tax reform, 1.03 million yen has been the point at which the total spousal exemption
amounts start to decrease as spouses’ incomes increase.
C. Social Security Payments
The following three categories comprise the social security system in Japan:
Category I: Self-employed persons, farmers, etc., age 20 or over but under 60.
Category II: Private company employees and public officers.
Category III: Dependent spouses of private company employees and public of-
ficers.
C-1. Choice Between Category I and III (Threshold: 1.3 Million Yen
Ceiling)
Wives whose annual income is less than 1.3 million yen are classified into Category
III and are treated as their husbands’ dependents; they do not need to make payments
for their own pension and health insurance. However, if their annual income equals or
exceeds 1.3 million yen, then they will shift to Category I, in which they are required
to pay for the national pension and the national health insurance.
The national pension as of 2003 is a lump-sum tax of 13,300 yen per month. The
calculation of the national health insurance varies among municipalities. When the
calculation method using the former corrected income system (Type 4) is assumed,
the national health insurance is composed of an income-based component, a house-
hold property-based component, an insurance receiver per-capita component, and a
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household per-capita component. According to the Survey on National Health Insur-
ance 2003 (Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, Government of Japan, 2003b),
as of 2003 the average premium rate of the income-based component, the house-
hold property-based component, the insurance receiver per-capita component, and
the household per-capita component are 9.151 %, 9,989 yen, 24,762 yen, and 20,083
yen, respectively.
C-2. Choice Between Category II and the Other Two Categories (Thresh-
old: 3/4 of Regular Employee’s Work Hours)
In contrast, if one’s work hours exceed 3/4 of a regular employee’s work hours,
that worker is classified into Category II, in which people are required to enroll for
the employees’ pension- and health-insurance systems (Welfare Pension and Health
Insurance). The amounts of these premiums are proportional to their earnings and
halved between employers and employees. As of 2003, the premium rates only for
employees are 6.79% for welfare pension and 4.1% for health insurance. There might
be a case that some employers limit employees’ hours to avoid the enrollment in these
employees’ pension and health insurance systems. These cases are included in the
“F.Other” category, rather than in Factor C−2.
D. Employer-Provided Spousal Allowances
According to a survey conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Office in 2001, the
fraction of firms that have a family allowance system is 83.5 % on average, and
91.5 % among large firms with 1000 or more employees. The rule for the eligibil-
ity of employer-provided spousal allowances differs among employers: 61.5 % of firms
that offer family allowances determine the eligibility for spousal allowances based on
spouses’ incomes.13 Among these firms, 78.4 % of firms set 1.03 million yen as the
13The way employers know how much their employees’ wives earned depends on the individual
rules of particular companies. In many cases, each employee reports his wife’s expected annual
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critical income threshold at which spousal allowance vanishes because it is the income
threshold for the standard spousal exemption in tax. 13.9 % of firms set the income
threshold at that for the social security payment, i.e., 1.3 million yen.14 The average
amount of spousal allowances per month is 14,500 yen (≈USD 145) (Cabinet Office,
Government of Japan, 2001), and it is known that this spousal allowance is also a
factor that could potentially make a spike at 1.03 million yen in a wife’s earning
distribution (Takahashi et al., 2009).
E. Employment Insurance Premium
The employment insurance system regulates that all workers who work for 20
hours or more per week and are expected to stay employed for more than a certain
length of time are covered by the employment insurance.15
F. Other
The remaining reasons include the following:
(a) To avoid enrollment in the employment insurance or welfare pension system due
to reasons originating within the firm
(b) To avoid the reduction in the pension amount currently provided
(c) Other
income for the year during the month of March since a fiscal year starts on April 1 in Japan. If the
amount that the wife has actually earned by December is significantly different from the estimate
provided in March, the employee has to return the spousal allowance that he has received. When
the wife’s annual income unexpectedly exceeds 1.03 million yen by only a slight margin, in many
cases, the employee is not required to return the spousal allowance.
145.8% of firms have different income thresholds and the remaining 1.9% offered no answer to the
question.
15The expected length of employment regulated in the conditions has been revised several times.
The minimum length was set at one year prior to 2009 and changed to six months in 2009. In 2010,
it was further revised to 31 days.
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Figure 2.1 summarizes these income/work-hour thresholds and the amount of each
payment as of 2003. The Y -axis represents the amount of wives’ annual earnings and
the X-axis represents weekly work hours. If they choose to earn 1.03 million yen or
less, their income tax becomes zero, and they also become eligible for the standard
spousal exemption and employer-provided spousal allowances, although the criteria
for spousal allowances differ among firms. Furthermore, they can choose among the
three categories of the social security system by adjusting their incomes to below
or above 1.3 million yen and their work hours to below or above 3/4 of a regular
employee’s work hours.
Figure 2.2 reports how each factor (A∼F ) affected labor supply of female workers
in 2006. The data is obtained from the General Survey on Part-time Workers 2006
(Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, Government of Japan, 2006). The sample
is restricted to female part-time workers who answered that they adjusted their labor
supply during the previous year. The height of each bin represents the percentage
of those who answered each factor (A∼F ) affected their decisions of labor supply
adjustment. According to Figure 2.2, the limit of nontaxable income (1.03 million
yen) is the most influential factor affecting the labor supply because this is applicable
to both single and married women. The spousal exemption schedule is the second
most influential factor. Considering that the standard spousal exemption vanishes at
1.03 million yen and that the majority of firms set the income threshold for losing
spousal allowances at that amount, in most cases it can be said that, in addition to
Factor A, Factor B and Factor D also refer to the 1.03 million yen ceiling. From this
evidence, we understand that 1.03 million yen serves as a critical income threshold
for many female workers.
Figure 2.3 presents a histogram of 2003 income distribution of married women.
The sample comprises married women in the Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS).
In Figure 2.3, there is a conspicuous spike at around 1 million yen, just below the
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1.03 million yen threshold.16 This reflects the fact confirmed in Figure 2.2 that there
are many women who adjust their labor supply so that their annual incomes do not
exceed 1.03 million yen. Furthermore, since this is the income distribution prior to
the tax reform, there is another spike at the old kink in the household budget line,
i.e., 0.7 million yen. This point will be discussed in Section 2.4. Throughout this
paper, I will examine what happened to married women originally at the spike of 0.7
million yen after the tax reform.
In addition to these two spikes, there is also a spike, albeit somewhat smaller,
at just below 1.3 million yen (Abe and Otake, 1995; Oishi, 2003). This is because
married women have to make a social security payment by themselves once their
income exceeds 1.3 million yen (i.e., Factor C-1). Thus, 1.3 million yen also serves
as a threshold of annual income in Japan, and this will also be considered in Section
2.4.
2.3 Evidence
In this section, I will review the overall trend of the Japanese labor market from
2003 to 2006 and I will confirm how the statistics changed after the tax reform.
2.3.1 Data
The data set used in this study is Japanese panel data from Keio Household Panel
Survey (KHPS) 2004-2007. The KHPS data are relatively new as the data collection
for the survey began in 2004. This survey is conducted on January 31 every year
and includes observations randomly chosen from almost all regions and industries in
Japan. A key feature of KHPS is that it is the first nationwide longitudinal survey in
Japan of individuals (4,000 households and 7,000 people) of all ages and both sexes,
16There are many studies that point out a considerable cluster of observations near this amount
(Abe and Otake, 1995; Kantani, 1997; Higuchi, 1995; Takahashi, 2010a,b).
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which also captures information regarding education, employment, income, expenses,
health, and family structure. The survey has been designed to enable comparisons
with major international panel surveys such as Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) and European Community Household Panel (ECHP).
Since the survey asks about information concerning the previous year, information
prior to the tax reform can be obtained from the 2004 survey. For example, annual
incomes in the previous year are reported in this survey, and this information is used
as incomes workers had originally earned before the tax reform.17 However, only
a question about the average work hours per week does not specify if it is asking
about work hours in the previous year. That question simply asks: “How long do
you work per week on average?” The survey is held every January and, thus, there
is a possibility that some respondents provided information about their average work
hours during January of the year in which the survey was held, instead of their work
hours from the previous year. The concern regarding this possibility would be that
work hours provided by respondents in the 2004 survey have already been affected
by the tax reform. To circumvent this problem, the main focus of this paper is the
analyses of annual incomes.
2.3.2 Japanese Labor Market Trends: 2003-2006
As stated in the previous section, there is a concern about using work hours
reported in the January 2004 survey as the information prior to the tax reform. How-
ever, even if respondents have already started to adjust their work hours in January
2004, the average work hours in January 2004 should also include information about
their 2003 work hours because it is unlikely that an individual’s work hours greatly
17As is the case with the US Current Population Survey, the Keio Household Panel Survey collects
information on the previous year’s income approximately one month before income taxes are due.
Thus, on the date the survey was conducted, it could be thought that most people had already
calculated (or at least roughly understood) their annual income in order to be ready to submit their
tax documents. Therefore, this paper proceeds assuming that the misreporting of incomes is not a
serious issue.
22
change beginning on January 1.18 For this reason, in this section that reviews the
trend of the Japanese labor market during the period 2003-2006, I use the information
about work hours provided in January 2004 as being reflective of the respondent’s
work hours prior to the tax reform.
During the period 2003-2006, Japan was recovering from a recession that started
in the late 1990s. Table 2.3.A summarizes trends of the Japanese labor market during
this period. The unemployment rate decreased significantly from 5.3% to 4.1%. The
other statistics are calculated from the Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS) 2004-
2007. The sample is 2,896 women who participated in the Keio Household Panel
Survey (KHPS) who reported information for both periods: before and after the
2004 tax reform. (The statistics from the period after the tax reform are calculated
as the average among the three years immediately following the tax reform.) Thus,
the differences in each of the statistics presented in the last column represent the
person-specific variation of each of the statistics, which is free from the change in the
composition of the sample. For example, each married women decreased weekly work
hours by 1.69 on average over the periods.
As was discussed in Section 2.2.2, spousal exemptions were initially designed to
support the nuclear family, in which full-time housewives specialized in domestic work
and childbearing by offering more spousal tax exemptions for a husband whose wife
worked less. Because this system has characteristics that could discourage married
women from working long hours, it was expected that the married women’s labor
supply would increase after abolishing part of the special spousal exemption.
However, both average annual income and average work hours slightly decreased
among married women after the tax reform, although this trend is not observed for
18Even if they try to adjust their work hours so that their annual income does not exceed a certain
threshold, it is unlikely that people start to adjust their work hours from the very beginning of each
year to control their annual income; rather, it is more natural to think that people start to adjust
their labor supply in the last half of the year based on the amount they have earned by that point
in time.
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single women; thus, we cannot see any evidence of increased income and work hours
among married women. During this period, there was little change in the average
hourly wage rate for both married women and single women. In contrast, husbands’
incomes increased during the same period, and the change is significantly different
from zero.19 Since this increase in husbands’ incomes could be one reason for the
decrease in wives’ work hours, it is worth checking the possibility that this change
in husbands’ incomes concealed the positive impact of the tax reform on wives’ work
hours.
2.3.3 The Effect of the Husband’s Income Increase vs. the Effect of the
Spousal-Exemption Cut
In this section, I will compare the magnitude of the effect of the increase in
the husbands’ incomes with the effect of the spousal-exemption cut, using a simple
calculation. The increase in husbands’ annual before-tax earnings is about 0.13 million
yen (≈USD 1,300), and for those with a husband whose marginal tax rate is 20 %,
the effect of the increase in husbands’ incomes on household income would be 0.104
million yen (≈USD 1,040) after tax.
Table 2.3.B summarizes the changes in the total amount of spousal exemptions
for both income tax and residential tax. The sample consists of 2,135 married women
from the Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS) whose husbands’ spousal exemption
amount was greater than zero in 2003. The amount is calculated based on their 2003
annual income. The amount of spousal exemption after the tax reform is a simulated
19During the period from 2003 to 2006, husbands’ annual incomes increased, while their work
hours stayed almost the same. Because their hourly wage rate also increased during the same
period, it is natural to assume that the increase in husbands’ annual incomes was caused by the
exogenous shock to their hourly wage in response to the recovering market conditions. In contrast,
the increase in wives’ hourly wage was very small: 1.6%. This difference between males and females
might reflect the fact that most hourly paid female workers are paid the minimum wage or slightly
above the minimum wage. Thus, the market’s recovery may not have been fully reflected in the
hourly wages of female workers. Although the increase in hourly wage rates among female workers
was small enough to be negligible, I also conducted theoretical and empirical analyses that allow for
fluctuations in hourly wages, which did not change the main results.
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amount of spousal exemption each woman would receive when her earnings did not
change over the period. Thus, the difference of the spousal exemption between the
periods reflects only the impact of the tax reform. The average loss of the total spousal
exemption for income tax is 0.27 million yen (≈USD 2,700), and hence the effect of the
spousal exemption cut on household income is 20 %×0.27 million yen=0.054 million
yen (≈USD 540) on average and 0.076 million yen (≈USD 760) maximum. If we
consider the spousal exemption for residential tax, the average loss of the spousal
exemption is 0.24 million yen (≈USD 2,400) on average and 0.33 million yen (≈USD
3,300) maximum. The tax rate for the residential tax applicable to the average
amount of the husband’s income is 10 %. Thus, the effect of the reduction in the
spousal exemption of the residential tax on household income is 10 %×0.24 million
yen=0.024 million yen (≈USD 240) on average and 0.033 million yen (≈USD 330)
maximum. Combining the effects for income tax and residential tax, the total effect
of the spousal exemption cut amounts to 0.078 million yen (≈USD 780) on average
and 0.109 million yen (≈USD 1,090) maximum.
Therefore, if we compare the effect of the spousal exemption cut and the effect of
an increase in husbands’ incomes, we notice that they almost offset each other. This
simple calculation implies that looking only at the average income and work hours
without controlling for the increase in the husbands’ incomes might result in missing
the increase in labor supply due to the tax reform, because the husbands’ income
effects might offset the tax reform effect.
In this paper, I will look more closely at what happened to the overall income




In this section, I will consider a utility maximization problem of a wife who chooses
the optimal combination of leisure and consumption given her husband’s income, and
I will simulate how the change in the spousal exemption system affects the wife’s
income choice.
2.4.1 The Tax Reform’s Effect on the Optimal Income
It is assumed that a wife chooses work hours that maximize her utility taking her
husband’s income as given.2021 The employment income deduction can be formulated
as: aY + b, where Y is annual income. Let w be a wife’s hourly wage, h be a wife’s
work hours, tW be a wife’s income tax rate, and tH be a husband’s income tax rate.
Then total household income, IHH , can be written as:
IHH = wh−max{0, [wh−(awh+ b)−0.38]tW}+ IH − (IH −D − SE(h))tH (2.1)
where IH represents the husband’s annual income, and D represents income deduc-
tions that the husband can claim, other than the spousal exemption. SE is the
20In the literature on female labor supply, it has been common to assume that the husband’s
decision is predetermined or exogenous (Mincer, 1962; Killingsworth, 1983; Hyslop, 1999; Takahashi
et al., 2009; Apps et al., 2012). In contrast, many recent studies analyzing households’ decisions
consider collective models that treat a family as a collection of agents with specific preferences
(Chiappori (1988) and Chiappori (1992) etc.). However, Donni and Moreau (2007) emphasize that
in most developed countries, the male labor supply is rigid and largely determined by exogenous
constraints and that in this case, use of the collective model could be misleading. This is the
case for the Japanese labor market as well: it is known that the male labor supply in Japan has
historically been much more inelastic than the female labor supply. Kuroda and Yamamoto (2008),
who estimated Frisch labor supply elasticity by gender, found that elasticity was 0.7 for males and
1.3 to 1.5 for females during the period from 1992 to 2002. Reflecting this fact, it is still common to
assume the husband’s exogenous labor supply in the context of a model of the female labor supply
in Japan (Takahashi et al., 2009). Thus, in this paper, I assume that imposing the assumption of
the husband’s exogenous labor supply is not a serious issue for consideration.
21The unilateral influence on labor decision (from a husband to a wife) is less likely to be true in
more modernized double-income couples in which the wife also earns a high income. However, in
this paper, wives of interest are those with low incomes because they were the group affected by the
tax reform; these women are more likely to belong to traditional households in which the husband
is the main earner and the wife is the second earner. It is thought that in these households, the
assumption above is likely to be true.
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amount of spousal exemption. Note that the wife’s choice of work hours will affect
the amount of the spousal exemption; therefore, SE can be written as a function of
a wife’s work hours, h. In Equation (2.1), the household income is calculated as the
summation of a wife’s annual after-tax income (=a wife’s annual earnings − income
tax (if applicable)) and a husband’s after-tax income (=a husband’s annual earnings
− income tax). The term (awh + b) represents the employment income deduction,
and 0.38 represents the amount of the basic deduction (million yen/ year). Since all
employees are eligible for the basic deduction of 0.38 million yen and the employment
income deduction of 0.65 million yen, the income tax becomes greater than zero when
annual earnings exceed 1.03 million yen. In Equation (2.1), it is assumed that the
tax credit is zero.2223
According to Table 2.2, the spousal exemption (SE) can be calculated as:
• Before the Tax Reform (∼2003)
SE =

0.76 for 0 ≤ wh < 0.7
1.41− wh for 0.7 ≤ wh ≤ 1.03
1.41− wh for 1.03 < wh < 1.41
0 for 1.41 ≤ wh
(2.2)
• After the Tax Reform (2004∼)
SE =

0.38 for 0 ≤ wh < 0.7
0.38 for 0.7 ≤ wh ≤ 1.03
1.41− wh for 1.03 < wh < 1.41
0 for 1.41 ≤ wh
(2.3)
22Since there is no tax credit that depends on the wife’s work hours, this assumption does not
change the result.
23Although residential tax, spousal allowances, and social security payments are not included in
Equation (2.1), these will be considered in simulations performed in the latter part of this section.
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where wh is the wife’s annual income, and the unit is million yen (≈USD 10,000).24
Substituting Equations (2.2) and (2.3) into Equation (2.1), household income before
and after the tax reform can be calculated as:
• Household Income Before the Tax Reform (∼2003)
=

wh+0.76 tH+IH(1−tH)+DtH for 0 ≤wh<0.7
w(1−tH)h+1.41 tH+IH(1−tH)+DtH for 0.7 ≤wh≤1.03
w[1−(1−a)tW−tH ]h+(0.38+b)tW+1.41tH+IH(1−tH)+DtH for 1.03<wh<1.41
w[1−(1−a)tW ]h+(0.38+b)tW+IH(1−tH)+DtH for 1.41≤wh
• Household Income After the Tax Reform (2004∼)
=

wh+0.38 tH+IH(1−tH)+DtH for 0 ≤wh<0.7
wh+0.38 tH+IH(1−tH)+DtH for 0.7 ≤wh≤1.03
w[1−(1−a)tW−tH ]h+(0.38+b)tW+1.41tH+IH(1−tH)+DtH for 1.03<wh<1.41
w[1−(1−a)tW ]h+(0.38+b)tW+IH(1−tH)+DtH for 1.41≤ wh
Figure 2.4a illustrates the household budget lines before and after the 2004 tax
reform. Since the income tax becomes greater than zero at annual earnings of 1.03
million yen, this creates a kink at 1.03 million yen in both of the budget lines. Com-
paring the two budget lines, we can clearly see the impact of the tax reform on the
household budget line. Since wives who had a net annual income of 1.03 million yen
or less lost the special spousal exemption after the tax reform, the intercept of the
budget line for these people shifted down. Furthermore, since the special spousal
exemption, where the amount had been reduced in stepwise fashion as the spouse’s
income rose before the tax reform, was abolished for those who earned between 0.7
24Here, I adopt the model structure assumed in Takahashi et al. (2009), that examines the effect
of the spousal exemption itself (on the female labor supply), not the effect of the reform in the
spousal exemption system. Thus, in Takahashi et al. (2009), only the household budget line prior
to the tax reform is considered, while in this paper, both household budget lines before and after
the tax reform are considered.
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and 1.03 million yen in 2004, the budget line for this income group became steeper
after the tax reform. This moved the kink in the household budget lines, caused by
the spousal exemption system, from 0.7 million yen to 1.03 million. As a result, the
kink at 1.03 million yen that had originally existed due to the limit of nontaxable
income became more conspicuous after the tax reform.
To consider a more realistic budget line, in Figure 2.4b I also include a social
security payment and spousal allowance. In Figure 2.4b, the dip at income equal to
1.03 million yen is caused by the loss of spousal allowance that the husband receives
from his employer at this point. Furthermore, married women have to make a social
security payment once their income exceeds 1.3 million yen, which creates a dip at
income equal to 1.3 million yen.25
Next, I will confirm the impact of the tax reform on labor supply for each income
group.
Proposition 2.1
Without a change in exogenous variables, such as husbands’ incomes and the price of
goods, the tax reform has no impact on those who originally earned more than 1.03
million yen but increases work hours for married women who originally earned 1.03
million yen or less.
Proof
Figure 2.5a depicts the impact of the tax reform on the labor supply of married
women who earn 1.03 million yen or less annually, in the setting in which there is no
change in the exogenous variables. If leisure is a normal good, married women who
annually earned less than 0.7 million yen prior to 2004 work more after the tax reform
because of the positive income effect (i.e., people at point A will move to point B
after the tax reform in Figure 2.5a). Married women who annually earned between
0.7 and 1.03 million yen prior to 2004 work more after the tax reform because of
25The details about these dips are discussed in Section 2.2.3.
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the positive substitution effect (movement from point C to point D) and the positive
income effect (movement from point D to point E).
In contrast, as Figure 2.5b shows, for married women who earn more than 1.03
million yen annually, there is no change in their household budget line after the tax
reform. Thus, the tax reform does not affect labor supply of these women. Q.E.D.
In Proposition 2.1, it is assumed there is no change in exogenous variables. How-
ever, Table 2.3.A confirmed that married women experienced an increase in their
husbands’ incomes as well as the tax reform during the period 2003-2006. If such a
change in an exogenous variable is considered, there might be a case in which the tax
reform affects the labor supply of married women who earned more than 1.03 million
yen before the tax reform. The next proposition states what could potentially happen
to the labor supply of married women who were not presumed to be affected by the
tax reform when they experience an increase in their husbands’ income as well as the
tax reform.
Proposition 2.2
(a) After the tax reform, when an increase in a husband’s income is considered,
there are cases in which married women who earned 1.41 million yen or more
greatly decrease their work hours to earn only 1.03 million yen.
(b) These cases can be realized only when the increase in a husband’s income is
sufficiently large and a wife’s preference for consumption (or a household’s pref-
erence for the wife’s consumption) is not “too strong.”
Proof of (a)
Figure 2.6a explains Proposition 2.2a graphically. The increase in a husband’s income
makes households richer and shifts household budget lines to the right.26 As long as
26At the same time, the husband’s marginal tax rate might also increase for some households that
experience an income increase. This will make the budget line flatter for the wives, whose annual
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leisure is a normal good, a wife decreases the number of work hours when the hus-
band’s income increases. Given an increase in a husband’s income, wife A −originally
at point A− will decrease the number of work hours to point A′ by the income effect.
In contrast, wife B −originally at point B− will jump to point B′ if her husband’s
income increases after the tax reform. When comparing these two wives, wife A has
the stronger preference for consumption (i.e., her indifference curve is flatter at each
value of leisure than wife B’s curve).27
I will confirm that the case illustrated in Figure 2.6a is possible by simulating the
wives’ optimal income choices with the following four representative utility functions:
1. Cobb-Douglas u(c, l) = cαl(1−α) 0 < α < 1
2. CES u(c, l) = {αcρ + (1− α)lρ}1/ρ ρ 6= 0, ρ < 1, 0 < α < 1




1−γ , γ > 0
4. Stone-Geary u(c, l) = γ ln(c− A) + (1− γ) ln(l −B) c > A, l > B
I calculated the optimal income for attaining the highest utility for 100 different
parameter values for each functional specification.28 To simulate what happens to
the optimal income when a husband’s income increases, the husband’s income in the
simulation increases from 5.2 million yen to 5.4 million yen, which are the average
amounts of husband’s income of each period. The hourly wage and the price of goods
incomes are between 1.03 million yen and 1.41 million yen, making the kink at 1.03 million yen in
the budget line more conspicuous. Thus, it is more likely that the “income jump” in Proposition
2.2 will be observed when we also consider a change in the husband’s tax rate.
27Here, a wife’s preference for consumption is considered, since it is assumed that a wife solves
her utility maximization problem by taking her husband’s income as given. However, considering
this as the household’s preference for the wife’s consumption will not change the result, i.e., even in
the case that the way a wife works reflects her husband’s preference about this matter as well, the
result will not change.
28α used in the Cobb-Douglas and Power function (CRRA) functions, and γ in the Stone-Geary
function are uniformly spaced on [0.1]. For the CES function, α is fixed at 0.5, and ρ is uniformly
spaced on [-0.5, 0.5] (a case with ρ=0 was omitted). 1.95 million yen and 1 are used for the subsistence
levels of consumption and leisure, respectively in the Stone-Geary. 1.95 million yen was the amount
of livelihood assistance for a standard household consisting of three members living in Tokyo as of
2003.
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are fixed at 1,000 yen and 100 yen, respectively. In the calculation, social security
payments, which include decision making among the three categories of the social se-
curity system, residential tax, employer-provided spousal allowance, and employment
insurance premium, are also considered. Concerning these payments/allowances, the
amounts specified in Figure 2.1 are assumed. Table 2.4.A presents the percentages
of the 100 simulated optimal incomes that belong to each income group before and
after the tax reform. For example, when using a Cobb-Douglas utility function, a
wife choose to earn 1.41 million yen or more before the tax reform and 1.03 million
yen after the tax reform in one out of a 100 cases.
According to Table 2.4.A, the majority of the income changes for the highest
income group are made within the group (i.e., changes from point A to point A′ in
Figure 2.6a). However, for all of the utility functions, we can observe a case in which
women who earned 1.41 million yen or more before the tax reform will decrease their
income to 1.03 million yen after the tax reform (i.e., the changes from point B to
point B′ in Figure 2.6a). Q.E.D.
Proof of (b)
Table 2.4.B reports the probability that married women in the highest income group
will decrease their incomes to 1.03 million yen after the tax reform, conditional on
having been in the highest income group prior to the tax reform. Thus, the number of
parameter values with which the “income jump” occurs is divided by the total number
of parameter values that attain annual incomes of 1.41 million yen or more, prior to
the tax reform. For example, as in the Cobb-Douglas case, when there is an increase
in the husband’s income of 0.2 million yen, the probability of the “income jump”
among high-income married women is calculated as 1/(1+40) using the numbers in
Table 2.4.A. This calculation is useful in predicting how often the “income jump”
occurs among people who originally earned 1.41 million yen or more prior to the tax
reform. This is because, in the actual data, there are people who already earned 1.41
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million yen or more prior to the tax reform, and the numbers presented in Table 2.4.B
predict how the incomes of these people were affected by the tax reform.
As can be confirmed in Table 2.4.B, the greater the husband’s income increase,
the higher the probability of the “income jump” becomes. When the increase in a
husband’s annual income is only 0.1 million yen (≈USD 1000), the “income jump”
will never occur for almost all of the utility functions, but if the increase in a hus-
band’s income is greater than 0.1 million yen, the “income jump” occurs at a positive
probability for all of the utility functions. Thus, we can say that the “income jump”
stated in Proposition 2.2a can be realized only when the increase in a husband’s
income is sufficiently large.
Next, I will show that these cases are possible only when the preference for con-
sumption is not “too strong.” Figure 2.6b shows how wives’ optimal incomes will
change if the tax reform occurs and their husbands’ incomes increase. To make the
result as obvious as possible, Figure 2.6b reports the results with a sufficiently large
increase in husbands’ incomes, i.e., increase of 2 million yen. Except for a husband’s
income after the tax reform, all parameters are set at the same as those in Table
2.4.A. The dots in Figure 2.6b show the amount of optimal income that attains the
highest utility for each value of α (i.e., the preference for consumption) when we use
a Cobb-Douglas utility function. It is obvious that the higher the parameter value, α,
the higher are the incomes that people choose. In Figure 2.6b, only individuals with
α of 0.6 or higher earned 1.41 million yen or more before the tax reform. Thus, for an
individual to be in the high income group originally, her preference for consumption
has to be sufficiently strong.
Comparing optimal incomes before the tax reform with optimal incomes after the
reform, we notice that individuals with α of 0.6-0.65, who originally earned 1.41 mil-
lion yen or more a year, decrease their annual incomes to 1.03 million yen after the
tax reform. These individuals correspond to “wife B” in Figure 2.6a. Thus, it can
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be said that there exists a region in the domain of α in which the “income jump”
occurs. In contrast, if the preference for consumption is “too strong” (with α more
than 0.65), the decrease in income is small enough that the income changes for the
high-income group are made within the group (i.e., changes from point A to point A′
in Figure 2.6a). Thus, it can be said that the “income jump” is possible only when
their preference for consumption is sufficiently strong, but not “too strong.” Q.E.D.
Proposition 2.2b provides an important implication about the levels of income and
the impact of the tax reform. For a wife to be originally in the high-income group,
her preference for consumption should be sufficiently strong, but if it is too strong,
the decrease in income is small enough that the income changes are made within the
group.
Individuals with very strong preferences for consumption are those who originally
earn extremely high incomes (e.g., more than 10 million yen per year), and they are
less likely to decrease their incomes to 1.03 million yen, even in response to an increase
in their husbands’ incomes and the tax reform. In this sense, we can say that the
“income jump” is not true for those who earned extremely high incomes but is likely
to be true for medium- to high-income married women.
In the next proposition, I will decompose the jump from 1.41 million yen or more
to 1.03 million into a “husband’s income effect” and the “tax reform effect.”
Proposition 2.3
After the tax reform, when an increase in a husband’s income is considered,
(a) the “income jump” in Proposition 2.2 is explained mainly by a large negative
“husband’s income effect”;
(b) there are cases in which a decrease in the wife’s income due to an increase in
the husband’s income is mitigated by a small positive “tax reform effect”; and
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(c) there is no case in which the tax reform would have caused a further decrease
in the wife’s work hours. In other words, the “tax reform effect” cannot be
negative.
Proof
Figure 2.7a illustrates a “husband’s income effect” and a “tax reform effect.” The
long-dashed line represents the counterfactual budget line without the tax reform in
2004. In Figure 2.7a, a wife would have decreased her income from 1.41 million yen
or more at point B, to 0.7 million yen at point C, if there had not been a tax reform
in 2004. This movement from point B to point C can be thought of as a “husband’s
income effect,” because this change was caused only by an increase in a husband’s
income. However, the tax reform actually occurred and not the long dashed budget
line, but the bold budget line was realized in 2004. Thus, a wife that should have
moved to point C will move to point B′ when the tax reform occurs, since point C is
no longer available. This movement from point C to point B′ can be thought of as
a “tax reform effect.” Thus, a movement from point B to point B′ is explained by
a large negative “husband’s income effect” and a small positive “tax reform effect.”
This “small positive tax reform effect” means that the decrease in income among
medium- to high-income married women that occurs in response to an increase in the
husbands’ income is slightly mitigated by the tax reform.
Again, this will be confirmed using a simulation on the wives’ optimal income
choices with the four representative utility functions. In Table 2.4.C, the parenthe-
sized numbers represent the “counterfactual” realizations of the optimal income (i.e.,
the percentages of the 100 simulated optimal incomes where the tax reform had not
occurred in 2004). The settings are the same as those represented in Figure 2.6b. Ac-
cording to the result of the Cobb-Douglas utility function, in six cases out of 100, a
wife who earned 1.41 million yen or more before the tax reform decreased her income
to 1.03 million yen after the tax reform. In contrast, the counterfactual realizations of
35
optimal income show that all six of these cases would have appeared in the category of
“income jump” from 1.41 million yen or more to between 0.7-1.03 million yen without
the tax reform; in other words, if the income earned by a married woman decreased
from 1.41 million yen or more to 1.03 million yen after the tax reform, without the
tax reform, her income would have decreased even further to 0.7 million yen, i.e., the
kink that existed prior to the tax reform. We can observe similar results for the other
preferences.29
Given these results, we would be inclined to conclude that the effect of the tax
reform is always positive in any case; however, when we consider a small increase in a
husband’s income, there are also cases in which a negative “husband’s income effect”
is the only explanation for the “income jump,” i.e., cases in which the “tax reform
effect” is zero. In Table 2.4.C, although a sufficiently large increase in a husband’s
income of 2 million yen is considered, if the increase in a husband’s income is as small
as what is shown in Table 2.4.A, there are also cases in which the tax reform effect
is zero, i.e., cases in which the counterfactual realizations appear in the same cell as
the actual realizations.
However, we can at least say that the tax reform cannot be negative in any case.
This will be confirmed using Figure 2.7b. Since both B′ and C in Figure 2.7b are
available on both the “after-reform” and counterfactual budget lines, a wife who
29Note that the kink at 1.03 million yen in the household budget line is more conspicuous when
we assume a higher hourly wage rate. That kink is caused by the difference in the slopes of the
budget line between the regions of 0.7-1.03 million yen and 1.03-1.41 million yen, and the difference
of the slopes, w{(1− a)tW − tH}, becomes greater as the hourly wage rate, w, increases. Thus, the
“income jump” (i.e., the discontinuous income decrease from 1.41 million yen or more to 1.03 million
yen among medium- to high-income married women in response to the increase in their husbands’
incomes) is more likely when we assume a higher hourly wage rate. In the current simulation, a
rounded version of the average hourly wage rate among hourly-paid married women (1000 yen) is
used for simplicity. However, even when we assume the actual average hourly wage rate (881 yen)
of hourly-paid workers, the number of cases in which the “income jump” from 1.41 million yen or
more to 1.03 million yen occurs does not change. When we assume the median hourly wage rate
among hourly-paid workers, which is 800 yen, the number of cases representing the “income jump”
decreases by one for each utility function in Table 2.4.C; however, it does not cause any other change.
In contrast, when we assume a higher wage rate, e.g., 1,342 yen, which is the average hourly wage
rate among all married women for all payment types, the number of the “income jump” increases
by one for some of the utility functions.
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would choose point C in the counterfactual budget line will never choose point B′
on the actual budget line after the tax reform, because point C is more preferable to
point B′ for her. Thus, there is no case in which married women face a negative “tax
reform effect” (a movement from C to B′). In other words, as long as the after-tax
and counterfactual budget lines overlap in the region of more than 1.03 million yen, it
is impossible for a wife who would choose point C on the counterfactual budget line
to choose point B′ in the actual budget line after the tax reform. Thus, if a married
woman greatly decreased her income from 1.41 million yen or more to 1.03 million
yen after the tax reform, she would have done the same thing even without the tax
reform or would have decreased her income further to 0.7 million yen. Q.E.D.
In this section, it has been confirmed that the tax reform has a positive impact
on work hours among low-income married women who originally earned 1.03 million
yen or less prior to the tax reform. Without a change in exogenous variables, the tax
reform would have no impact on work hours among married women who originally
earned more than 1.03 million yen. If there is a change in exogenous variables, such
as an increase in a husband’s income, the tax reform could also affect work hours
of medium- to high-income married women: the tax reform made the kink at 1.03
million yen in the budget line more conspicuous than before. As a result, there are
cases in which medium- to high-income married women are dragged to the mass point
at 1.03 million yen in the income distribution that had historically existed, when there
is a negative shock in the exogenous variables that could potentially discourage them
from working long hours, such as an increase in their husbands’ incomes. Even in
that case, the “tax reform effect” cannot be negative. Instead, the “income jump”
among medium- to high-income married women can be explained mainly by a negative
“husband’s income effect” and, in some cases, the income drop is mitigated by a small
positive “tax reform effect.”
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2.4.2 Introducing a Flexible Hourly Wage Rate
Up to this point, the hourly wage rate has been fixed in the simulation and the
figures. Here, I show that the introduction of the flexible hourly wage rate does not
change the theoretical implication. Table 2.4.D reports the probability of the “income
jump” among married women who earned 1.41 million yen or more before the tax
reform by husband’s income increase and change in wife’s hourly wage. From this
table, we notice that the “income jump” can be realized as long as the increase in a
wife’s hourly wage is not too large. Thus, except for cases in which married women
experience a large increase in their hourly wage rate, the main theoretical results are
preserved. As was confirmed in Table 2.3.A, the increase in wives’ hourly wage during
the period from 2003 to 2006 was very small: 1.6 %. Thus, it is unlikely that ignoring
such a small change in hourly wage rates matters in understanding the real impact
of the tax reform.
2.4.3 The Tax Reform’s Effect on Labor Participation
Next, I theoretically predict the effect of the tax reform on labor participation.
As was confirmed in Figure 2.4, the tax reform did not change the starting wage rate
but decreased the husband’s after-tax income via the spousal exemption cut. This
decrease in the husband’s after-tax income can be thought of as a decrease in wives’
non-labor income. Then, given that leisure is a normal good, the reservation wages
of married women should decrease in response to the tax reform; it is thus expected
that the probability of work will increase.
However, as was confirmed in Section 2.3.3, the effect of the spousal exemption
cut is not exceptionally large and is, at most, 0.109 million yen (≈USD 1,090). Thus,
there is a considerable possibility that the effect of the spousal exemption cut is too
small for the reservation wage to be lower than the market wage rate. Furthermore,
if we consider that many married women would incur some fixed costs for working,
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such as the monetary costs of child care or loss of time due to taking their children
to child care, this possibility would be more likely.
2.5 Empirical Model
In this section, I will estimate the impact of the tax reform on the labor supply
of married women for each income group. Based on the shape of the budget line
represented in Figure 2.4, married women can be divided into the following four
groups based on their 2003 income: less than 0.7 million yen, 0.7 to 1.03 million yen,
1.03 to 1.41 million yen, and 1.41 million yen or more. Since the tax reform’s impact
on the labor supply of women should differ according to income level, it is extremely
important to identify the tax reform’s impact on each income group. Particularly, in
order to determine whether the tax reform successfully worked, it is necessary to see
whether married women in the lowest and the second-lowest income group increased
labor supply after the tax reform. In addition to the tax reform effect on low-income
married women, we are also interested in how the labor supply among medium- to
high-income married women changed in response to changes in exogenous variables
(such as husbands’ incomes) as well as the tax reform.
I first test Proposition 2.1 in Section 2.4 by estimating difference-in-difference esti-
mations for each quantile of incomes and work hours. Then I employ a relatively novel
decomposition method, proposed by Firpo et al. (2007, 2010), to test Propositions
2.2 and 2.3 in Section 2.4. Lastly, I visually examine how the behavioral changes con-
firmed in the difference-in-difference estimation and the FFL decomposition affected
the overall income distribution, utilizing the DFL decomposition. This method also
enables us to test Propositions 2.2 and 2.3.
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2.5.1 Model
In Sakata and McKenzie (2005, 2006), a difference-in-difference estimation was
conducted to estimate the impact of the tax reform on the labor supply of married
women. The estimated model in Sakata and McKenzie (2005, 2006) is:
Yit = β0 + β1Aftert + β2Treatmenti + β3Aftert · Treatmenti + γXit + uit (2.4)
where Treatment=1 for the treatment group, and After=1 for samples in periods
after the tax reform. A dummy variable for working women and their work hours
are used for Yit in Sakata and McKenzie (2005, 2006). Utilizing the fact that those
who are expected to be affected by the tax reform are married women, they use
married women as the treatment group and single women as the control group in this
difference-in-difference estimation.
In this paper, I will estimate the model presented in Equation (2.4) by quantile
in the income distribution. The same regressions are also performed for labor par-
ticipation and work hours to strengthen the income regression results. This quantile
analysis enables us to separately examine the impact of tax reform on the low-income
married women who were directly affected by the reform and its impact on other
married women who were not presumed to be affected by the reform. According to
Proposition 2.1, we expect that the coefficient of the interaction term, β3, is signifi-
cantly positive for low quantiles and zero for high quantiles. If the coefficient of the
interaction term, β3, is significantly positive for low quantiles, it implies that the tax
reform increased labor supply among low-income married women as expected.
Note that the settings of the difference-in-difference estimation corresponds to
the case in which there is no change in exogenous parameters, since the husband’s
income and many other exogenous variables are controlled for in the estimation and
the coefficients of these explanatory variables, except for the treatment dummy, are
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also assumed to be the same before and after the tax reform.
2.5.2 CQR vs. UQR
In the difference-in-differences estimation, both the conditional quantile regression
(CQR) and the unconditional quantile regression (UQR) are used to examine the tax
reform’s impact on each quantile of incomes and work hours.
Firpo et al. (2009) showed that the UQR estimates can be represented as a
weighted average of CQR estimates. For example, when estimating the effect of
unions on wages, the CQR estimate is found to be negative for highly skilled workers
(with high educational attainment and extensive labor market experience) and posi-
tive for other workers. Suppose that the explanatory variables other than the union
status include only the workers’ skill level (highly skilled or otherwise) and that the
number of highly skilled workers is small. In CQR, wage distributions conditional
on skill level are used. The union effects are first estimated separately for the highly
skilled workers and for other workers, and then the CQR estimate of the union effect
is calculated as the weighted average of the union effects (β) conditional on each skill
level, i.e., EZ [β/Z], where Z represents a worker’s skill. Therefore, as long as the
number of highly skilled workers is smaller than that of other workers, the negative
union effects on skilled workers are averaged away by the positive effects on the ma-
jority of workers. As a result, the union effects are estimated to be positive for all
quantiles in CQR.
In contrast, in UQR, the unconditional distribution is used, and the fraction of
highly skilled workers varies by quantile, while it is fixed across quantiles in CQR.
Thus, in UQR, at high quantiles of (unconditional) wage distribution that mainly
consist of highly skilled workers in the sample, more weight is placed on highly skilled
workers. As a result, the UQR estimates of union effect on wages become negative
for high quantiles of wage distribution (Firpo et al., 2009).
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However, in the context of the tax reform effect in this paper, there is no possibility
that the sign of the estimate for the tax-reform effect varies by workers’ attributes,
although the magnitude of the effect might vary with differences in worker attributes.
Thus, it is hard to expect a case in which there is a significant gap between CQR
estimates and UQR estimates.
Figure 2.8 illustrates what is estimated in the CQR regression. Suppose T is the
treatment dummy and Z represents other covariates. The distribution at the left-
hand side is the income distribution of the control group conditioning on attributes
Z. In Figure 2.8, it is assumed for simplicity that there is no change in the income
distribution of the control group during the period 2003-2006. The dashed and bold
lines at the right-hand side represent the income distributions of the treatment group
before and after the tax reform, respectively. Yτ/T=1,Z represents income at the τ
quantile of the income distribution for the treatment group with workers’ attributes
Z, while Yτ/T=0,Z represents income at the τ quantile of the income distribution for
the control group with Z. The slope of the straight dotted line that connects incomes
at the τ quantile of each of the two distributions represents the CQR estimates for
the coefficient of the treatment dummy (βτ,CQR2 ), which is calculated as β
τ,CQR
2 =
Yτ/T=1,Z − Yτ/T=0,Z . The figure shows an example in which the dotted line rotates
around Y0.2/T=0,Z in response to an increase in income among low-income workers in
the treatment group, and the slope becomes flatter after the tax reform. Then, the
change in the slope, i.e., the gap in the slope between the two dotted lines, represents
the magnitude of the interaction term between treatment and after dummy variables,
i.e., βτ,CQR3 . In this way, it is expected that the coefficient of the treatment dummy
variable, which is originally negative, becomes smaller negative or even positive at
low quantiles after the tax reform, in response to the increase in incomes among
low-income workers in the treatment group.
Whether we should use CQR or UQR depends upon what we want to know. As is
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indicated in Figure 2.8, since the CQR estimates capture the changes in distribution
conditional on X, it will help us to understand the within-group effect of the tax
reform. The UQR estimate captures the between-group effect as well as the within-
group effect. The UQR estimate might be helpful when we estimate the counterfactual
impact of expanding the eligibility of the spousal exemption because it captures the
direct impact of increasing the proportion of the treatment group. In general, when
an explanatory variable of interest, X, is binary, the coefficient of X from a UQR
becomes equal to the effect of increasing the proportion of people with X=1 on the τ
quantile of the distribution (i.e., βτ = dqτ/dPr[X=1] ∀τ). This holds for all quantiles
in a UQR, while in a CQR, it holds only for the mean (Firpo et al., 2009). In the
context of the model presented above, the coefficient of the treatment dummy from
the UQR is equal to the effect of increasing the proportion of the treatment group on
the τ quantile in the income distribution.
Figure 2.9 is presented to depict the interpretation of the UQR estimate. In Figure
2.9, we see how the income distribution moves after increasing the proportion of the
treatment group by one unit. Suppose that before the tax reform, when we increase
the proportion of the treatment group by one unit, income at the 20th quantile of the
distribution shifts from Y 0.2t=0 to Y
0.2 ′
t=0 . Then Y
0.2 ′
t=0 − Y 0.2t=0 represents β2 for the 20th
quantile before the tax reform, i.e.,β 0.22,t=0. Similarly, if income at the 20th quantile
of the distribution shifts from Y 0.2t=1 to Y
0.2 ′
t=1 after the tax reform in response to the
increase in the proportion of the treatment group, Y 0.2
′
t=1 − Y 0.2t=1 represents β2 for the
20th quantile after the tax reform, i.e.,β 0.22,t=1. Then, the difference in β
0.2
2 between
before and after the tax reform corresponds to β 0.23 . Details regarding unconditional
quantile regression are presented in Firpo et al. (2009).30
30In Figure 2.9, the two figures are placed vertically to compare the magnitudes of β 0.22 and to show
β 0.23 as the difference between the two β
0.2







2.5.3 Basics of FFL Decomposition
Before explaining how I will utilize the FFL decomposition technique in the con-
text of the model presented in Section 2.5.1, I will briefly explain the FFL decompo-
sition method. In the FFL, the total change in Y is divided into the composition and
structure effects, and they are further decomposed into the contributions of each ex-
planatory variable. In this sense, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (OB) would be
the counterpart of this method. However, two characteristics in the FFL decomposi-
tion differentiate it from the classic OB decomposition. First, in FFL, the recentered
influence function (RIF) of Y , instead of Y , is used as the dependent variable, which
enables us to examine distributional changes in Y ; this was possible only for the
mean in the classic OB decomposition (Firpo et al., 2007, 2010). Second, to calculate
the counterfactual distributions, the reweighting method proposed in the DiNardo,
Fortin, and Lemieux decomposition (DiNardo et al., 1996) is used. By performing the
reweighting regressions, we can prevent the difference in the coefficients between the
two periods from being contaminated by differences in the distribution of X between
the two periods. (This point will be explained at the end of this section.)
Conceptually, the influence function (IF) represents the influence of increasing an
individual observation on the distributional statistic, such as means, variances, quan-
tiles, and Gini coecients. For the τth quantile, the influence function IF (Y ; qτ , FY )
is known to be equal to {τ − 1(Y ≤ qτ )}/fY (qτ ). The IF gives us a way to explore
how changes in the distribution of Y affect qτ . The goal here is to compute the effect
of changing X on quantiles. The process leading up to this goal is divided into two
steps: (1) changes in X→changes in the distribution of Y and (2) changes in the dis-
tribution of Y→changes in qτ . The IF only does step two. To connect steps one and
two, we need the Law of Iterated Expectations (LIE). To utilize the LIE, we need the
recentered version of the IF, i.e.,RIF, which is simply equal to qτ+IF (Y ; qτ , FY ). The
RIF has a very convenient feature in that its expectation is equal to its distributional
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statistics (in our case, qτ ):
qτ = E[RIF ] = EX(E[RIF/X]) (2.5)
Then, using the LIE, the distributional statistic can also be expressed in terms of the
expectations of the conditional RIF −i.e., a function of X. Thus, by using the RIF,
step one can be connected to step one. The details about this process can be found
in work by Firpo et al. (2007, 2010).
The counterfactual distribution in FFL is calculated by DiNardo et al. (1996)
method using the following reweighting term:
ω = h(X/t≥2004)
h(X/t=2003)
= P (t≥2004/X)P (X)/P (t≥2004)
P (t=2003/X)P (X)/P (t=2003)
= P (t≥2004/X)P (t=2003)
P (t=2003/X)P (t≥2004)
(2.6)
where the density h(X/t = T ) is the p.d.f. of attributes in year T . The second
equation is derived from Bayes’ rule. In the actual regression of ω, P (t = T/X)
can be calculated using propensity scores obtained from the probit model in which
P (t = T ) is regressed on X, and P (t = T ) is calculated as the proportion of the
observations from year T in the pooled data.
In Section 2.7, I will report both results without reweighting, i.e., the classic OB
decomposition, and results with reweighting. For the latter, the following different
pooled samples are used to obtain the composition and the structure effects.
• Estimation 1: Reweighted regression with a pooled sample of X03 andXC,04:



















C,03 − βτ03) + (XC,04 −X 03)′βτC,03
• Estimation 2: Reweighted regression with a pooled sample of XC,04 andX04:
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04 − βτC,03) + (X04 −XC,04)′βτ04
where XC,04 is the counterfactual 2004-2006 distribution of X obtained from the
reweighting method, and βτC,03 is the counterfactual values of the coefficients for the
τth quantile. In calculating XC,04, the 2003 sample is reweighted to mimic the 2004-
2006 sample using the reweighting term defined in Equation (2.6), which means that
we should have plim(XC,04) = plim(X04). The dependent variable used to obtain
βτC,03 is the RIF of Y in 2003, thus the counterfactual values of the coefficients can
be thought of as coefficients that would be realized if the determinant structure of Y
stayed the same from 2003 to 2004-2006. The composition effect from Estimation 1
and the structure effect from Estimation 2 are used in the FFL decomposition.
Counterfactual values of the coefficients are used here because the difference in
the coefficients between the two periods in the classic OB decomposition may be
contaminated by differences in the distribution of X between the two years. In the
FFL decomposition with reweighting, the (asymptotically) same X is used for the
two periods to estimate the structure effect, and hence the difference in βτ should
not be contaminated by the difference in the distribution of X.
2.5.4 FFL Decomposition Model
Now, we return to the context of this paper. The purpose of adding the FFL
decomposition is to test Propositions 2.2 and 2.3. In the decomposition, utilizing the
advantage of the technique that enables us to further divide each of the structure and
composition effects to a contribution of each explanatory variable, I examine whether
medium- to high-income married women actually decreased their incomes by a large
46
negative “husband’s income effect” (and not “tax-reform effect”). This is possible by
checking the magnitude of the composition effect attributable to husband’s income; If
it is greatest at medium- to high-quantiles of the income distribution with statistical
significance, it supports Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 stating that the “income jump,”
which is explained mainly by a large negative “husband’s income effect,” is likely to
occur for medium- to high-income married women. It is also important to check that
the structure effect attributable to the treatment dummy variable is not significantly
negative for these women to make sure that this “income jump” cannot be explained
by the negative tax reform effect.
Furthermore, I reconfirm the results obtained from the difference-in-difference es-
timation in the FFL decomposition as well. If the coefficient of the treatment dummy
variable becomes higher after the tax reform in the difference-in-difference regressions
(i.e., the interaction term between the treatment and after dummy variables is sig-
nificantly positive in the difference-in-difference regressions) and the structure effect
attributable to the treatment dummy variable obtained from the FFL decomposi-
tion is significantly positive at low quantiles, this would imply that the tax reform
contributed to increasing incomes among low-income women.
Note that the structure effect attributable to the treatment dummy variable cor-
responds to the coefficient of the interaction term between the treatment and af-
ter dummy variables in the difference-in-difference regression. Thus, by looking at
the structure effect attributable to the treatment dummy variable, it is possible to
reconfirm the results for low-income married women in the difference-in-difference
regression.
Figure 2.10 illustrates the interpretation of the FFL estimates visually. The dashed
line represents the income distribution before the tax reform, and the solid line repre-
sents that for after the tax reform. As can be confirmed in the figure, the quantiles are
reassigned for each period in FFL, and FFL compares the RIF of income at quantile
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τ between before and after the tax reform.
Again, in the FFL decomposition, we can observe whether incomes among medium-
to high quantiles decreased after the tax reform; and, if so, whether this was caused by
the “income jump,” which is explained mainly by a large negative effect of husband’s
income. In addition, the results obtained from the difference-in-difference estimation
are reconfirmed in the FFL decomposition by checking whether incomes at low quan-
tiles increased after the tax reform; and, if so, whether this was caused by the tax
reform.
2.5.5 DFL decomposition
Lastly, utilizing the DFL decomposition method, I visually examine how the be-
havioral changes confirmed in the difference-in-difference estimation and the FFL
decomposition affected the overall income distribution. The merit of this method is
that it visually decomposes the change in the distribution into two parts: structure
effects and composition effects (DiNardo et al., 1996; DiNardo and Lemieux, 1997).
First, the income distribution in 2003 is expressed as:
F2003 =
∫
f2003(Y/X)h(X/t = 2003)dX (2.7)
where f2003(Y/X) is the income determination mechanism in 2003 that maps workers’
attributes to the income distribution. Again, the density h(X/t = 2003) is the p.d.f.




f2004(Y/X)h(X/t ≥ 2004)dX (2.8)
What the distribution would be after the tax reform if the income determination
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mechanism were identical to its mechanism in 2003 is expressed as:
F 20032004 =
∫
f2003(Y/X)h(X/t ≥ 2004)dX (2.9)
This can be thought of as a counterfactual distribution in the period 2004-2006
without the tax reform because it consists of the same workers’ attributes as the real
2004-2006 distribution of X but of β prior to the tax reform. This counterfactual
distribution is calculated by DiNardo et al. (1996) method:
F 20032004 =
∫
f2003(Y/X)h(X/t ≥ 2004)dX =
∫
ωf2003(Y/X)h(X/t = 2003)dX (2.10)
where ω is given by Equation (2.6). This reweighting process is exactly the same as
that in the FFL.
2.6 Regression Sample
Again, the data set used in this study is Japanese panel data from the Keio
Household Panel Survey (KHPS) 2004-2007. Since the characteristics of this survey
were already reported in Section 2.3.1, in this section, I will discuss how I select the
regression samples from the data.
The details of the KHPS are as follows: respondents for the first wave were men
and women aged between 20 and 69 as of January 31, 2004, from all of Japan. The
first wave (2004) included 4,005 households, the second wave (2005) included 3,314
out of 4,005 in the first wave, the third wave (2006) 2,887 households, and the fourth
wave (2007) 2,643 households. Additionally, 1,419 households were newly added to
the samples in 2007, and this paper also utilizes these samples. The attrition rate
from the first wave to the fourth wave was 34 %.31
31The sample selection issue arising from attrition (i.e., from the first to the fourth waves) is
expected to be small, because the characteristics of the women who participated in the survey in all
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Table 2.5 contains descriptive statistics for the sample of main analyses. The first
column in Table 2.5 reports the overall sample including non-working women, which
is used for the probit estimation first conducted to check the tax reform effect on
labor participation decision.
As discussed in Section 2.2, the real schedule of the spousal exemption is defined
with regard to the spouse’s total income, which is calculated as the total earnings
minus the employment income deduction for employees, and the total earnings minus
necessary expenses for other workers. While necessary expenses vary among individ-
uals, the amounts of the employment income deduction, which are the counterpart of
necessary expenses, are fixed for each amount of employment incomes. As a result,
the uniform correspondence between the amount of annual earnings and the amount
of the spousal exemption can be obtained only from employment incomes. Therefore,
analyzing the effect of the spousal exemption for employment income earners is more
straightforward. For this reason, the sample of the main analyses concerning the tax
reform effect on the income distribution is restricted to employees, which comprises
41 % of all the observations.
Furthermore, in the theoretical model, traditional households in which the hus-
band is the main earner and the wife is a dependent were assumed, but this assumption
is less unlikely to be true for married women who work for the government. Nishikawa
(2002) shows that the gap in work hours between a husband and a wife in a couple
in which a wife works in the public sector is much smaller than that for other types
of couples. This finding implies that the assumption about the unilateral influence
on labor decision (from a husband to a wife, and not the reverse) is unlikely to hold
for these women. For this reason, in the main analyses, I also restrict the sample to
employees who work in the private sector.
In the sample of the main analyses, 3,206 observations in the panel that are
years (2004-2007) are similar to those of the women who dropped from the sample at some point
during that time. Table A.2.1 presents the descriptive statistics for these two groups.
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employed in the private sector and work at least one hour each year are used.3233 The
average age is 44.22 years. Among the four income groups (0-0.7 million, 0.7-1.03
million, 1.03-1.41 million, and 1.41 million+), the group that comprises the largest
number of workers is the group with incomes of 1.41 million yen and above, which
corresponds to 44% of all samples. Among married women, almost half of the sample
is in the income groups that were directly affected by the tax reform.
Furthermore, although it is the husbands’ after-tax incomes, not the before-tax
incomes, that would actually affect the wives’ incomes, there is a concern about using
the husbands’ after-tax incomes to control for husbands’ incomes in estimating the
tax reform effect. If the husband’s after-tax incomes were used in the estimations, the
change in spousal exemption would also be reflected in the variable. This means that
part of the tax reform effect would be captured by the husbands’ incomes as well,
despite our desire to capture the impact only by the treatment dummy variable. To
circumvent this problem, husband’s after-tax incomes that ignore the spousal exemp-
tions are used in the regressions because this variable comes closer to the economically
relevant variable than do pre-tax incomes, without introducing the problem stated
above. The average value of this variable among married women is 4.84 million yen.
2.7 Results
2.7.1 Difference-in-Difference Regression Results
Table 2.6 reports the results of the difference-in-difference estimations for labor
participation, annual incomes, and work hours. The coefficient of interest is that
pertaining to the interaction term between treatment and after dummy variables.
32Thus, if either of these three conditions, i) positive work hours, ii) employed, and iii) private
sector, are not satisfied during year t, that person is dropped from the sample of year t.
33Only women who reported all the necessary variables will be included in the sample in the
regression. A comparison of workers’ characteristics between the raw data and the regression sample
did not show any significant difference. Thus, the sample selection issue arising from using only
people who reported all the necessary variables is expected to be small.
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The treatment group is made up of married women whose husbands are eligible for
the spousal exemptions (i.e., married women who are not the head of household and
have husbands whose total income is 10 million yen or less per year). Single women
and married women whose husbands are not eligible for the spousal exemptions are
used as the control group.
Column 1 first reports the probit estimation result using the overall sample in-
cluding non-working women. The coefficient of the interaction term between the
treatment and after dummy variables is insignificant, and we do not see any evi-
dence that the tax reform increased labor participation. This might reflect the noise
in the regression as well as the possibility that the effect of the spousal exemption
cut is too small for the reservation wage to be lower than the market wage rate.
The dependent variable in Column 2 to 6 is annual income, while the dependent
variable for the UQR (Column 7 to 9) is the recentered influence function (RIF) of an-
nual income.34 The CQR of weekly work hours is also added to the table to strengthen
the analyses of incomes. The explanatory variables include the treatment dummy,
husband’s annual after-tax income that ignores the spousal exemptions, number of
children, age and its square, tenure and its square, unionized worker dummy variable,
permanent employee dummy variable, the logarithm of firm size, educational dummy
variables, and industry dummy variables.35
Column 2 and 3 present the results of the OLS regression and the fixed effects (FE)
model, respectively. The OLS and FE estimates for a coefficient of the interaction
34The RIF for the τth quantile can be computed as qτ + {τ − 1(Y ≤ qτ )}/fY (qτ ) using the sample
estimate of qτ and the kernel density estimate of fY (qτ ) using the Epanechnikov kernel.
35Table 2.6 reports the results without hourly wage rate in X. Forty-three percent of the women
in the sample are paid hourly, and hourly wage information is available only for this group. Fifty-one
percent of the women in the sample are paid monthly, and the hourly wage for this group needs to
be calculated by dividing the monthly salary by the number of hours worked per month as reported
by the workers. This can create a measurement error in the explanatory variable. Thus, in the main
analyses, I report results without hourly wage rate. However, as was confirmed in Section 2.3, the
hourly wage rate was stable over the period for both married and single women; the sensitivity check
that includes hourly wage rate in X thus shows that the main results are preserved when hourly
wage rate included.
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term are both insignificant, which reflects the fact that these estimates capture the
mean impact of the tax reform. However, those who were directly affected by the
tax reform are only married women whose annual income is 1.03 million yen or less;
hence, there is a possibility that the mean impact estimated in the OLS and FE model
missed the real impact of the tax reform on low-income married women.
To capture the heterogeneous impact of the tax reform across income groups, I
conducted the same difference-in-difference estimation by quantile. Columns 4 in Ta-
ble 2.6 reports the CQR estimates for women whose income is at the 30th quantile,
and the coefficient of the interaction term is significantly positive at this quantile.
These women belong to the lowest and second-lowest income group, and hence mar-
ried women at this quantile are those who were directly affected by the tax reform.
The CQR estimate shows that married women whose income is at the 30th quantile
increased their incomes by 0.164 million yen per year.
In contrast, for the higher quantiles, the coefficients of the interaction term are
close to zero and insignificant. We can observe similar results for the UQR from
Column 7 to 9. The fact that we do not see any significant difference in the results
for the interaction term between CQR and UQR reflects a uniform sign of the tax
effect across worker characteristics as discussed in Section 2.5.2.
In Column 10 to 12, the same regressions are conducted for weekly work hours.
We can observe results similar to the results for incomes: i.e., the significantly pos-
itive estimates for the coefficients of the interaction term for the low quantile and
insignificant estimates for the quantiles above median. The CQR estimate of the
interaction term indicates that the tax reform increased the weekly work hours of
low-income married women by 3.589 hours. A simple calculation using the average
hourly wage rate shows that this increase in work hours leads to an income increase
of approximately 0.16 million yen per year, which is consistent with the result of the
income regression. I also tried a regression including asset incomes and polynomials
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of husband’s income, and the main results are preserved even when these variables
are included.
Note that the results obtained from Table 2.6 are consistent with Proposition 2.1.
In Table 2.6, the husband’s income and many other exogenous variables are controlled
for, and it is implicitly assumed that the coefficients of these explanatory variables,
except for the treatment dummy, are the same before and after the tax reform. This
corresponds to the case in which there is no change in exogenous variables. Proposi-
tion 2.1 states that in such an environment, the tax reform has no impact on those
who originally earned more than 1.03 million yen but increases work hours and for
married women who originally earned 1.03 million yen or less. This is exactly what
Table 2.6 demonstrates.
In Figure 2.11, I plotted the coefficients for the interaction term between treatment
and after dummy variables obtained from the CQR for all quantiles. For the income
distribution, the fraction of married women who were directly affected by the tax
reform should be approximately 1 for the quantiles lower than the 43th quantile
(corresponding to 1.03 million yen) and 0 for the higher quantiles.36 Reflecting this
fact, Figure 2.11 shows that the magnitude of the tax reform’s effect drops near the
income distribution’s 43th quantile.
The reason for the small tax reform effect at the 10th quantile is that the estimates
at these extremely low quantiles are likely to be affected by special characteristics that
are not captured by the explanatory variables. For example, these women might be in
very conservative households and would, therefore, not have much incentive to work
more, even after tax reform. Note that in general, both ends of the distribution are
likely to include people who have special characteristics; thus, the standard errors
36Although earning less than 1.03 million yen does not directly equate with being eligible for the
special spousal exemption (because the husbands’ total incomes also need to be 10 million yen or less
per year for the household to be eligible for the special spousal exemption), the fraction of spouses
whose husbands’ total incomes are more than 10 million yen is very small (only 1.5% in the sample).
In the sample, it seems that the condition regarding the husbands’ incomes is not very effective.
54
of the interaction term’s coefficient at the 10th quantile and quantiles over the 70th
quantile are, indeed, very large. This finding demonstrates the importance of esti-
mating the impact of the tax reform by quantile, rather than estimating the mean
impact, because by doing so, we can prevent the estimates from being contaminated
by the imprecise estimates at the extremely low or high quantiles.
For the work-hour distribution, the magnitude of the coefficient peaks at around
the 30th quantile and diminishes as we move toward the higher quantiles. This reflects
the fact that the fraction of married women with an income of 1.03 million yen or
less peaks at around the 30th quantile of the work-hour distribution and declines for
the higher quantiles.
Considering the Difference in Husbands’ Tax Rates
To take into account the difference in husbands’ tax rates, I also conducted a
regression in which “eligible” married women whose husbands’ tax rate is 20 % are
used as the treatment group and “eligible” married women whose husbands’ tax rate
is 10% are used as the control group. Thus, only “eligible” women are included in the
sample, and the treatment and control groups are defined by the husbands’ tax rates.
Since the impact of the spousal exemptions on the household budget line becomes
greater as the husbands’ tax rate increases, the theory predicts that married women
whose husbands’ tax rate is higher will be affected by the tax reform more than those
whose husbands’ tax rate is lower.
Figure A.2.1 plots the CQR estimates for the coefficient of the interaction term
between treatment and after dummy variables in the income regression. The estimate
is significantly positive at the 20th quantile meaning that the magnitude of the tax
reform effect is greater for those whose husband’s tax rate is higher. Thus, the
difference-in-difference estimation results support the theoretical predictions.
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2.7.2 FFL Decomposition Results
Next, I will report the FFL decomposition results. An extension of the classic OB
decomposition and the reweighted-regression decomposition results for the 25th, 50th,
60th, 70th, and 95th quantiles in the income distribution are reported in Table 2.7.
The odd-numbered columns report the results of the decomposition without reweight-
ing. The even-numbered columns report the results of the reweighted-regression de-
composition, in which F (X) in 2003 is reweighted to the 2004-2006 period.
First, for both the decomposition without reweighting and the reweighted-regression
decomposition, the structure effects attributable to the treatment dummy at the 25th
quantile are significantly positive at the 10 % significance level. The results here are
comparable with those from the difference-in-difference estimation; the structure ef-
fect attributable to the treatment dummy in the FFL decomposition corresponds to
the coefficient of the interaction dummy between treatment and after dummy variables
in the difference-in-difference regression. The FFL decomposition results from low-
income women indicate that the increase in the coefficient of the treatment dummy,
confirmed in Table 2.6, contributed to increasing incomes among low-income women.37
Second, the composition effects attributable to husbands’ incomes are signifi-
cantly negative among medium-to high-income women at the 50th and 60th quantiles.
Proposition 2.2 in Section 2.4 states that there are cases in which medium-to high-
income married women greatly decrease their incomes after the tax reform (from 1.41
37It is well known that the contribution of each covariate to the unexplained part can depend
on arbitrary scaling decisions (Jones and Kelley, 1984; Jann, 2008). As a related issue, it is also
known that the unexplained part of the decomposition arbitrarily depends on the choice of reference
groups when indicator variables are included in the model (Jones, 1983; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1999;
Firpo et al., 2010). However, identifying the magnitude of the structure effect attributable to the
treatment dummy variable is not of interest here because the magnitude of the tax reform effect
was already estimated in the difference-in-difference estimation. Rather, the main objective of using
the FFL decomposition here is to compare the statistical significance and relative magnitude of the
composition effect attributable to the husbands’ incomes across all quantiles. Note that the potential
problems stated above do not arise in estimating the contribution of each covariate to the explained
part (Jones, 1983; Jones and Kelley, 1984; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1999; Jann, 2008; Firpo et al.,
2010). Thus, it is still meaningful to compare the statistical significance and relative magnitude of
the composition effect attributable to the husbands’ incomes across all quantiles.
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million yen or more to 1.03 million yen) in response to an increase in their husbands’
incomes. In addition, Proposition 2.3 emphasizes that the discontinuous jump from
1.41 million yen or more to 1.03 million yen among these women is explained mainly
by a large negative husband’s income effect.
To compare the magnitude of the “husband’s income effect” among all quantiles,
Figure 2.12 plots the composition effect attributable to husbands’ incomes in Table
2.7. From it, we can see that the magnitude of the negative “husband’s income effect”
peaks at around the 60th quantiles. This result indicates the possibility that the dis-
continuous “income jump” among medium- to high-income married women actually
occurred in response to an increase in husbands’ incomes, because this “income jump”
can be explained by a large negative husband’s income.
At quantiles over the 70th in Table 2.7, the composition effects attributable to
husbands’ income become smaller and insignificant. Figure 2.12 also indicates that
the negative husband’s income effect vanishes at these high quantiles. These results
support the theoretical implication that the “income jump” is not possible for those
whose preference for consumption is very strong.
It is also important to note that, as was suggested in Proposition 2.3, there is no
quantile in which there is a significant negative structure effect attributable to the
treatment dummy variable. Thus, the theoretical implication that the “tax reform
effect” cannot be negative is supported.
2.7.3 DFL Decomposition Results
Lastly, I will confirm how these changes in the optimal income decision affected
the overall income distribution of married women. Figure 2.13 depicts the DFL
decomposition results for the income distribution of married women. Comparing the
two “actual” distributions, the income distribution after the tax reform is less spread
out, and low-income married women and high-income married women gathered to
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the center of the distribution after the tax reform. In addition, if we look at the
counterfactual distribution, the income distribution would have shifted to the left in
response to the increase in husbands’ incomes during the “after” period without the
tax reform.
Furthermore, the fractions of those who earned more than 2.5 million yen and those
who earned between 1.41 million yen and 1.7 million yen decreased during the period.
This change can be explained by the gap between the actual before distribution and
the counterfactual distribution, which indicates a composition effect. Among the
composition effects at the 50th and 60th quantiles in the FFL decomposition, only
the husbands’ income effect was significantly negative. Given that these quantiles
correspond to 1.41 million yen and 1.7 million yen, respectively, the distributional
change for the incomes of 1.41 million yen to 1.7 million yen can be explained by the
husbands’ income effect.
In contrast, for the incomes below 1.03 million yen, we observe a different trend.
In response to an increase in the husbands’ incomes, the actual before distribution
shifted to the left, i.e., to where the counterfactual distribution occurs. However,
low-income married women were also affected by the tax reform; hence, the decline
of their income was mitigated by the tax reform effect, which is captured by the gap
between the actual after distribution and the counterfactual distribution.
Although the smoothed lines in Figure 2.13 help us understand the overall trend of
the income distribution, it is difficult to confirm the spikes in the income distributions
by the figure. Thus, next, I will see how the spikes in the income distribution changed
by Figure 2.14, in which histograms of income distribution of married women for both
periods are presented. In Figure 2.14, the spike at the kink in the household budget
line that had existed prior to the tax reform (0.7 million yen) shrank, and people who
were originally at this spike moved to the kink at 1.03 million yen that was made
more conspicuous by the tax reform. That movement resulted in the conventional
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spike at 1.03 million yen being more conspicuous after the tax reform.
As shown in the theoretical model, the kink at 1.03 million yen in the budget line,
which became more conspicuous after the tax reform, drags even medium- to high-
income married women, who are not presumed to be affected by the tax reform, to
the mass point when there was a negative shock in the exogenous variables that could
potentially discourage them from working long hours. Consequently, the decrease in
income among medium- to high-income married women offset the increase in income
among low-income women, which resulted in the slight decrease in the average income
among married women.
2.8 Conclusion
In Japan, there is a spousal exemption system, wherein the amount of the income
exemption a husband can claim is reduced as his spouse’s income rises. In 2004,
the special spousal exemption was abolished for taxpayers whose spouses had annual
earnings of 1.03 million yen or less, and it was expected that the married women’s
labor supply would increase after that tax reform was enacted. However, both the
average annual income and the average work hours slightly decreased among married
women after the tax reform.
At the same time, married men’s incomes increased in the years following the
tax reform, which could potentially conceal the reform’s real impact; hence, this
paper estimates the reform’s real impact by controlling for the trends in exogenous
variables. Furthermore, as the impact of the tax reform could be heterogeneous across
income groups due to the tax exemption system, this paper takes this into account
and examines the income distribution rather than focusing on the mean impact.
The theoretical model shows that the tax reform made the kink at 1.03 million
yen in the household budget line more conspicuous, which produces four testable
implications: (1) the tax reform increases work hours (and hence the incomes) for
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married women who earned 1.03 million yen or less but has no impact on married
women who originally earned more than 1.03 million yen, when there is no change in
exogenous parameters; (2) however, if an increase in a husband’s income is considered,
there are cases in which medium- to high-income married women greatly decrease their
work hours to earn only 1.03 million yen; (3) even in this case, the “tax reform effect”
cannot be negative; (4) this “income jump” among medium- to high-income married
women can be explained mostly by a negative “husband’s income effect”; and (5) in
some cases, this “income jump” is mitigated by a small positive “tax reform effect.”
These implications were tested using data from the Keio Household Panel Survey
(KHPS). In these empirical analyses, I first examined how married women in each
income group responded to the tax reform using a difference-in-difference estimation
within a framework of the conditional and unconditional quantile regressions. The
results showed that the effects of the tax reform on annual incomes and work hours
were significantly positive at low quantiles. If we estimated the mean impact of the
tax reform, we did not see any significant impact, implying that it was important
to estimate the impact of tax reform for each quantile. In contrast, the tax reform
effect for high-income women was small and insignificant. This is consistent with a
theoretical implication that the tax reform has no impact on high-income married
women in a setting in which there is no change in exogenous parameters.
To examine whether medium- to high-income married women actually decreased
their incomes by a large negative “husband’s income effect” (and not “tax-reform
effect”), I also adopted a relatively new decomposition technique proposed by Firpo
et al. (2007, 2010). This FFL technique enables us to further decompose the structure
effects and the composition effects into contributions of each individual covariate. The
structure effect attributable to the treatment dummy was significantly positive for the
low quantiles, implying that the tax reform contributed to increasing incomes among
low-income married women. Furthermore, the magnitude of the composition effect
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attributable to husbands’ incomes is greatest among medium- to high-income married
women. This indicates the possibility that the discontinuous “income jump” among
medium- to high-income married women in response to an increase in husbands’
incomes actually occurred because this “income jump” can be explained mainly by a
large husband’s income effect.
The results of DFL decomposition also showed that low-income married women
and high-income married women gathered to the center of the income distribution
after the tax reform. Accordingly, the mass point at 1.03 million yen became more
conspicuous after the tax reform.
Although the tax reform did contribute to increasing incomes among low-income
married women, that tax reform resulted in the kink at 1.03 million yen in the house-
hold budget line becoming more conspicuous, making it a more attractive income
choice than before. Due to this change in the household budget line, the annual
income of some of the medium- to high-income married women decreased to 1.03
million yen when they experienced both the tax reform and an increase in their hus-
bands’ incomes. As a result, the decrease in incomes caused by a large negative
husband’s income effect offset the increase in income among the low-income women,
which resulted in a slight decrease in the average income among married women.
The important implications here are that although the tax reform contributed to
an increase in labor supply of married women, ironically, it made the conventional
distortion at 1.03 million yen in the income distribution more conspicuous and that
this will be the case as long as the remaining spousal exemption exists.
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Figure 2.1: Factors that Could Potentially Induce Labor Supply Adjustment
Note: This figure was created based on Table 1 of Oishi (2003). The amounts of National Health Insurance are the average amounts as of 2003
reported in the Survey on National Health Insurance 2003 (Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, Government of Japan, 2003b). (*) Concerning
spousal allowances, the income threshold used most frequently (i.e., 1.03 million yen) is reported.
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Figure 2.2: Reasons for Labor Supply Adjustment among Female Part-
time Workers
Note: The sample is restricted to female part-time workers who answered that they adjusted their
labor supply. Each bin in Figure 2.2 reports the percentage of those who answered each factor (A∼F )
affected their decisions of labor supply adjustment. A∼F correspond to the following: A: the limit
of nontaxable income (1.03 million yen), B: Spousal exemption schedule, C-1: 1.3 million yen ceiling
for no social security payment, C-2: 3/4 of regular worker’s work hours at which workers enroll for the
employees’ pension- and health- insurance systems, D: Income threshold for the employer-provided
spousal allowances, E: 20 hours/week at which workers enroll for the employment insurance, and
F : Other.
63
Figure 2.3: Spikes in the Annual Income Distribution of Married Women (2003)
Note: Figure 2.3 presents the 2003 income distribution of married women in the Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS). The bin width is 0.1 million
yen, but for the bin just below 1.03 million yen, people earning 0.9 to 1.03 million yen (instead of 0.9 to 1 million yen) are included in order to separate
people below this threshold from those above it.
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Figure 2.4: Impact of Tax reform on Household Budget Line
a. Household Budget Lines without Spousal Allowance and Social
Security Payment
Note: This is the simplest version of the household budget line, which
considers neither employer-provided spousal allowances nor the social
security payment.
b. Household Budget Lines with Spousal Allowance and Social Security
Payment
Note: In this figure, employer-provided spousal allowances that vanish
at 1.03 million yen and social security payments that start from 1.3
million yen are considered.
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Figure 2.5: Impact of Tax reform on Labor Supply of Married Women (Without Change in Exogenous Param-
eter)
a. Impact on Married Women Who Earn 1.03 Million Yen or Less
Note: Married women at point A will move to point B after the tax
reform because of the positive income effect. Married women at point C
will move to point E because of the positive substitution effect (C→D)
and the positive income effect (D→E).
b. Impact on Married Women Who Earn More Than 1.03 Million Yen
Note: Without a change in exogenous variables, there is no impact on
married women who earn more than 1.03 million yen.
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Figure 2.6: Change in Labor Supply of Medium- to High-income Married Women in Response to both Tax
Reform and Increase in Husband’s Income
a. “Income Jump” from 1.41 Million Yen or More to 1.03 Million Yen
Note: When an increase in a husband’s income is considered, there
are cases in which married women who earn 1.41 million yen or more
will decrease their incomes to 1.03 million yen (B→B′) after the tax
reform.
b. Wives’ Optimal Income Choice by Preference for Consumption
Note: The dots in Figure 2.6b show the amount of optimal income
that attains the highest utility for each value of α (i.e., the preference
for consumption) when we use the Cobb-Douglas utility function. The
simulation settings are the same as those in 2.4.A, except that Figure
2.6b reports the results with a sufficiently large increase in husbands’
incomes (i.e., increase of 2 million yen).
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Figure 2.7: Decomposition of the “Income Jump” into “Tax Reform Effect” and “Husband’s Income Effect”
a. Decomposition of the “Income Jump”
Note: The long-dashed line represents the counterfactual budget line
without the tax reform in 2004. The “income jump” from B to B′ is
decomposed into a large negative “husband’s income effect” (B→C)
and a small positive “tax reform effect” (C→B′).
b. “Tax Reform Effect” Cannot Be Negative
Note: This figure shows that a tax reform effect cannot be negative:
both B′ and C are available on the “after-reform” and counterfactual
budget lines; a wife who chose point C on the counterfactual budget
line would never choose point B′ on the actual budget line following
the tax reform, because point C is preferable to point B′.
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Figure 2.8: Interpretation of CQR Estimate for β3
Note: Figure 2.8 illustrates the interpretation of the CQR estimate for β3 visually. The distribution
at the left-hand side is the income distribution for the control group conditioning on attributes Z.
The dashed and bold lines at the right-hand side represent the income distributions before and after
the tax reform, respectively. Yτ/T=1,Z represents income at the τ quantile of the income distribution
for the treatment group with workers’ attributes Z, while Yτ/T=0,Z represents income at the τ
quantile of the income distribution for the control group with Z. The slope of the straight dotted
line that connects incomes at the quantile of each of the two distributions represents the CQR
estimates for the coefficient of the treatment dummy variable (i.e., βτ,CQR2 ), which is calculated as
βτ,CQR2 = Yτ/T=1,Z − Yτ/T=0,Z . The change in the slope, i.e., the gap in the slope between the two
dotted lines, represents the magnitude of the interaction term between treatment and after dummy
variables, i.e.,βτ,CQR3 .
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Figure 2.9: Interpretation of UQR Estimate for β3 [Change in Income
Distribution When Increasing Proportion of the Treatment Group]
Note: Figure 2.9 illustrates the interpretation of the UQR estimate for β3 visually. In Figure 2.9, we
see how the distribution moves after increasing the proportion of the treatment group by one unit.
Suppose that we start from the solid line and that the distribution shifts to the dashed distribution at
the left when we increase the proportion of the treatment group by one unit. In the figure, income at
the 20th quantile of the distribution shifts from Y 0.2t=0 to Y
0.2 ′
t=0 when we increase the proportion of the
treatment group by one unit before the tax reform. β2 for the 20th quantile before the tax reform can
be calculated as β 0.22,t=0 = Y
0.2 ′
t=0 −Y 0.2t=0. Similarly, β 0.22,t=1 = Y 0.2
′
t=1 −Y 0.2t=1. Then, β 0.23 = β 0.22,t=1−β 0.22,t=0.
(t=0 and t=1 in superscript mean before and after the tax reform, respectively.) Note that in Figure
2.9, the two figures are placed vertically to compare the magnitude of β0.22 and to show β
0.2
3 as the






Figure 2.10: Interpretation of FFL Results
Note: Figure 2.10 illustrates the interpretation of the FFL estimates visually. The dashed line
represents the income distribution before the tax reform, and the solid line represents that for after
the tax reform. The quantiles are reassigned for each period in FFL, and FFL compares the RIF of
income at quantile τ between before and after the tax reform. In the FFL decomposition, we can
observe whether incomes among medium-to high quantiles decreased after the tax reform; and, if so,
whether this was caused by the “income jump,” which is explained mainly by a large negative effect
of husband’s income. Furthermore, the results obtained from the difference-in-difference estimation
are reconfirmed in the FFL decomposition by checking whether incomes at low quantiles increased
after the tax reform; and, if so, whether this was caused by the tax reform.
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Figure 2.11: Coefficients for Interaction Term in the Difference-in-
Difference Estimations
Note: The OLS and the CQR estimates for the coefficient of the ineraction term are reported. These
values are obtained from Table 2.6.
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Figure 2.12: Composition Effect Attributable to Husband’s Income in FFL
Decomposition
Note: These coefficients are those obtained from the FFL decomposition in Table 2.7.
73
Figure 2.13: Actual Income Distributions and Counterfactual Distribution (DFL Decomposition Result)
Note: The same explanatory variables as in FFL decomposition are used. Samples are married women in the Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS),
2004-2007.
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Figure 2.14: Changes in Histogram of Income among Married Women
Note: Samples are married women in the Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS), 2004-2007. The bin width is 0.1 million yen, but for the bin just
below 1.03 million yen, people earning 0.9 to 1.03 million yen (instead of 0.9 to 1 million yen) are included in order to separate people below this
threshold from those above it.
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Table 2.1.A: Employment Income Deduction Schedule
Parameters Total Annual Earnings (Y )
a=0, b=0.65 million if Y≤ 1.625 million yen
a=0.4, b=0 if 1.625 million yen<Y≤ 1.8 million yen
a=0.3, b=0.18 million if 1.8 million yen<Y≤ 3.6 million yen
a=0.2, b=0.54 million if 3.6 million yen<Y≤ 6.6 million yen
a=0.1, b=1.2 million if 6.6 million yen<Y≤ 10 million yen
a=0.05, b=1.7 million if 10 million yen<Y
Note: The employment income deduction can be formulated as aY + b, where Y is the total annual
earnings. All employees are eligible for a tax deduction of 0.65 million yen. If the amount of the tax
deduction calculated from Table 2.1.A is less than 0.65 million yen, it is set at 0.65 million yen.
Table 2.1.B: Tax Rate Schedule for Income Tax (1999-2006)
Amount of Taxable Income
(Unite: Million Yen≈10,000 USD) Tax Rate (%) Amount of Deduction (yen)
≤3.3 10 % 0
(3.3,9] 20 % 0.33 million
(9,18] 30 % 1.23 million
>18 37 % 2.49 million
Note: The schedule of the tax rate along with the deduction amount is listed in Table 2.1.B. The
tax rate changed in 2007 from a 4-tier system (10 %, 20 %, 30 %, and 37 %) to a 6-tier system
(5 %, 10 %, 20 %, 23 %, 33 %, and 40 %). Since incomes during 2003-2006 are analyzed in this
paper, the previous 4-tier system is presented in Table 2.1.B. The tax rate is determined based on
individual taxable income, which is calculated as total earnings − employment income deduction −
basic deduction (of 0.38 million yen) − other deductions/exemptions (if applicable). Total income
tax =Tax Rate×Taxable Income−Deduction in Table 2.1.B.
Table 2.1.C: Tax Rate Schedule for Income-Based Component of Residen-
tial Tax (1999-2006)
Amount of Taxable Income
(Unite: Million Yen≈10,000 USD) Tax Rate (%) Amount of Deduction (yen)
≤ 2 5 % 0
(2,7] 10 % 0.1 million
>7 13 % 0.31 million
Note: Residential taxes are levied at a rate based on personal income of the previous year as well as
uniform per-capita rate. The taxable income is calculated in the same way as the income tax, but
the amount of the basic deduction for the residential tax is 0.33 million yen instead of 0.38 million
yen.
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No Change Before After Before After
∼0.699.. 0.38 (0.33) 0.38 (0.33) 0 (0) 0.76 (0.66) 0.38 (0.33)
0.70∼0.749.. 0.38 (0.33) 0.33 (0.33) 0 (0) 0.71 (0.66) 0.38 (0.33)
0.75∼0.799.. 0.38 (0.33) 0.28 (0.28) 0 (0) 0.66 (0.61) 0.38 (0.33)
0.80∼0.849.. 0.38 (0.33) 0.23 (0.23) 0 (0) 0.61 (0.56) 0.38 (0.33)
0.85∼0.899.. 0.38 (0.33) 0.18 (0.18) 0 (0) 0.56 (0.51) 0.38 (0.33)
0.90∼0.949.. 0.38 (0.33) 0.13 (0.13) 0 (0) 0.51 (0.46) 0.38 (0.33)
0.95∼0.999.. 0.38 (0.33) 0.08 (0.08) 0 (0) 0.46 (0.41) 0.38 (0.33)
1.00∼1.03 0.38 (0.33) 0.03 (0.03) 0 (0) 0.41 (0.36) 0.38 (0.33)
1.030..∼1.049.. 0 (0) 0.38 (0.33) 0.38 (0.33) 0.38 (0.33) 0.38 (0.33)
1.05∼1.099.. 0 (0) 0.36 (0.33) 0.36 (0.33) 0.36 (0.33) 0.36 (0.33)
1.10∼1.149.. 0 (0) 0.31 (0.31) 0.31 (0.31) 0.31 (0.31) 0.31 (0.31)
1.15∼1.199.. 0 (0) 0.26 (0.26) 0.26 (0.26) 0.26 (0.26) 0.26 (0.26)
1.20∼1.249.. 0 (0) 0.21 (0.21) 0.21 (0.21) 0.21 (0.21) 0.21 (0.21)
1.25∼1.299.. 0 (0) 0.16 (0.16) 0.16 (0.16) 0.16 (0.16) 0.16 (0.16)
1.30∼1.349.. 0 (0) 0.11 (0.11) 0.11 (0.11) 0.11 (0.11) 0.11 (0.11)
1.35∼1.399.. 0 (0) 0.06 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06)
1.40∼1.409.. 0 (0) 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03)
1.41∼ 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Note: Table 2.2 shows the amount of spousal exemptions by the amount of spouse’s annual earnings. The un-parenthesized numbers represent
the income tax spousal exemptions and the parenthesized numbers represent the residential tax spousal exemptions. The schedule of the spousal
exemption by “spouse’s annual earnings” is applicable only for employees. The schedule applicable to all workers is defined by the total income, not
by the total earnings, which is calculated as the total earnings minus the employment income deduction for employees and the total earnings minus
necessary expenses for other workers.
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Table 2.3.A: Japanese Labor Market Trends in the Period 2003-2006
Before(2003) After(2004-2006) Difference
Unemployment Rate (%) 5.30 (2003) 4.10 (2006) -1.20
Married Women
Weekly Work Hours 30.37 28.67 -1.69
(19.11) (15.93) (0.54)
Annual Income (million yen≈10,000 USD) 1.84 1.78 -0.06
(1.92) (1.76) (0.04)
Husband’s Annual Income (million yen≈10,000 USD) 5.23 5.36 0.13
(3.32) (3.23) (0.04)
Hourly Wage Rate (100 yen≈1USD) 8.81 8.95 0.14
(8.64) (8.61) (0.09)
Single Women
Weekly Work Hours 36.18 37.46 1.28
(18.38) (17.56) (1.33)
Annual Income (million yen≈10,000 USD) 2.13 2.25 0.11
(1.40) (1.44) (0.06)
Hourly Wage Rate (100 yen≈1USD) 9.34 9.55 0.21
(2.66) (2.34) (0.29)
Note: The unemployment rate is obtained from the Statistics Bureau. The other statistics are calculated from the Keio Household Panel Survey
(KHPS) 2004-2007. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The sample is 2,896 women who participated in the Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS)
who reported information for both periods: before and after the 2004 tax reform. The statistics from the period after the tax reform are calculated as
the average among the three years immediately following the tax reform. The statistics for weekly work hours, hourly wage rate, and annual income
are obtained from sample participants who worked at least one hour during each period. The average husbands’ annual income is obtained from all
the married women in the sample. The hourly wage rate of hourly-paid workers is reported in the table due to the data limitation that hourly wage
information is available only for this group.
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Table 2.3.B: Changes in Total Spousal Exemption Amount (Unit: Million Yen≈10,000 USD)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Income Tax
Actual Spousal Exemption Before Tax Reform 0.640 0.184 0.030 0.760
Simulated Spousal Exemption After Tax Reform With the Same Earnings 0.369 0.050 0.030 0.380
Difference -0.270 0.160 -0.380 0.000
Residential Tax
Actual Spousal Exemption Before Tax Reform 0.560 0.156 0.030 0.660
Simulated Spousal Exemption After Tax Reform With the Same Earnings 0.322 0.040 0.030 0.330
Difference -0.238 0.138 -0.330 0.000
Note: Samples are 2,135 women in the Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS) whose husbands received spousal exemption greater than zero in 2003.
The amount is calculated based on their 2003 annual income. The amount of spousal exemption after the tax reform is a simulated amount of spousal
exemption each woman would receive when her earnings did not change over the period. Thus, the difference of the spousal exemption between the
periods reflects only the impact of the tax reform.
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Table 2.4.A: Impact of Tax Reform with an Increase in Husbands’ Incomes
on Wives’ Optimal Income Choice
Income Group Homothetic Non-homothetic
Before After Cobb-Douglas CES CRRA Stone-Geary
<0.7
<0.7 39 27 0 28
[0.7, 1.03) 0 0 0 0
1.03 0 0 0 0
(1.03, 1.30) 0 0 0 0
[1.30, 1.41) 0 0 0 0
≥1.41 0 0 0 0
[0.7, 1.03)
<0.7 0 1 0 1
[0.7, 1.03) 6 13 0 5
1.03 8 16 7 8
(1.03, 1.30) 0 0 0 0
[1.30, 1.41) 0 0 0 0
≥1.41 0 0 0 0
1.03
<0.7 0 0 0 0
[0.7, 1.03) 0 0 0 0
1.03 6 10 10 7
(1.03, 1.30) 0 0 0 0
[1.30, 1.41) 0 0 0 0
≥1.41 0 0 0 0
(1.03, 1.30)
<0.7 0 0 0 0
[0.7, 1.03) 0 0 0 0
1.03 0 0 0 0
(1.03, 1.30) 0 0 0 0
[1.30, 1.41) 0 0 0 0
≥1.41 0 0 0 0
[1.30, 1.41)
<0.7 0 0 0 0
[0.7, 1.03) 0 0 0 0
1.03 0 0 0 0
(1.03, 1.30) 0 0 0 0
[1.30, 1.41) 0 0 0 0
≥1.41 0 0 0 0
≥1.41
<0.7 0 0 0 0
[0.7, 1.03) 0 0 0 0
1.03 1 1 1 1
(1.03, 1.30) 0 0 0 0
[1.30, 1.41) 0 0 0 0
≥1.41 40 32 82 50
Observations 100 100 100 100
Note: Table 2.4.A presents the percentages of the 100 simulated optimal incomes that belong to
each income group before and after the tax reform for each utility function. The parameters for a
husband’s income before and after the tax reform are set at the average amount of the husband’s
income in Table 2.3.A. The hourly wage and the price of goods are fixed at 1,000 yen and 100 yen,
respectively. In the calculation, the social security payments, the decision making among the three
categories of the social security system, residential tax, employer-provided spousal allowance, and
employment insurance premium are also considered. Concerning these payments/allowances, the
amounts specified in Figure 2.1 are assumed.
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Table 2.4.B: Probability of “Income Jump” among High-Income Married Women (%) by Husband’s Income
Increase
Increase in Husband’s Income
(million yen≈10,000 USD)
Homothetic Non-homothetic
Cobb-Douglas CES CRRA Stone-Geary
0.1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.96
0.2 2.44 3.03 1.20 1.96
0.5 4.88 6.06 2.41 5.88
1 7.32 12.12 4.82 9.80
1.5 12.2 21.21 8.43 13.73
2 14.63 24.24 9.64 17.65
Note: Table 2.4.B reports the probability that married women in the highest income group will decrease their incomes to 1.03 million yen in response
to an increase in their husbands’ incomes after the tax reform, conditional on having been in the highest income group prior to the tax reform. Thus,
the number of parameter values with which the “income jump” occurs is divided by the total number of parameter values that attain annual incomes
of 1.41 million yen or more, prior to the 2004 tax reform. For example, in the Cobb-Douglas case with an increase in husband’s income of 0.2 million
yen, the probability of the “income jump” among high-income married women is calculated as 1/(1+40). The simulation settings are the same as
those in Table 2.4.A.
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Table 2.4.C: Impact of Tax Reform with an Increase in Husbands’ Incomes
on Wives’ Optimal Income Choice (Counter-factual Realizations Included)
Income Group Homothetic Non-homothetic
Before After Cobb-Douglas CES CRRA Stone-Geary
< 0.7
<0.7 39 (39) 27 (27) 0 (0) 28 (28)
[0.7, 1.03) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
1.03 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
(1.03, 1.30) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
[1.30, 1.41) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
≥1.41 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
[0.7, 1.03)
<0.7 5 (6) 14 (14) 0 (0) 8 (8)
[0.7, 1.03) 6 (8) 9 (16) 0 (7) 6 (6)
1.03 3 (0) 7 (0) 7 (0) 0 (0)
(1.03, 1.30) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
[1.30, 1.41) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
≥1.41 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
1.03
<0.7 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
[0.7, 1.03) 0 (6) 0 (10) 0 (10) 0 (7)
1.03 6 (0) 10 (0) 10 (0) 7 (0)
(1.03, 1.30) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
[1.30, 1.41) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
≥1.41 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
(1.03, 1.30)
<0.7 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
[0.7, 1.03) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
1.03 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
(1.03, 1.30) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
[1.30, 1.41) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
≥1.41 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
[1.30, 1.41)
<0.7 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
[0.7, 1.03) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
1.03 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
(1.03, 1.30) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
[1.30, 1.41) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
≥1.41 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
≥1.41
<0.7 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
[0.7, 1.03) 0 (6) 0 (8) 0 (8) 0 (9)
1.03 6 (0) 8 (0) 8 (0) 9 (0)
(1.03, 1.30) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
[1.30, 1.41) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
≥1.41 35 (35) 25 (25) 75 (75) 42 (42)
Observations 100 100 100 100
Note: The parenthesized numbers represent the “counterfactual” realizations of the optimal income
(i.e., the percentages of the 100 simulated optimal incomes where the tax reform had not occurred
in 2004). The simulation settings are the same as those in 2.4.A, except that Table 2.4.C reports
the results with a sufficiently large increase in husbands’ incomes (i.e., increase of 2 million yen).
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Table 2.4.D: Probability of “Income Jump” among High-Income Married
Women (%) by Husband’s Income Increase and Change in Wife’s Hourly
Wage
Change in Wife’s
Hourly Wage (yen (%))
Increase in Husband’s Income
(million yen≈10,000 USD)
0.2 0.5 1 1.5 2
-100 yen (-10%) 9.756 12.195 14.634 29.268 21.951
-50 yen (-5%) 4.878 7.317 9.756 29.268 17.073
-20 yen (-2%) 2.439 4.878 9.756 29.268 14.634
0 yen (0%) 2.439 4.878 7.317 26.829 14.634
+20 yen (2%) 0.000 2.439 4.878 24.39 12.195
+50 yen (5%) 0.000 0.000 2.439 12.195 9.756
+100 yen (10%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 31.707 7.317
Note: Table 2.4.D reports the probability of the “income jump” among married women who earned
1.41 million yen or more before the tax reform by husband’s income increase and change in wife’s
hourly wage. These simulation settings are the same as those in 2.4.B. Only the result of the
Cobb-Douglas utility function is reported.
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics
All Women Employees in Private Sector
(Sample for Probit) All Married Women Single Women
Hours of Work (hours/week) 17.98 30.87 28.82 37.73
(20.89) (16.98) (16.53) (16.65)
Before-Tax Income 1.03 1.88 1.76 2.20
(million yen/year) (1.60) (1.62) (1.63) (1.40)
Husband’s After-Tax Income 4.00 3.72 4.84 0.00
(million yen/year) (3.14) (2.99) (2.49) 0.00
Age 48.15 44.22 46.32 37.25
(12.86) (11.31) (9.78) (13.14)
Tenure 10.04 7.03 7.50 5.44
(10.58) (7.62) (7.86) (6.56)
Number of Children 1.37 1.41 1.68 0.54
(1.08) (1.10) (1.00) (0.95)
Firm Size 149.82 233.80 229.91 246.78
(181.84) (197.40) (197.18) (197.71)
Dummy Variables
Married 0.84 0.77 1.00 0.00
Working 0.55 1.00 1.00 1.00
Employee 0.41 1.00 1.00 1.00
Employee in Private Sector 0.37 1.00 1.00 1.00
Permanent Employee 0.29 0.59 0.57 0.68
Unionized Worker 0.07 0.14 0.12 0.17
Education Dummy Variables
Junior High School 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.03
High School 0.55 0.57 0.60 0.46
Junior College 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.28
University 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.22
Income-group Dummy Variables
Income<0.7 0.54 0.19 0.22 0.11
0.7≤Income≤1.03 0.14 0.25 0.30 0.10
1.03<Income<1.41 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.11
1.41≤Income 0.27 0.44 0.37 0.68
Observations 10976 3206 2466 740
Note: The first column reports descriptive statistics for the probit regression, and the descriptive
statistics for employees represent those of the sample used in the main analyses. Husbands’ after-
tax incomes that ignore the spousal exemptions are used for husbands’ incomes. All the earnings
data are corrected for inflation (i.e., the real earnings, calculated as nominal earnings divided by
the consumer price index (CPI) of each year are reported for women’s (before-tax) annual incomes
and husbands’ (after-tax) annual incomes that ignore the spousal exemptions.) The CPI of each
year is 1, 1, 0.997, and 1 for 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively. (The base CPI is that of
2003.) The husbands’ incomes for single women are treated as zero and included in the sample. For
this reason, the average value of the husbands’ incomes is low for the sample that consists of both
married women and single women.
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Table 2.6: Difference-in-Difference Estimation: Effects of Tax Reform on Labor Supply
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent Variable Work=1 Annual Income (Million Yen) RIF of Annual Income Weekly Work Hours
Quantile Mean 30th 60th 90th 30th 60th 90th 30th 60th 90th
Probit OLS FE CQR UQR CQR
Treatment -0.334 -0.667 -0.366 -0.475 -0.464 -0.517 -0.307 -0.786 -0.537 -7.291 -4.801 -5.286
(0.061) (0.172) (0.306) (0.069) (0.075) (0.143) (0.061) (0.139) (0.376) (1.362) (1.380) (1.280)
After 0.129 -0.028 - -0.138 -0.038 -0.082 -0.105 -0.061 0.030 -1.480 0.190 -1.130
(0.052) (0.090) (0.064) (0.069) (0.128) (0.046) (0.120) (0.257) (1.257) (1.267) (1.192)
Treatment·After -0.021 0.073 0.038 0.164 0.074 0.064 0.172 0.126 0.028 3.589 0.726 1.657
(0.059) (0.101) (0.034) (0.075) (0.081) (0.149) (0.058) (0.138) (0.302) (1.470) (1.480) (1.388)
Husband’s Income -0.053 0.036 0.198 -0.037 -0.032 -0.000 -0.031 -0.069 0.117 -0.874 -0.811 -0.537
(million yen/year) (0.008) (0.037) (0.127) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.020) (0.061) (0.122) (0.131) (0.125)
Number of Children -0.034 -0.152 -0.123 -0.067 -0.135 -0.171 -0.036 -0.202 -0.287 -0.873 -0.657 -0.995
(0.020) (0.033) (0.070) (0.017) (0.018) (0.036) (0.020) (0.051) (0.112) (0.335) (0.332) (0.332)
Age 0.191 0.081 - 0.072 0.100 0.100 0.024 0.098 0.318 0.335 0.153 -0.218
(0.013) (0.025) (0.012) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013) (0.033) (0.075) (0.231) (0.227) (0.213)
Age2/100 -0.221 -0.104 - -0.090 -0.125 -0.125 -0.032 -0.137 -0.371 -0.525 -0.285 0.253
(0.014) (0.028) (0.013) (0.014) (0.024) (0.016) (0.037) (0.083) (0.259) (0.251) (0.233)
Tenure - 0.085 0.078 0.069 0.066 0.077 0.064 0.144 0.093 0.666 0.612 0.558
(0.016) (0.019) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.016) (0.042) (0.106) (0.107) (0.101)
Tenure2/100 - 0.009 -0.229 -0.054 0.119 0.167 -0.136 -0.200 0.429 -0.790 -0.649 -0.784
(0.065) (0.086) (0.018) (0.020) (0.039) (0.022) (0.054) (0.162) (0.357) (0.359) (0.336)
Unionized Worker - 0.566 0.153 0.415 0.583 0.485 0.122 0.644 1.368 3.867 0.298 1.732
(0.101) (0.079) (0.049) (0.050) (0.091) (0.042) (0.127) (0.384) (0.925) (0.933) (0.862)
Permanent Employee - 0.614 0.133 0.302 0.424 0.654 0.073 0.648 1.564 5.319 5.660 4.787
(0.062) (0.057) (0.033) (0.034) (0.064) (0.036) (0.086) (0.180) (0.650) (0.635) (0.605)
ln (Firm Size) - 0.072 0.008 0.037 0.066 0.084 0.024 0.027 0.265 0.696 0.489 -0.037
(0.020) (0.017) (0.011) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012) (0.029) (0.068) (0.218) (0.213) (0.200)
Education Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.083 0.409 0.137 0.160 0.294 0.355 0.190 0.349 0.270 0.151 0.163 0.100
Observations 10976 3206 3206 3206 3206 3206 3206 3206 3206 3206 3206 3206
Note: Marginal effects are reported in Column 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. The Probit, OLS, and UQR standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. A constant term is also included. Husbands’ after-tax incomes that ignore the spousal exemptions are used for husbands’ incomes.
The treatment group is made up of married women whose husbands are eligible for the spousal exemptions (i.e., married women who are not the
head of household and have husbands whose total income is 10 million yen or less per year). Single women and married women whose husbands are
not eligible for the spousal exemptions are used as the control group.
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Table 2.7: FFL Decomposition Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Reweighting No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Quantile 25th 50th 60th 70th 95th
Total Change: 0.0002 - -0.0106 - -0.0072 - -0.0616 - -0.0544 -
(0.0275) (0.0354) (0.0708) (0.0857) (0.1686)
Composition Effects:
Treatment -0.0027 -0.0023 -0.0040 -0.0035 -0.0041 -0.0036 -0.0045 -0.0039 -0.0046 -0.0040
(0.0033) (0.0014) (0.0050) (0.0020) (0.0055) (0.0027) (0.0062) (0.0032) (0.0096) (0.0073)
Husband’s Income -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0115 -0.0118 -0.0169 -0.0165 -0.0055 -0.0049 0.0202 0.0244
(0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0058) (0.0035) (0.0093) (0.0060) (0.0073) (0.0066) (0.0200) (0.0159)
Other 0.0047 0.0072 0.0025 0.0054 -0.0144 -0.0099 -0.0168 -0.0136 -0.0169 -0.0064
(0.0125) (0.0082) (0.0207) (0.0116) (0.0437) (0.0230) (0.0542) (0.0287) (0.1102) (0.0553)
Total -0.0006 0.0021 -0.0131 -0.0098 -0.0354 -0.0300 -0.0268 -0.0224 -0.0013 0.0140
(0.0130) (0.0081) (0.0225) (0.0116) (0.0453) (0.0227) (0.0544) (0.0276) (0.1106) (0.0531)
Structure Effects:
Treatment 0.1442 0.1785 0.1272 0.1189 -0.0996 -0.0063 -0.0521 0.0845 -0.0828 -0.1662
(0.0841) (0.0822) (0.1070) (0.1065) (0.1973) (0.1933) (0.2348) (0.2496) (0.6007) (0.5273)
Husband’s Income -0.1186 -0.1494 0.0044 -0.0090 0.0610 0.0393 -0.1029 -0.0959 0.1650 0.1349
(0.0792) (0.0790) (0.0968) (0.0963) (0.1730) (0.1672) (0.2084) (0.2164) (0.5781) (0.5042)
Other/Constant -0.0248 -0.0306 -0.1291 -0.1076 0.0667 0.0416 0.1202 -0.0223 -0.1353 -0.0423
(0.0544) (0.0526) (0.0774) (0.0729) (0.1630) (0.1613) (0.1952) (0.2097) (0.3069) (0.2934)
Total 0.0008 -0.0015 0.0025 0.0023 0.0282 0.0746 -0.0347 -0.0337 -0.0531 -0.0735
(0.0265) (0.0256) (0.0311) (0.0292) (0.0600) (0.0555) (0.0730) (0.0719) (0.1436) (0.1331)
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the RIF of annual income (million
yen). “Husband’s Income” includes husband’s after-tax income that ignores spousal exemptions and its square. The “Other” category includes age and
its square, number of children, tenure and its square, unionized worker dummy variable, permanent employee dummy variable, educational dummy
variables, and industry dummy variables. The standard errors of the decomposition components are computed using the delta method and take
into account the variability induced by stochastic regressors (Jann, 2008). The odd-numbered columns report the results of the decomposition using
RIF-regressions without reweighting. The even-numbered columns report the results of the reweighted-regression decomposition, in which F (X) in
2003 is reweighted to 2004-2006.
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Figure A.2.1: Tax Reform Effects for Higher Husbands’ Tax Rates
Note: The sample includes “eligible” married women whose husbands’ tax rates are 10% or 20%. In
this regression, annual income is regressed on I(tH = 0.2), After, and I(tH = 0.2)×After and other
explanatory variables. Figure A.2.1 plots CQR estimates for the coefficient of I(tH = 0.2)×After.
The dependent and independent variables used in this regression are the same as those in Column
4 to 6 in Table 2.6, except that the treatment group in this regression is “eligible” married women
whose husbands’ tax rate is 20% and the control group is “eligible” married women whose husbands’
tax rate is 10%.
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Table A.2.1: Check for Selection Issue due to Attrition
All Women Participated in All Years Dropped
Hours of Work (hours/week) 17.60 17.41 17.98
(21.47) (21.30) (21.83)
Before-Tax Income 0.98 0.98 0.98
(million yen/year) (1.60) (1.60) (1.59)
Age 47.17 46.94 47.65
(12.91) (12.61) (13.48)
Number of Children 1.36 1.41 1.25
(1.07) (1.07) (1.08)
Married 0.84 0.85 0.82
Working 0.52 0.53 0.51
Employed 0.39 0.38 0.39
Education Dummy Variables
Junior High School 0.13 0.11 0.15
High School 0.55 0.55 0.56
Junior College 0.21 0.21 0.19
University 0.11 0.12 0.10
Observations 3269 2189 1080
Note: The descriptive statistics represent those for 2004. The sample in the first column includes
all women who participated in the 2004 survey. The sample in the second column includes only
those workers who participated in all years (2004-2007), and the third column reports information
about those workers who dropped from the sample at some point during the 2004-2007 period. Since
the sample includes both working and non-working women, 0 hours and 0 yen are included in the
calculations of the average work hours per week and the average annual income, respectively.
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CHAPTER III
Why Do Wages Become More Rigid during a
Recession Than during a Boom?
3.1 Introduction
When unemployed workers are available, why do firms not cut wages until the
excess supply is eliminated, as is expected in the ideal market scenario depicted by
conventional theory? This question has puzzled many economists, and a number of
studies have attempted to solve the dilemma. Noteworthy among them are the efforts
of Bewley (1999), who conducted commendable field research, and provided us with
a clue to the answer. In the research, Bewley (1999) found that none of the existing
theories about wage rigidity correctly explains his findings in the “real” US labor
market, which implies the need for a new theoretical model.
One of the reasons why research on wage rigidity during recession is important is
that wages during recessions could be a factor that would reduce high unemployment;
i.e., theoretically, firms could hire more people by paying lower wages to the existing
workers. In this sense, it would not matter if wages increase or do not fall during
booms; however, if wages do not fall during recessions, it could be a factor that
prevents new workers from being hired. Thus, if there is a special reason wages do
not fall during recessions, it would be important to understand the possible source of
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such wage rigidity.
There are two core concepts in wage rigidity: real wage rigidity and nominal wage
rigidity. Bewley (1999) defines each concept of wage rigidity as follows: “Real wages
are downwardly rigid if employers feel obliged to increase pay by at least the rate of
inflation in the cost of living. Nominal wages are rigid if there is resistance to cutting
nominal pay but not to increasing pay by less than the rate of inflation in the cost of
living.”
In this paper, I will explore the mechanism in which the nominal wages become
downwardly rigid during recessions (but not during booms) by showing that firms have
a reason to resist cutting nominal pay only during recessions. To do so, I construct
a new type of efficiency wage model in which workers’ efforts could be maintained
not only by high wages (under the threat of performance-based layoffs), but also by
performance-based pay and promotion. In the sense that high wages induce workers’
high effort via the threat of dismissal, this paper utilizes the idea of the shirking
model. However, the following attributes make this model different from the existing
shirking models.
First, wages are assumed to be performance-based, unlike the standard efficiency
wage hypothesis, which assumes fixed wages. Recently, performance-based pay has
been employed in many countries. For example, Lemieux et al. (2009) show that, in
the U.S., the proportion of performance-pay jobs is increasing. Moreover, the “pay for
performance” system has been widespread in many countries. This is particularly so
in Japan, where most employees traditionally receive a substantial portion of their pay
in the form of bonuses. This trend has been particularly widespread since the 1990s.
In Japan, it is generally the case that the bonus is a payment that can fluctuate,
depending on the firm’s business and the worker’s performance. Thus, particularly
for countries such as Japan, it is important to assume performance-based pay rather
than fixed wages. Given this scenario, in the model presented in this paper, a worker’s
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total compensation is divided into two components: a fixed pay component (regular
pay) and a performance-based pay component (bonus). This division enables us to
understand how each component of pay contributes to wage rigidity during recessions.
Second, the layoff decision is endogenous, and is allowed to be contingent on mar-
ket conditions. In Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), the dismissal rule is exogenously given,
and workers caught shirking are fired regardless of market conditions. Sparks (1986)
further developed the rule of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) by making both workers’
effort levels and the criterion for dismissal endogenous. In Sparks’ model, it is as-
sumed that workers who provide effort equal to or above the minimum effort standard
are never dismissed, and a firm offers workers a labor contract that specifies a wage
and the minimum effort standard. In equilibrium, workers’ efforts are set equal to
the minimum effort standard, which yields no dismissals regardless of market condi-
tions, as Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) demonstrated. However, in the real world, while
unionized experienced employees’ jobs are relatively secure even during recessions, it
is widely observed that many non-union workers are actually laid off during reces-
sions, depending on their performance. According to Bewley (1999), 28 % (86 %) of
non-union (unionized) workers are laid off based on inverse seniority, while 57 % (7
%) of non-union (unionized) workers are laid off based on performance.1 In order
to capture these widely observed practices, I adopt a model in which firms decide
how much weight they put on performance (or seniority) as a layoff criterion, rather
than the “minimum effort standard.”2 In this way, it becomes possible to allow the
layoff criteria to differ between unionized workers and non-union workers, and in this
1The remaining category is “both performance and inverse seniority,” and 7 % of unionized
workers and 13 % of non-union workers are categorized into this category.
2In most economic models, firms lay off their workers either randomly or based on seniority.
For example, Baily (1977) and Macleod et al. (1994) present models in which firms lay off workers
randomly, while Grossman (1983) and Reagan (1992) assume seniority-based layoffs. Nosal (1990),
Strand (1991), and Strand (1992) consider both types of layoffs. Laing (1994) and Gibbons and
Katz (1991) propose signaling models, in which firms may choose to lay off workers according to
observed ability. Ioannides and Pissarides (1983) present a model in which a firm decides to lay off
a worker based on the information of an external offer to the worker.
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model, layoffs can actually occur only during recessions in equilibrium. Consequently,
unlike Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Sparks (1986), I arrive at an answer to the
following question: Why do wages not fall during downturns in which firms lay off
many workers, thereby creating high unemployment?
Third, I extend the standard shirking theory by introducing promotions. Since
promotion is also an important instrument for maintaining workers’ incentives, in
Section 3.3, I present the model with promotions.
The main results obtained from the theoretical model are as follows: (a) Perfor-
mance-based layoffs are more likely to occur when the layoff costs and the output
price are low; (b) experienced employees’ regular pay is likely to be downwardly rigid
during periods in which performance-based layoffs occur; and (c) bonuses move pro-
portionally to the output price. Together with the result (a), the result (b) has an
implication on the downward rigidity of regular pay during recessions: without the
threat of layoffs, wages scheduled to be paid in the next period do not affect current
workers’ efforts because workers will necessarily receive the wages without being laid
off in the next period, regardless of their current effort levels. Thus, the firm cannot
control the workers’ efforts using their future wages, which results in a lower, at least,
a less downwardly rigid regular pay without the threat of layoffs. In contrast, under
the threat of layoffs, workers can receive the next period’s wages only when they work
hard in the current period and avoid layoffs. Therefore, the higher wages scheduled
to be paid after performance-based layoffs have occurred are, the harder workers try
to avoid layoffs, thus investing greater efforts. This gives the firm an incentive to
raise the future regular pay to maintain workers’ current efforts, which results in a
downwardly rigid regular pay during recessions.
The rationale behind (c) is very simple. During recessions, firms are discouraged
from maintaining workers’ current incentives at a high level due to the lower value of
productivity. In contrast, during booms, it is more beneficial for firms to raise bonuses
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so as to induce higher effort levels from workers because the value of productivity is
high. As a result, the bonus moves proportionally to the output price. I also show
that introducing promotions does not change these main results.
In order to test these theoretical implications obtained from the theoretical model,
I conduct an empirical analysis using the Japanese panel data from the Keio House-
hold Panel Survey (KHPS) 2004-2007. There are two steps in the estimations of
the theoretical model: The first step is a layoff regression, employed to confirm
that performance-based layoffs are more likely to occur for non-union workers whose
performance-based layoff costs are relatively low and during recessions in which the
output price is low. The second step is a wage regression, which shows that regular
pay becomes downwardly rigid when performance-based layoffs are likely to occur, i.e.,
for non-union workers during recessions, and that bonuses just move proportionally
to the output price.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the framework of the
basic model. Section 3.3 shows that the results obtained in the basic model remain
unchanged even if promotions are introduced. Section 3.4 presents a strategy to
test the implications of the theoretical model, followed by a possible solution for
the selection bias problem. Section 3.5 provides a brief description of the data, and
Section 3.6 discuses the results from my empirical analysis. Section 3.7 contains the
conclusion to this paper.
3.2 The Basic Model
3.2.1 Model Structure
Worker Types
I assume that there are only two types of workers in each firm: new employees
and experienced employees. Workers who have been recently recruited by a firm
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are categorized as new employees, and workers who have continued with the same
employer are categorized as experienced. Here, by simplicity, workers are assumed to
have a two-period time horizon. In the first period, they join a firm as new employees.
In the second period, they either remain with the same employer as experienced
employees or are laid off at the beginning of the second period.3
Output Price
Firms are assumed to be price-takers, and the output price is drawn randomly
from a distribution G(p) with density function G(p) > 0 for p ∈ [p−, p+]. Thus, the
output price is assumed to be i.i.d. here, so that a higher value of pt does not lead
the firm (or others) to expect a higher value of pt+1.
Wages
A worker’s wage is divided into two components —a fixed pay component and a
performance-based pay component— and it is expressed as follows:
wt(pt) = at(pt) + bt(pt) et (3.1)
where at represents regular (fixed) pay and bt represents the “piece rate” paid for
each unit of effort, et. It is assumed that both at and bt are contingent on the output
price, pt, and that the contract specifies (at(pt), bt(pt)) for each realization of pt.
Layoffs
When a firm uses workers’ “performance” as a criterion for layoffs, the layoff
probability for a worker is assumed to be a decreasing function of the efforts offered
by the same worker in the previous period. In contrast, if the firm uses “seniority” as
3In this model, I assume that workers who have been recently employed by a firm are not laid
off. The firm thus controls the entire labor force by adjusting the number of new employees and the
number of layoffs of experienced employees.
94
a criterion for layoffs, an experienced worker who has already worked for one period
in the firm will not be laid off with a probability 1. It is assumed that the firm can
choose how much weight to put on performance while choosing the layoff criterion.
Let γ t ∈ [0, 1] denote the weight put on performance by the firm while deciding the
layoff criterion. It is assumed that γ is also contingent on the output price, p, i.e.
γ(p).






+ (1− γ t(pt)) · 1 (3.2)
where eN is a new employee’s effort. The subscripts N,E, hereafter, represent the
types of workers, new employees and experienced employees, respectively. I assume
that e is exogenously given, while γ t is chosen by the firm. Note that the higher
γ t is, the higher the layoff risks that a worker faces. If γ t = 1, the layoff decision is
completely performance-based, and the fraction, (1−eN/e), of experienced employees
will be laid-off. Note that a “completely performance-based” layoff decision does
not mean that the firm lays off all workers whose efforts in the first period are less
than e: it means that an increase/decrease in eN will be fully reflected in the layoff
probability. For γ t ∈ [0, 1], changes in the effort level will be partially reflected in
the layoff probability. If γ t = 0, the layoff decision is completely seniority-based and
thus, an experienced worker who has already worked for one period will be retained
in the firm with a probability 1. In this case, changes in the effort level do not affect
the layoff probability at all.
Timing
The timing is given by the following:
1. The output price, pt, is observed by both the firm and its workers.
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2. Each firm selects a labor contract that will be offered to the new employees.
3. New employees decide whether to accept or reject the firm’s offer. Experienced
employees also decide whether to stay in the same firm.
4. Both new employees and experienced employees who continue with the firm
exert effort, production occurs, profits are realized, and payments are made.
5. In case of γ t > 0, workers are laid off with a probability γ t+1(pt+1)(1 − eN/e).
If not laid off, workers who have finished their first period at the firm become
new experienced employees. Original experienced employees who have finished
their second period at the firm retire.
6. Steps from 1 to 5 are repeated.
3.2.2 Workers
All workers are assumed to be identical in that they possess the same skills and
utility functions. A worker’s utility is assumed to be increasing in wage income, w,
and decreasing in the level of work effort, e. The posited utility function is:
Utility = w − e2 (3.3)
Let EU be the discounted expected lifetime utility of a new employee employed in
period t. Assuming that a worker is paid wages at the end of a period, the next
equation shows the discounted lifetime utility of a new employee hired in period t:




























where U(p) is the utility of a laid off worker when the output price, p, is realized.4
Workers who have completed the first period are allowed to quit the firm if the utility
of the second period, calculated after the output price pt+1, has been realized to be
lower than U(p). Given the contract proposed by a firm, each employed worker decides
the amount of effort to invest into his/her current job with the aim of maximizing
his/her expected lifetime utility.
Note that the worker never has an incentive to supply efforts beyond e because
offering efforts beyond e brings disutility without lowering the probability of layoffs.
In order to capture the fact that experienced employees are better protected against
permanent layoffs under seniority-based layoffs than under performance-based layoffs,
I assume hereafter that the exogenous variable e is large enough to ensure that the
internal solution for e∗N is always less than e, which results in e
∗
N/e < 1. Then, solving





















Equations (3.5) and (3.6) show that workers’ current efforts depend on the current
piece rate, b, i.e., e∗N and e
∗
E increase in bN and bE, respectively. It is, however,
more important to note that as long as a firm pays wages that are higher than those
necessary to keep workers during the second period, the efforts of a new employee,
eN , will also depend on the wages scheduled to be paid in the next period after
performance-based layoffs have occurred, i.e., γ t+1(p) > 0. In other words, in deciding
4In this paper, it is assumed that all workers have the same ability and skill, thus there is no
room for the sort of inference that arises in the “career-concern” models, where the worker’s outside
option in the second period depends on the market’s estimate of the worker’s ability. Therefore,
U(p) does not depend on effort in the first period as it usually does in “career-concern” models.
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the optimal effort level, new employees consider the future wages to be paid during
periods in which performance-based layoffs occur. For example, if performance-based
layoffs occur only in recessions, wages scheduled to be paid during recessions will
affect new employees’ efforts, while wages scheduled to be paid during booms will
not.
This is because given the possibility of being laid off, new employees can re-
ceive wages scheduled to be paid in the second period only if they work hard in the
first period and avoid layoffs. Then, higher wages of experienced employees during
“performance-based layoff periods” encourage new employees to work hard.
In contrast, experienced employees’ wages during periods in which performance-
based layoffs do not occur, i.e., experienced employees’ wages with γ t+1(p) = 0, do
not affect new employees’ efforts because new employees will necessarily receive the
wages without being laid off, regardless of their current effort levels. Thus, when
γ t+1(p) = 0, only the current piece rate can affect new employees’ incentives.
In addition, since experienced workers are assumed to retire after the second
period, only the current “piece rate” induces experienced employees’ efforts without
threat of future layoffs. Equation (3.6) explains this result.
3.2.3 Firms
All firms are assumed to produce the same output, adopt the same technology, and
utilize homogeneous labor input. Output is a function of the amount of total efforts
provided by new employees and experienced employees. For simplicity, I assume the
following linear production function:
f(nN eN , nE eE) = nN eN + nE eE (3.7)
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where nN and nE denote the number of new employees and the number of experienced
employees, respectively. In any period, the realization of the firm’s profits is:
Πt = pt f(nN,t eN,t, nE,t eE,t)− nN,t(aN,t + bN,t eN,t)− nE,t(aE,t + bE,t eE,t) (3.8)
Experienced employees are recruited from last period’s new employees, so the number
employed, nE, is given by:
5
nE,t =
 0 t = 0(γ t eN,t−1e + 1− γ t) n∗N,t−1 ∀ t ≥ 1 (3.9)
In period 0, when the firm is established, there is no worker who continue with the
firm, and hence, there is no experienced employee at the firm in period 0 by the
definition of experienced employees in this paper.
Let C be the exogenous costs associated with laying off a worker. Note that in this
model, it is assumed that workers who were recently employed by a firm are not laid
off. This simplification makes the “seniority-based layoffs” equivalent to “no layoff
of experienced workers.” Thus, layoff costs (C) are also equivalently treated as the
costs of performance-based layoffs.
The firm offers a new employee hired in period t a contingent contract, Xt =(nN,t,
aN,t, bN,t, γ t+1(pt+1), aE,t+1(pt+1), bE,t+1(pt+1); ∀pt+1) to maximize its profits subject
to providing workers with a competitively determined utility level. Since a compet-
itive firm with constant returns to scale is considered here, this utility level will be
adjusted until the firm makes zero profits in equilibrium. Thus, the firm’s problem can
be viewed as one of maximizing a worker’s utility, subject to its zero profit constraint
(Arnott and Stiglitz, 1985).
5Here, I adopt the hiring structure assumed in Ioannides and Pissarides (1983).
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+ 1− γ t+1(p)
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 dG(p) = 0,
Equation (3.5),
Equation (3.6),
aE,t+1(pt+1) + bE,t+1(pt+1)eE,t+1 − e2E,t+1 ≥ U(pt+1) ∀ pt+1
γ t+1(pt+1) ≥ 0 ∀ pt+1, and
γ t+1(pt+1) ≤ 1 ∀ pt+1
(3.10)
Let λ, η(pt+1), µ1t ≥ 0, and µ2t(pt+1) ≥ 0 ∀ pt+1 be the Lagrangian multiplier on
the zero profit constraint, the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the no-quit
constraint for experienced workers, γ t+1(pt+1) ≥ 0 and γ t+1(pt+1) ≤ 1∀ pt+1, respec-





Substituting Equation (3.11) and ∂eN,t/∂bN,t = 1/2 into the first conditions for bN,t
and aE,t+1 yields:
η(pt+1) = 0 ∀ pt+1 (3.12)
This means that the no-quit constraint for experienced employees is not binding.
Thus, as long as the firm solves the optimization problem presented in (3.10), the
no-quit constraint is automatically satisfied, and workers will never quit even without
6The first order conditions are solved in the Appendix.
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the no-quit constraint.7
From the first conditions for bE,t+1 (i.e., equation (3.4A) in the Appendix), we
obtain pt+1 = 2e
∗





Combining these two equations yields:
b∗E(pt+1) = pt+1 ∀ pt+1 (3.13)
Equation (3.13) implies that the piece rate for experienced workers is set equal to the
output price. Thus, in equilibrium, the marginal revenue of effort from the viewpoint
of a firm (pt+1), the marginal disutility of effort (2e
∗
E,t+1), and the marginal cost of
7In the equilibrium, the no-quit constraint is automatically satisfied, so placing the no-quit con-
straint will not change the optimal solution. It will, however, effect, the feasible options for the firm
to deviate from the solution. Here, I will show that when we do not place the no-quit constraint,
the possibility that aE,t+1(pt+1) + bE,t+1(pt+1)eE,t+1 − e2E,t+1 = U(pt+1) holds in equilibrium is
excluded, and hence in equilibrium, aE,t+1(pt+1) + bE,t+1(pt+1)eE,t+1 − e2E,t+1 > U(pt+1) is always
satisfied—that is, workers are always paid higher wages than they would earn as a result of the
outside option during the second period. In the simple principal-agent problem, maximizing profits
subject to a participation constraint yields the same equilibrium as maximizing worker utility subject
to a profit constraint. Therefore, in order to explain the intuition which led to the result, I assume a
problem maximizing profits subject to a participation constraint. Suppose that a firm paid just the
necessary level of wages to keep workers during the second period. Then, the firm could be better
off by increasing bN,t by a small amount and decreasing aE,t+1(pt+1) for the realization of pt+1 with
which performance-based layoffs occur by an amount that satisfies the hiring constraint. This is
because if the firm paid just the necessary amount to keep workers during the second period, future
wages should not affect the incentives for new employees. Therefore, decreasing aE,t+1(pt+1) during
the “layoff regime” would not affect new employees’ efforts but would allow the firm to increase
bN,t, and this would enable the firm to induce greater efforts from experienced employees. Further-
more, decreasing aE,t+1(pt+1) will cause the utility from the second period to drop below the utility
of the outside option. Thus, in response to the decrease in aE,t+1(pt+1), workers will quit at the
beginning of the second period, which would benefit the firm because the profits during periods in
which performance-based layoffs occur were originally scheduled to be negative. The fact that a firm
has an incentive to move from the solution derived from the maximization problem contradicts the
definition of the equilibrium. Thus, as long as workers are allowed to quit, the firm pays more than
necessary to prevent workers from quitting in equilibrium. (When the firm pays more than necessary
to prevent workers from quitting, decreasing aE,t+1(pt+1) from the optimal level derived in this sec-
tion will lower the new employees’ level of effort, which results in a decrease in profits. Thus, the firm
does not have an incentive to deviate from the solutions derived in the Appendix.) In contrast, if
we do place the no-quit constraint, both cases, aE,t+1(pt+1)+ bE,t+1(pt+1)eE,t+1−e2E,t+1 > U(pt+1)
and aE,t+1(pt+1)+bE,t+1(pt+1)eE,t+1−e2E,t+1 = U(pt+1), can be realized in equilibrium. The reason
why aE,t+1(pt+1) + bE,t+1(pt+1)eE,t+1 − e2E,t+1 = U(pt+1) can also be optimal in this case is that
the deviation stated above—decreasing aE,t+1(pt+1) slightly and increasing bN,t to make up for the
loss of utility—is not possible when we have no-quit constraint, because decreasing aE,t+1(pt+1) will
break the no-quit constraint, taking aE,t+1(pt+1) + bE,t+1(pt+1)eE,t+1 − e2E,t+1 below U(pt+1).
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effort from the viewpoint of a firm (b∗E(pt+1)) are set to be equal. Equation (3.13)
also implies that firms base wages less on workers’ performance during recessions.
This is because, during recessions, firms are discouraged from maintaining workers’
incentives at a high level since the value of productivity, pt+1, is lower.
Furthermore, by solving the first order condition with respect to γt+1(pt+1), we
obtain the following Proposition:
Proposition 3.1
Performance-based layoffs occur when p2t+1/4 − U(pt+1) + C < 0 is satisfied. This
implies that:
1. Performance-based layoffs are more likely to occur when layoff costs, C, are low.
2. With a constant U , the above inequality is more likely to be satisfied for lower
pt+1.
3. Even if U(pt+1) is allowed to vary with pt+1, as long as the utility function of
unemployed workers is a concave function of pt+1, i.e., as long as U
′(pt+1) ≥
0 and U ′′(pt+1) ≤ 0 are satisfied, performance-based layoffs do not occur for
sufficiently large pt+1.
8
Proof. See the Appendix.
In words, the firm’s optimal layoff decision can be explained as follows: When
pt+1 > 2
√
U(pt+1)− C is satisfied, γ∗t+1(pt+1) = 1 holds, i.e., the optimal layoff rule
is the seniority-based layoff, and nobody will be laid off under the assumption that
layoffs are implemented only from experienced workers.9 Once pt+1 crosses the thresh-
old value, 2
√
U(pt+1)− C, layoffs are implemented, i.e., the “no-layoff regime” will
switch to the “layoff regime.” When pt+1 < 2
√
U(pt+1)− C is satisfied, the layoff
decision is completely performance-based, and an experienced worker will be laid off
8In Section 3.6, I will empirically examine with which pt+1 this inequality is more likely to be
satisfied.
9The result of seniority-based layoffs means “no layoff” under this assumption.
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with probability, 1− eN/e. Within the “layoff regime,” a decrease in pt+1 will reduce
eN through the reduction in bE,t+1, which results in an increase in layoffs.
10
The next proposition explains how the optimal regular pay and the optimal
bonuses are related to the layoff decision stated above.
Proposition 3.2
1. In periods in which performance-based layoffs occur, the regular pay of expe-
rienced employees has a higher lower-bound than the regular pay in periods in
which performance-based layoffs do not occur.
2. Except for cases in which the output price greatly declines from period t to
period t + 1, workers’ pay becomes more performance-based as their careers
progress.
3. Experienced employees’ bonuses move proportionally to the output price re-
gardless of the possibility of performance-based layoffs.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3.2.1 implies that it is more important for the firm to raise experienced
employees’ piece rate than to raise new employees’ piece rate since the former can
affect not only experienced employees’ current efforts but also new employees’ efforts
in the preceding period. As a result, the piece rate paid to new employees is set below
10Given the linear production technology, each cohort’s two-period problem is solved independently
of other cohorts. With this setting, the firm’s decision to lay off the existing experienced workers in
period t is made independently from its decision to hire new junior worker in period t, and hence
even during a period in which the firm conducts performance-based layoffs, junior workers can be
hired. As Nosal (1990) also assumes, “seniority-based layoffs (layoffs by inverse-seniority)” means
here that the possibility for experienced workers to be laid off is zero. It is also possible to pose
a restriction that junior workers are not hired during periods in which experienced workers are
laid off. However, the object of this paper is to classify periods by the layoff possibility of senior
workers, rather than delving into specifics regarding the definition of each layoff type. Thus, the
term “seniority-based layoffs” in this paper should be understood as a situation where the layoff
probability of senior workers is automatically set at zero (regardless of their performance, market
conditions, and the number of new hires).
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the output price, while the piece rate paid to experienced employees is set equal to
the output price. Thus, if workers encounter the same output price between period
t and t+1, they necessarily experience an increase in the piece rate as their careers
progress. Except for the case in which the output price greatly declines from period
t to period t+ 1, workers experience a piece rate increase as their careers progress.
Simple calculations using the first-order condition for bN show that bN would
become equal to pt if the possibility of performance-based layoffs were eliminated,
i.e., if γ∗t+1(pt+1) = 0 was satisfied with probability 1. If this could happen, the firm
would not have to differentiate bN from bE since both piece rates would affect only
workers’ current efforts without a possibility of layoffs. In this way, when there is no
possibility of performance-based layoffs, the two periods become independent of each
other, and then the two-period problem becomes a per-period profit maximization
problem.
Proposition 3.2.2 is more important because it offers an implication for wage
rigidity. Future wages scheduled to be paid in the next period during which layoffs do
not occur do not affect new employees’ current efforts, because workers will necessarily
receive the wages without being laid off in the next period, regardless of their current
effort levels. Thus, the firm cannot control new employees’ efforts by manipulating
their future wages under the “no-layoff regime,” which results in a lower, or at least
a less downwardly rigid, regular pay.
In contrast, future wages scheduled to be paid in the next period during which
layoffs occur affect new employees’ current efforts since workers will receive the wages
only when they work hard in the current period, and avoid being laid off. Thus, the
higher the wages scheduled to be paid in the next period are, the harder the workers
will work. This gives the firm an incentive to pay high regular pay under the “layoff
regime.” As a result, the regular pay of experienced workers has a lower bound,
equal to the layoff costs when the output price is low enough that layoffs occur, while
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the regular pay can be below the layoff costs when the output price is high enough
that layoffs do not occur. In this way, in this model, the downward wage rigidity
during recessions occurs through a channel in which a low output price increases the
probability of performance-based layoffs.
The intuition behind Proposition 3.2.3 is very simple. Firms are discouraged from
maintaining workers’ current incentives at a higher level due to the lower value of
productivity during recessions. Thus, during recessions, firms base their wages less
on workers’ performance.
3.3 Promotion
So far, we have seen how a firm uses the threat of layoffs to maintain new em-
ployees’ incentives and how the wage decision yields wage rigidity during periods in
which performance-based layoffs occur. However, promotions can be thought of as
another important instrument for maintaining new employees’ incentives. Thus, in
this section, I consider promotions as well as layoffs. Here, it is assumed that a new
employee can be promoted at the beginning of the second period and that the pro-
motion probability is an increasing function of the workers’ efforts offered in the first








This is very similar to the probability of a worker being retained in the firm, and a
new employee can be promoted with probability 1 if he/she offers a level of work effort
greater than or equal to eP , which is exogenously given. Promotions are generally
accompanied by an increase in salary. Thus, let R(p) ≥ 0 be the additional reward
paid to the promoted workers. I assume that R is also contingent on the output price.
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In these settings, Equation (3.4) in the previous section becomes:


































Introducing promotions changes new employees’ choice of the optimal effort, and the























 dG(p) = 0
(3.16)
Note that now R can affect new employees’ efforts even in the “no-layoff regime,”
which can be confirmed from the fact that R remains in the equation even for the cases
of γ = 0. This is because a higher R motivates workers even in the “no-layoff regime”
as long as the promotion probability is based on a new employee’s performance. Note
that experienced employees’ wages excluding R, i.e., aE + bE eE, still do not affect
new employees’ efforts under the “no-layoff regime” because workers will necessarily
receive the wages, aE + bE eE, under the “no-layoff regime” regardless of whether
they will be promoted or not.
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 dG(p) = 0,
Equation (3.16),
γ t+1(pt+1) ≥ 0 ∀ pt+1, and
γ t+1(pt+1) ≤ 1 ∀ pt+1 (3.17)
Then we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3.3
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 are still true even if promotions are allowed.
Proof. See the Appendix.
If we allow for promotions, the regular pay in the “layoff regime” falls by an amount
that is proportional to the wage increase when promoted. Thus, there is a trade-off
between a high wage increase when an employee is promoted and the high regular pay
of experienced employees in the “layoff regime” because both future factors can pos-
itively affect new employees’ incentives. However, even if promotions are considered,
the conditional expectation of regular pay under the “layoff regime” is still set above
layoff costs, C, because of the participation constraint for the experienced employees.
In contrast, the regular pay under the “no-layoff regime” can be below the layoff costs,
as in the previous section. As a result, in periods in which performance-based layoffs
occur, the regular pay of experienced employees has a higher lower-bound than the
11The participation constraint for experienced employees does not change since it should be sat-
isfied for those who are not promoted under the assumption of R ≥ 0.
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regular pay in periods in which performance-based layoffs do not occur. Therefore,
it can be said that the important implications from the basic model do not change
even if we allow for promotions.
3.4 Empirical Model
This section presents a strategy to test empirically the implications of the theo-
retical model. There are two steps in the evaluation of the theoretical model. The
first is layoff regression, which tests the implications of Proposition 3.1. The second
is wage regression, which tests the implications of Proposition 3.2.
3.4.1 Layoff Regression
Proposition 3.1 states that layoffs occur when the inequality, p2t+1/4− U(pt+1) +
C < 0, is satisfied. This implies that layoffs are more likely to occur when the
performance-based layoff costs, C, and the output price, p, are low.12
Thus, the following model is estimated:
Involuntary Leaveit = γ0 + γ1NonUnionit + γ2 Priceit +Xitγ + uit (3.18)
where Involuntary Leaveit is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if individual
i was laid off or left his/her employer due to the reason on the firm’s side during
year t. NonUnion is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual
is a non-union worker at the beginning of year t, and Priceit represents the output
price the firm (where individual i belongs to) faces at the beginning of year t . Xit
represents attributes of individual i and its firm at the beginning of year t.
12The impact of the output price on layoffs is actually indeterminate because it depends on the
functional form of U(pt+1). However, as shown in Proposition 3.1, the negative relationship between
the output price and the layoff probability is true as long as the functional form of U(pt+1) is linear
or concave, as usually assumed in economics literatures.
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The union status captures the magnitude of performance-based layoff costs, C,
because the costs associated with performance-based layoffs of unionized workers are
expected to be higher than those of non-union workers.13
The expected sign for γ1 is positive because non-union workers are expected to
have a higher layoff probability than unionized workers because of their lower layoff
costs. The expected sign for γ2 is negative.
In the layoff regression, it is expected that restricting the sample to experienced
workers places more focus on performance-based layoffs than on seniority-based lay-
offs. This is because the layoffs that happen among experienced or senior workers are
less likely to be “seniority-based layoffs.” Thus, Section 3.6 will present the results
obtained from the sample that consists only of experienced workers. After confirming
that the theoretical implication of Proposition 3.1 is true in the actual data, I will
proceed to the wage regressions to test Proposition 3.2.
3.4.2 Wage Regression
Wage regressions are added to test Proposition 3.2. Proposition 3.2.2 states that
the regular pay of experienced workers becomes downwardly rigid during periods in
which performance-based layoffs occur. Together with Proposition 3.1, which states
that performance-based layoffs are likely to occur during recessions, Proposition 3.2.2
has implications for the downward rigidity of regular pay during recessions.
Note that this type of model about the threat of performance-based layoffs is more
likely to be true for non-union workers (Bewley, 1999) because there is a possibility
13The survey conducted by Abraham and Medoff (1984) shows that in the U.S., approximately
78 % of union groups were covered by written policies that specify seniority as the most important
factor to be considered in permanent layoff decisions, while it was just 16 % for nonunion groups.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data also reveal that in 1970-71, over 70% of employee groups
under major union agreements in the U.S. were covered by layoff provisions that specify seniority
as the most important factor to be considered in permanent layoff decisions. Given these evidences,
in the empirical analysis, I will use union-status as a proxy for layoff costs, C, assuming that costs
associated with the performance-based layoffs of experienced/senior workers are lower for non-union
workers than for unionized workers because of the contract provisions.
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that the constraint under which the performance-based layoffs become optimal cannot
be satisfied for unionized workers even when the output price is low because of their
high “performance-based layoff costs.”14
In the layoff regression, it was possible to roughly distinguish performance-based
layoffs from seniority-based layoffs by checking whether each laid-off worker had been
an experienced worker with a sufficiently long tenure with a previous employer. How-
ever, in the regular-pay regressions, which use samples of working people, it is not
possible to know the types of layoff criteria (whether they are performance-based or
seniority-based) assumed in their firms by just restricting the sample to experienced
workers. Thus, in the regular-pay regression, I include the interaction term between
the “non-union worker” dummy variable and the output price. By including this
term, we can test whether wage rigidity is more likely to be observed for non-union
workers whose layoffs are more likely to be based on performance.
In contrast, Proposition 3.2.3 predicts that the bonus does not depend on the
types of layoffs; hence, distinguishing performance-based layoffs is not necessary for
the bonus-pay regression, which means that we are not interested in a coefficient of the
interaction term in the bonus regression. Instead, checking whether the coefficient
of the output price is significantly positive is important because Proposition 3.2.3
suggests that the bonuses of experienced employees move proportionally to the output
price.
14According to Bewley (1999), 28 % (86 %) of non-union (unionized) workers are laid off accord-
ing to inverse seniority, while 57 % (7 %) of non-union (unionized) workers are laid off according
to performance. The model explains these widely observed layoff practices as follows: The costs
associated with the performance-based layoffs of unionized experienced employees are high enough
that p2t+1/4−U(pt+1)+C < 0 is never satisfied for any pt+1. Thus, the firm never lays off unionized
experienced employees because of the high layoff costs. In contrast, with the relatively low costs
associated with the layoffs, both cases p2t+1/4−U(pt+1) +C > 0 and p2t+1/4−U(pt+1) +C < 0, are
possible for non-union workers. Then, the firm implements performance-based layoffs for non-union
workers when the output price is low and no workers are laid off when the output price is high.
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Thus, the estimated model is:
lnait = α0 + α1NonUnionit + α2Priceit
+α3NonUnionit · Priceit +Xitα + uit
lnbit = β0 + β1NonUnionit + β2Priceit
+β3NonUnionit · Priceit +Xitβ + eit
(3.19)
where lnait and lnbit are the logarithm of regular pay and bonus pay for individual
i in year t, respectively. Although the theoretical implication regarding the output
prices refers to the firm-specific output price, wages are often indexed with respect to
the overall price level as well, either formally or informally. In order to capture this
widely observed practice, the year dummy variables are also included in X.
The implications from Proposition 3.2 can be written as follows: α3 < 0β2 > 0 (3.20)
Proposition 3.2.2 expects α3 to be significantly negative because, in the compar-
ison between non-union workers and unionized workers, regular pay is expected to
fluctuate less in response to changes in the output price for non-union workers who
are more likely to face the downward wage rigidity.
In contrast, the sign of β2 implied by Proposition 3.2.3. is significantly positive.
In order to use bonuses as the performance-based component of wages, it is necessary
to ensure that bonuses are actually paid for workers’ current performance. This is
supported by Freeman and Weitzman (1989), Ohashi (1989), and Brunello (1991), all
of whom examined the Japanese bonus system. Freeman and Weitzman (1989) state
that compensating workers’ efforts is one of the main purposes of bonus payment in
Japan. Ohashi (1989) also found that bonuses are paid to compensate employees for
their intensity of work. Brunello (1991) found no statistically significant correlation
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between bonuses and employment level in the car, steel, and electric-machinery in-
dustries in Japan, which implies that the profit-sharing aspect of the Japanese bonus
system is not substantial. Particularly, since the 1990s, the importance of the “pay-
for-performance” aspect of the Japanese bonus system has been increasing. Thus, it is
thought that it is theoretically more valid to assume performance pay (w(e) = a+ be)
than fixed pay (w) for Japan.
3.4.3 Restricting the Sample to Experienced Workers
The theoretical implications of wages could be true only for experienced workers,
because the crux of the model is that under the threat of layoffs, firms maintain work-
ers’ incentives by using future wages, which will be paid to “experienced workers.”
Therefore, in Section 3.6, I will present the empirical results for both all workers and
experienced workers, and I will confirm that the expected results on wages can be
obtained or become more conspicuous when the sample is restricted to experienced
workers.
In contrast, the theoretical implications of layoffs would be true for new employees
as well when we relax the assumption that new employees are not laid off. However, as
discussed in Section 3.4.1, restricting the sample to experienced workers in the layoff
regression helps us focus more on performance-based layoffs, rather than seniority-
based layoffs. For this reason, in the layoff regression as well, the result with the
sample that consists only of experienced workers will be reported.
3.4.4 Sample Selection Bias
Since the dependent variables in the wage regressions, regular pay and bonuses,
are reported only by working people, there might be a selection bias problem. If there
is a tendency that workers with specific unobserved characteristics are likely to avoid
layoffs during recessions, Priceit and the error term might be correlated. For example,
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if workers with very high ability are less likely to be laid off during recessions, then
the lower the output price is, the more likely it is that workers included in the sample
will be of high ability.15 Since such unobservable individual characteristics might be
included in the error term, Priceit are thought to be correlated with the error term.
Then, the coefficients α2 and β2 might be negatively biased in the OLS. Furthermore,
it is thought that this selection bias is more serious for non-union workers, since their
employment is thought to be less protected than that of unionized workers. This
means that α3 might also be biased if we use OLS.
Thus, it is necessary to control for workers’ fixed effect by using panel data. In
this paper, this problem is expected to be resolved by using the fixed effects model.
3.5 Data
The data set used in this study is Japanese panel data from Keio Household
Panel Survey (KHPS), conducted annually by Keio University. The KHPS data are
relatively new as the data collection for the survey began in 2004. This survey is
conducted in January every year and includes observations randomly chosen from
almost all regions and industries in Japan. A key feature of KHPS is that it is
the first nationwide follow-up survey in Japan of individuals (4,000 households and
7,000 people) of all ages and both sexes, which also captures information regarding
education, employment, income, expenses, health, and family structure. The survey
has been designed to enable comparisons with major international panel surveys such
as Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and European Community Household
Panel (ECHP).
The details of the KHPS are as follows: Respondents for the first wave are men
and women aged between 20 and 69 as of January 31, 2004, from all of Japan. The
15This type of selection bias can be thought of as the so-called countercyclical composition bias,
although the term is usually used in the context of aggregate time-series data (Stockman (1983),
Bils (1985), Solon et al. (1994), and Chang (2000)).
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first wave (2004) included 4,005 households, the second wave (2005) included 3,314
out of 4,005 in the first wave, the third wave (2006) 2,887 households, and the fourth
wave (2007) 2,643 households. The attrition rate from the first wave to the fourth
wave is 34 %. Although 1,419 households were newly added to the samples in 2007,
this paper does not utilize these samples.16
The industry-level CPIs are used as the measure of Priceit. Since KHPS records
wage data in the previous year, the price indexes used as the independent variable
in wage regressions are the annual price indexes for the previous year. Table 3.1.A
reports changes in the annual CPI for each industry during the period 2003-2006. The
CPI data is obtained from the Consumer Price Index data by the Statistics Bureau at
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of
Internal Affairs and Communications, 2006). To avoid a potential mismatch between
the CPI data and the industry categories used in the survey, the service industry and
the “financing and insurance” industry are excluded from the sample. Additionally,
because, in many cases, the outputs in the mining industries are used as the interme-
diate goods traded between firms, the price index data in the Corporate Goods Price
Index are used for the mining industry (Bank of Japan, 2006).
Table 3.1.B contains descriptive statistics for the sample of layoff regression. Sam-
ples include only individuals who were working as of January in year t. Those repre-
sented in the first column are divided into two groups: those who left/changed their
employer during year t (shown in the second column) and those who continued with
the same employer (shown in the third column). The layoff regression determines how
the employment status and the output price at the beginning of year t affect the layoff
probability during year t. Thus, Table 3.1.B reports characteristics of the workers
(and the employers) at the beginning of year t and the industry-level consumer price
index during January. Because the survey asks about a change in employer during
16The data can be extended in the future study since this survey will continue in the future.
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the previous year, the information about the job change during year t can be obtained
from the survey of year t+1. In contrast, the characteristics of the workers (and the
employers) at the beginning of year t are obtained from the survey of year t. To
utilize both, the sample is restricted to individuals who participated in the survey for
at least two straight years.
The average age of the participants is 46.04 years and 63 % of the sample did not
belong to any labor union. Individuals who left or changed their previous employer
during year t represent 5 % of the sample, and approximately 20 % of these people
are those who left their previous employers involuntarily. This category includes lay-
offs, dismissals, and other firm-related reasons excluding bankruptcy. The criterion,
“Years Needed To Be Experienced,” represents the average value of the answer to
the questions: How long does it take for workers to feel they are experienced in your
field?, and the average value is calculated for each of industry × occupation cells.
The sample average of the answer to that question is 2.12 years. This measure is
used to classify the sample into experienced workers and others.
Table 3.1.C reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of wage regressions. In
the wage regressions, the observations are restricted to individuals who earned positive
values of regular pay and bonuses.17 In the estimation sample, the average monthly
regular pay from 2003-2006 is 327,301 yen (≈USD 3,273.01), while the average annual
bonus for individuals who received a positive bonus amount is 960,475 yen (≈USD
9,604.75). These amounts become higher if we restrict the sample to experienced
workers. In order to distinguish “experienced” worker groups from other workers,
two criteria are used: tenure of three years and “Years Needed To Be Experienced.”
According to the general survey on working conditions conducted in 2003, three years
of tenure is the most common minimum length of tenure that is necessary for an
17The reason why the layoff regression has more observations than the wage regressions is that
only 60 % of workers in the sample receive bonuses greater than zero. The samples are unified
between the regular-pay and bonus-pay regressions, thus because of the fewer samples of the bonus
regression, the sample size for the regular-pay regression is also reduced.
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employee to receive retirement allowances in Japan (Ministry of Health, Labor, and
Welfare, Government of Japan, 2003a). The minimum tenure required for an employee
to receive retirement allowances differs between layoffs and quits. For layoffs, the
minimum tenure required to receive a retirement allowance is less than 1 year for 12.2
% of all firms, 1-2.9 years for 30.3 % of all firms, 2-2.9 years for 11.1 % of all firms,
3-3.9 years for 38.7 % of all firms, 4-4.9 years for 1.1 % of all firms, and more than 5
years for 6.2 % of all firms. For quits, I omit the overall distribution of firms over the
criteria, but the fraction of the firms that set the minimum requirement of tenure in
the 3-3.9 years category is 60 %. Thus, three years can serve as a useful threshold for
classifying workers into “new” and “experienced” groups, because it becomes harder
for a firm to lay workers off at a tenure of three years, at least in terms of costs.
The total annual bonus payment amounts to three-times the employee’s monthly
regular pay. From this data, it can be confirmed that most employed workers in
performance-pay jobs in Japan receive a substantial portion of their pay in the form
of a bonus. This is consistent with other previous studies that use other earning
data.18
3.6 Empirical Results
3.6.1 Layoff Regression Results
Table 3.2 presents the regression results of the layoff equation. The dependent
variable is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if the individual was laid-off
or left his/her employer due to firm-related reasons during year t. Individuals who
were working at the beginning of year t are used for the sample. In this regression,
18It is well known that the ratio of bonuses to total pay is traditionally high in Japan compared
to other countries. Nakamura and Hubler (1998) show that the ratios of bonus to regular pay in
the 1980s were 0.317, 0.121, and 0.194 for Japan, Germany, and the U.S., respectively. According
to Nakamura and Nakamura (1991), most employed workers in Japan are paid 25 to 33 % of their
total earnings in the form of bonus payments.
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layoff experience during year t is regressed on the industrial-level CPI during January,
the non-union status dummy variable and other characteristics of the workers at
the beginning of the year. The other characteristics of the workers include: the
male dummy variable, the education dummy variables, potential experience in years
(=age−6−education years) and its square, tenure and its square, the marital status
dummy variable, the number of children, the logarithm of firm size, year dummy
variables, payment-type dummy variables, and industry dummy variables.
The estimates in Table 3.2 show that the effect of the CPI on layoff experience
is significantly negative in all columns. In other words, the data show that layoffs
are more likely to occur during periods in which the output price is low, which is
consistent with Propositions 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. This is also consistent with the findings
of Bewley (1999) that the majority of layoffs are implemented in response to reduced
demand for labor because of a decline in product demand.
Columns 3 to 6 show the results of the layoff regressions among experienced work-
ers only. As discussed in Section 3.4, it is expected that the layoffs that occurred
among experienced workers are likely to be performance-based. The estimates from
these columns suggest the significant positive effect of the non-union worker dummy
on the layoff experience. This is consistent with the prediction from Proposition
3.1.1, which states that performance-based layoffs are more likely to occur when the
costs of performance-based layoffs are low. Thus, it is expected that the theoretical
predictions concerning performance-based layoffs are true in the actual data.
3.6.2 Wage Regression Results
In the wage regressions, the same explanatory variables as those included in the
layoff regressions are used with two exceptions. First, the interaction between non-
union status and the industrial-level CPI is also included in the wage regression.
Second, the CPI used in the wage regression is the annual CPI (by industry) instead
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of the CPI during January.
Table 3.3 reports the results of the regular pay regression. As discussed in Section
3.4.4, the OLS estimates might suffer from the sample selection bias. Thus, the FE
estimates, not the OLS estimates, should be taken as the more reliable results. The FE
estimates indicate that the coefficient of the interaction term is significantly negative,
which supports Proposition 3.2.2, i.e., the regular pay of experienced employees is
less responsive to changes in the output price for non-union workers whose layoffs
are more likely to be based on performance. Together with the result from the layoff
regression, which states that performance-based layoffs are likely to occur during
recessions, this implies that downward wage rigidity occurs during recessions in the
presence of performance-based layoffs.
Table 3.4 presents the results of the bonus-pay regressions. Although the OLS
estimates suggest insignificant coefficients for the CPI, we confirmed in Section 3.4.4
that the coefficient of the CPI could be negatively biased in the OLS regressions due
to the sample selection problem. Indeed, if we examine the FE estimates, the effect of
the CPI on bonuses becomes significantly positive for experienced workers. Thus, the
results of the bonus regressions are consistent with Proposition 3.2.3: The bonuses of
experienced employees move proportionally to the output price.
These results from the wage regressions are consistent with Freeman and Weitz-
man (1989), who found that Japanese bonuses are much more procyclical than Japanese
base wages.19
19Freeman and Weitzman (1989) also found that base wages in Japan are negatively related to
employment. The results obtained from Table 3.3 are also consistent with this finding of Freeman
and Weitzman (1989) because, in the current paper, base wages become downwardly rigid when
employment shrinks due to layoffs. Consequently, this implies a negative relationship between base
wages and employment. Moreover, Freeman and Weitzman (1989) found that bonuses are positively
related to employment. Note that, in the current paper, it is assumed that bonuses are paid for
the workers’ efforts. As a result, they are set equal to the output price. Thus, although the model
setting, itself, assumes the pay-for-performance bonus model, the results do not refute the positive
correlation between the amount of bonuses and the firms’ profits (or other variables that reflect the
firms’ profits, such as employment). Therefore, it can be said that the findings here do not contradict
the findings in Freeman and Weitzman (1989), which also analyzed the Japanese labor market.
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effect of performance-
based layoffs on wage rigidity in the context of performance pay. Given the findings
of Bewley (1999) that performance-based layoffs frequently occur during recessions,
especially for non-union workers, I constructed a theoretical model in which firms’
layoff decisions can depend on workers’ performance, and firms can decide how much
weight they put on performance in the layoff decision. Thus, both the rules for layoffs
and wages are endogenous in this model. The firms’ decisions follow an over-lapping
generation model structure, dividing the workers into two types: new employees and
experienced employees.
The main results obtained from the theoretical model are as follows: a) Perfor-
mance-based layoffs are more likely to occur when the layoff costs and the output price
are low. b) Experienced employees’ regular pay is likely to be downwardly rigid during
periods in which performance-based layoffs occur. c) Bonuses move proportionally to
the output price.
The reason for the result (b) is important: Without the threat of layoffs, wages
scheduled to be paid in the next period do not affect current workers’ efforts because
workers will necessarily receive the wages without being laid off in the next period,
regardless of their current effort levels. Thus, the firm cannot control new employees’
efforts using their future wages, which results in a lower, at least, a less downwardly
rigid regular pay without the the threat of layoffs. In contrast, under the threat of
layoffs, workers can receive the next period’s wages only when they work hard in
the current period and avoid layoffs. Thus, the higher the wages to be paid in the
next period are, the harder workers try to avoid layoffs, investing greater efforts. This
gives the firm an incentive to raise the future regular pay to maintain workers’ current
efforts, which results in a downwardly rigid regular pay of experienced employees
under the threat of layoffs.
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The explanation underlying (c) is very simple. Firms are discouraged from main-
taining workers’ current incentives at a higher level due to the lower value of produc-
tivity during recessions, which results in the bonus that moves proportionally to the
output price. This analysis also showed that introducing promotions does not change
the results.
The empirical analysis in this paper uses Japanese panel data from the Keio
Household Panel Survey (KHPS). All the empirical results confirmed the theoretical
implication: performance-based layoffs are likely to occur for non-union workers and
during recessions; and regular pay is likely to be downwardly rigid for non-union whose
layoffs are more likely to be based on performance. Given that performance-based
layoffs are likely to occur during recessions, the result concerning regular pay implies
that downward wage rigidity occurs during recessions in the presence of performance-
based layoffs. Furthermore, the bonus-pay regression confirmed that firms base wages
less on workers’ performance during recessions by paying lower bonuses. As a result,
wages during recessions become both “downwardly rigid” and “rigid” (inflexible) with
respect to performance.
This type of explanation for wage rigidity can be applied to unionized workers
whose layoff decisions are likely to be performance-based in countries such as Japan
where performance-based pay has been widely employed.
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Appendix
The first order conditions are as follows:
∂L
∂aN,t
= 1− λnN,t = 0 (3.1A)
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∂bN,t
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+ µ1t − µ2t = 0 ∀ pt+1 (3.5A)
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aE,t+1(pt+1) + bE,t+1(pt+1)eE,t+1 − e2E,t+1 − U(pt+1)
}
= 0 ∀ pt+1
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Proof of Proposition 3.1
Given that ∂eN,t/∂bN,t = 1/2 > 0 and given Equation (3.11), from Equation (3.2A),




By substituting Equations (3.11), (3.13), and (3.8A) into Equation (3.5A), Equation









p2t+1 − U(pt+1) + C
)
g(pt+1)
+µ1t(pt+1)− µ2t(pt+1) = 0 (3.9A)
Note that µ1t(pt+1) ≥ 0 and µ2t(pt+1) ≥ 0 are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated
with γ t+1(pt+1) ≥ 0 and γ t+1(pt+1) ≤ 1, respectively. Since (eN,t/e − 1) in the first
term in (3.8A) is always negative by assumption, the sign of (µ1t(pt+1)−µ2t(pt+1))
depends on the sign of the term, (p2t+1/4− U(pt+1) + C), and can be categorized as:
µ1t(pt+1)− µ2t(pt+1)

< 0 if 1
4
p2t+1 − U(pt+1) + C < 0
= 0 if 1
4
p2t+1 − U(pt+1) + C = 0
> 0 if 1
4
p2t+1 − U(pt+1) + C > 0
(3.10A)
Since both µ1t(pt+1) and µ2t(pt+1) are always non-negative, the sign of {µ1t(pt+1)
−µ2t(pt+1)} can be negative only when µ1t(pt+1) = 0 and µ2t(pt+1) > 0.20 This
corresponds to the case of γ∗t+1(pt+1) = 1, i.e., the case in which the layoff decision is
completely performance-based.
The second case, {µ1t(pt+1)− µ2t(pt+1)}= 0, can be true only when µ1t(pt+1) =
20Note that these two multipliers cannot be positive at the same time since γt+1(pt+1) = 0 and
γt+1(pt+1) = 1 cannot hold at the same time.
122
µ2t(pt+1) = 0 holds. In this case, γ
∗
t+1(pt+1) can take any number between 0 and 1
when pt+1 satisfies the condition, p
2
t+1/4−U(pt+1)+C = 0, as an equality. With con-
tinuous pt+1, this happens with zero probability. The last case, (µ1t(pt+1)−µ2t(pt+1))>0,
can be satisfied only when µ1t(pt+1) > 0 and µ2t(pt+1) = 0, which corresponds to the
case of γ∗t+1(pt+1) = 0, i.e., the case in which a firm’s layoff decision is completely
seniority-based.
Mathematically, the optimal layoff decision stated above can be written as:

γ∗t+1(pt+1) = 1 if T (pt+1, C) < 0
γ∗t+1(pt+1) ∈ [0, 1] if T (pt+1, C) = 0
γ∗t+1(pt+1) = 0 if T (pt+1, C) > 0
(3.11A)
where T (pt+1, C) ≡ p2t+1/4− U(pt+1) + C
It is obvious that the function, T (pt+1, C), is increasing in C, and thus the case of
γ∗t+1(pt+1) = 1 is more likely to occur when C is low. In other words, firms are more
likely to implement performance-based layoffs when layoff costs are low.
If we assume that the utility of the laid off workers, U , does not depend on pt+1,
the value of ∂T/∂pt+1 = pt+1/2 − U ′(pt+1) is always positive since, in that case, the
second term, U ′(pt+1), is zero. On the other hand, if we allow U to increase in pt+1,
the sign of ∂T/∂pt+1 = pt+1/2−U ′(pt+1) becomes indeterminate and varies according
to the functional form of U(pt+1). However, even if we allow U to depend on pt+1, we
can still say that T (pt+1, C) > 0 is satisfied for sufficiently large pt+1 as long as the
law of diminishing marginal utility is satisfied for U(pt+1) with respect to pt+1, i.e.,
U ′(pt+1) ≥ 0 and U ′′(pt+1) ≤ 0.
For ease of understanding, I will divide the function T (pt+1, C) into two parts:
p2t+1/4 +C and U(pt+1). Figure A.3.1 depicts p
2
t+1/4 +C and U(pt+1) as functions of
pt+1. As shown in (3.9A), when the curve, p
2




is satisfied, and performance-based layoffs do not occur. Depending on the value of
C, the curve, p2t+1/4 +C, can move up or down in Figure A.3.1. It is also possible to
move U(pt+1) up and down by changing the intercept of U(pt+1). However, as long
as the law of diminishing marginal utility is satisfied for U(pt+1) with respect to pt+1,
i.e., U ′(pt+1) > 0, and U
′′(pt+1) < 0, p
2
t+1/4+C finally moves above the U(pt+1) curve
as pt+1 increases since p
2
t+1/4 + C is a convex function of pt+1. In other words, the
value of T (pt+1, C) goes to infinity as pt+1 increases except when U(pt+1) is a convex
function of pt+1. Thus, the firm sets γ
∗
t+1(pt+1) = 0, i.e., the firm stops implementing
layoffs for sufficiently large pt+1 as long as U(pt+1) is concave. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.1
Given Equations (3.11) and (3.13), Equation (3.8A) can be rewritten as:
∂L
∂eN,t







p2t+1 − U(pt+1) + C
)
dG(p) = 0 (3.12A)
As shown in (3.11A), γ∗t+1(pt+1) = 1 holds for any pt+1 that satisfies pt+1 <2
√
U(pt+1)− C
and γ∗t+1(pt+1) = 0 holds for any pt+1 that satisfies pt+1 > 2
√
U(pt+1)− C. There-
fore, the inside of the integral in (3.12A) becomes zero for the realizations of pt+1 >
2
√














p2t+1 − U(pt+1) + C
)
dG(p) = 0 (3.13A)
By the condition of pt+1 < 2
√
U(pt+1)− C, the second term in (3.13A) is negative.















Proof of Proposition 3.2.2
Substituting Equation (3.5) into Equation (3.13A) yields:










dG(p) = 0 (3.17A)
Then, the conditional mean of the regular pay in period t+1, conditional on being
in the “layoff regime,” i.e., pt+1 < 2
√
U(pt+1)− C, is expressed as:
E[a∗E,t+1(p)/p < 2
√











) + C > C
(3.18A)
The first term in Equation (3.18A) shows that in order to maintain new employ-
ees’ efforts, the lower the new employees’ piece rate is, the higher the experienced
employees’ regular pay should be. There is a trade-off between a high regular pay
for experienced employees and a high piece rate for new employees.21 However, by
21Note that the optimal regular pay is presented in a form of conditional mean. This is because
new employees do not care about the exact amount of the regular pay they will receive for each
realization of pt+1. However, they still care about their future regular pay. The only aspects they
care about are how much pay they will receive on average during periods in which layoffs occur and
during periods in which layoffs do not occur. Thus, as long as the conditional mean of aE in each
of the two layoff regimes satisfies the first-order conditions of the firm’s maximization problem, any
aE(pt+1) for pt+1 ∈ [p−, p+] can be optimal for a firm. However, while hiring, the firm needs to
specify not only the conditional mean of aE in each of the two layoff regimes but also aE(pt+1) for
all realizations of pt+1 because, otherwise, the firm would pay zero regular pay for any realization
125
Inequality (3.16A), we know that b∗Nt is set below the output price; i.e., the first term
in Equation (3.18A) is positive. Thus, the conditional mean of aE, conditional on
being in the “layoff regime,” has a lower bound of C>0.
As confirmed in Equation (3.12), the no-quit constraint does not bind, which
means that the following condition is satisfied even without the condition:
aE,t+1(pt+1) + bE,t+1(pt+1)eE,t+1 − e2E,t+1 ≥ U(pt+1) (3.19A)





We know from Equation (3.11A) that U(pt+1)−p2t+1/4 > C holds when γ∗t+1(pt+1) = 1,








Thus, the lower bound of C exists not only for the conditional mean of the regular
pay in period t+1, conditional on being in the “layoff regime,” but also for every
realization of aE,t+1(pt+1).
We have confirmed that by the first order conditions w.r.t. wages, Equation
(3.8A) is satisfied. Since ∂EU
∂eN,t
= 0 holds because of the effort supply function of new
of pt+1 in the second period, insisting that it originally set aE(pt+1)=0 for that realization of pt+1,
and that the conditional means still satisfy the employment contract. In order for the firms to
refrain from such moral hazards and gain the trust of their workers, aE(pt+1) for every realization










This is nothing but Equation (3.17A). Thus, in the equilibrium, new employees’
efforts are exerted until any further increase in eN,t will not change the total profits.
As long as the probability of pt+1 <2
√
U(pt+1)− C is positive, the optimal bN,t is
set less than pt (Proposition 3.2.1) because aE,t+1 also plays the role of inducing new
employee efforts. This means that an increase in eN,t will increase the profits from the
first period because (pt − bN,t)eN,t > 0 holds. Then, to attain Equation (3.8A’), an
increase in eN,t should decrease profits from the second period. Since an increase in
eN,t will increase the probability of a worker being retained in the firm, aE,t+1 should
be high enough that the increase in the probability (of a worker being retained in
the firm) will yield more costs (aE,t+1) than benefits (C) from the view point of the
firm. This makes aE,t+1 in the “layoff regime” high enough that the no-quit constraint
holds.
In contrast, regular pay under the “no-layoff regime” is free from constraint
(3.12A) since it does not affect the new employees’ efforts by virtue of the fact that
workers can gain regular pay regardless of their efforts. (Under the “no-layoff regime,”
the second term in (3.12A) becomes zero, and hence aE,t+1 is no longer included in
the equation.) Consequently, regular pay under the “no-layoff regime” is free from
the constraint of maintaining the workers’ incentives, and it can be low provided that
constraint (3.6A) is satisfied.22
Then, using the zero-profit constraint, the conditional mean of regular pay under
22Note that, under the “no-layoff regime”, aE,t+1 does not affect eN,t, which means both the
objective function and the Kuhn-Tucker constraint are linear with respect to aE,t+1 under the “no-
layoff” regime. Thus, we cannot conclude anything from Equation (3.12) for aE,t+1 under the
“no-layoff regime”, and it is also possible for the firm to provide aE,t+1 that induce workers to quit.
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the “no-layoff regime” is expressed as:
E[a∗E,t+1(p)/p > 2
√













As is shown in Equation (3.22A), in the absence of performance-based layoffs,
the firm can choose any combination of a∗N and a
∗
E as long as it satisfies the zero-
profit constraint. This is because there is no difference between a∗E in the “no-layoff
regime” and a∗N from the viewpoint of a firm in that neither of them affects the
workers’ incentives. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.3
From Equation (3.13), we know that the piece rate paid to each unit of effort, bE, is set
equal to the output price. Thus, the amount of bonus is expressed as bE,t+1eE,t+1 =
p2t+1/2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Since the first order condition with respect to aN,t does not change, even if promotions
are allowed, Equation (3.11) still holds. The expression of (3.2A) before expanding
the term, ∂L/∂eN,t, does not change.
Given that ∂eN,t/∂bN,t = 1/2 > 0 and given Equation (3.11), Equation (3.8A) still
holds from Equation (3.2A). Then, conditions (3.3A) and (3.4A) do not change even
if promotions are allowed. Given Equation (3.11) and (3.8A), the result in Equation
(3.13) still holds: the piece rate is set equal to the output price.
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+ µ1t − µ2t = 0 ∀ pt+1
(3.23A)
However, R in the first term and the second term in (3.23A) cancel out each other,
and the two conditions, (3.11) and (3.8A) still hold. Thus, the optimal layoff decision
(3.11A) is preserved, and Proposition 3.1 is true even when promotions are allowed.
Given Equation (3.11), ∂L/∂eN,t can be written as:





−aE,t+1(p) + C − 2 eN,teP R(p)
)
− (1− γt+1(p)) 1ePR(p)
 dG(p) = 0
(3.24A)
Considering that γ∗t+1(pt+1) = 1 holds for any pt+1 that satisfies pt+1 < 2
√
U(pt+1)− C,
and that γ∗t+1(pt+1) = 0 holds for any pt+1 that satisfies pt+1 > 2
√
U(pt+1)− C, the
conditional mean of the compensation in the second period other than the performance-










































The only difference between (3.18A) and (3.25A) is the last term in (3.25A); the
last term in (3.25A) is added to the conditional mean of regular pay once promo-
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tions are allowed. R is the mean amount of the wage-increase (R) estimated at the
beginning of the first period. As shown in (3.25A), if we allow for promotions, the
regular pay in the “layoff regime” falls by an amount that is proportional to the wage
increase when promoted. Thus, there is a trade-off between a high wage increase
when an employee is promoted and the high regular pay of experienced employees in
the “layoff regime” because both future factors can positively affect new employees’
incentives. However, even if promotions are considered, the regular pay under the
“layoff regime” is still set above layoff costs, C, i.e., Inequality (3.21A) still holds,
because the no-quit condition does not bind, and the firm pays higher than necessary
to keep workers in the second period.
In contrast, the regular pay in the “no-layoff regime” is still free from the con-
straint of maintaining the workers’ incentives and can be low provided the zero-profit
constraint is satisfied.
By substituting (3.25A) into the zero-profit constraint, the conditional mean of




































The only difference between (3.22A) and (3.26A) is that (3.26A) has the third
term. The mean pay in the “no-layoff regime”, again, does not have a positive lower
bound. Thus, even when promotion is allowed for, the main results of the previous
section are preserved. Q.E.D.
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Table 3.1.A: Changes in Consumer Price Index by Industry
Industry \ Year 2003 2004 2005 2006
Agriculture 99.6 103.2 100.0 102.0
Communications 108.6 107.3 100.0 96.4
Construction 100.6 100.3 100.0 100.3
Electricity, Gas, Heat Supply and Water 99.1 99.2 100.0 103.6
Fishery and Forestry 99.6 103.2 100.0 102.0
Manufacturing 100.2 100.3 100.0 100.6
Mining 99.5 99.6 100.0 101.0
Real Estate 100.3 100.1 100.0 100.0
Transport 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.6
Wholesale and Retail Trade 100.2 100.3 100.0 100.6
Note: The base year of the CPI is 2005, and the CPI for 2005 is fixed at 100 for each industry.
The CPI data is obtained from the Consumer Price Index data by the Statistics Bureau at the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications, 2006). To avoid a potential mismatch between the CPI data and the industry
categories used in the survey, the service industry and the “financing and insurance” industry are
excluded from the sample. The price index for the mining industry is obtained from the price index
data in the Corporate Goods Price Index (Bank of Japan, 2006).
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CPI by industry 100.18 100.09 100.18
(0.96) (0.89) (0.96)
Age 46.04 41.70 46.26
(11.53) (11.83) (11.47)
Tenure 13.82 6.14 14.20
(11.81) (8.90) (11.81)
Number of Children 1.49 1.41 1.49
(1.09) (1.14) (1.09)
Years Needed To Be Experienced 2.12 1.98 2.13
(1.19) (1.00) (1.20)
Firm Size 202.42 166.88 204.16
(206.62) (185.12) (207.48)
Male 0.69 0.59 0.70
Married 0.85 0.75 0.86
Non-union Worker 0.63 0.79 0.62
Change/Left Employer during Year t 0.05 1.00 0.00
lnvoluntary Leave 0.01 0.17 0.00
Education Dummy Variables
Junior High School 0.10 0.06 0.10
High School 0.53 0.58 0.53
Junior College 0.10 0.12 0.10
University 0.25 0.22 0.25
Graduate School 0.01 0.01 0.01
Payment-Type Dummy Variables
Paid Monthly 0.73 0.57 0.74
Paid Weekly 0.00 0.00 0.00
Paid Daily 0.07 0.08 0.07
Paid Hourly 0.15 0.29 0.14
Paid Yearly 0.05 0.06 0.05
Observations 4638 217 4421
Note: Column 1 contains the descriptive statistics for individuals who were working as of January
in year t. Those represented in Column 1 are divided into two groups: those who left/changed their
employer during year t (Column 2) and those who continued with the same employer (Column 3).
“Involuntary Leave” is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the individual was laid off or left
his/her employer due to the reason on the firm’s side during year t. The CPI is the industry-level
consumer price index during January of each year. The CPI for January 2005 is fixed at 100 for
each industry. “Years Needed To Be Experienced” represents the average length of years it takes
for workers to feel they are experienced in their field, and the average value is calculated for each of
industry × occupation cells. To avoid a potential mismatch between the CPI data and the industry
categories used in the survey, the service industry and the “financing and insurance” industry are
excluded from the sample.
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Table 3.1.C: Descriptive Statistics for the Estimation Sample of Wage Re-
gressions
All Workers Experienced Workers
Tenure> X Years Tenure>Three Years
Regular Pay (100 yen≈ 1 USD / month) 3273.01 3348.66 3442.42
(1776.72) (1788.03) (1802.16)
Bonus (100 yen≈ 1 USD / year) 9604.75 10068.96 10514.09
(9277.52) (9413.45) (9525.70)
CPI by industry 100.45 100.43 100.44
(1.51) (1.44) (1.47)
Age 45.03 45.61 45.98
(10.68) (10.46) (10.29)
Tenure 15.13 16.60 17.49
(11.28) (10.86) (10.55)
Number of Children 1.49 1.52 1.55
(1.06) (1.05) (1.05)
Years Needed To Be Experienced (X) 2.19 2.15 2.24
(1.21) (1.20) (1.23)
Firm Size 273.13 277.86 281.22
(204.70) (204.06) (204.33)
Male 0.77 0.78 0.80
Married 0.86 0.88 0.89
Non-union Worker 0.62 0.61 0.60
Education Dummy Variables
Junior High School 0.07 0.07 0.07
High School 0.53 0.53 0.52
Junior College 0.10 0.10 0.10
University 0.28 0.28 0.29
Graduate School 0.02 0.02 0.02
Payment-Type Dummy Variables
Paid Monthly 0.86 0.87 0.88
Paid Weekly 0.00 0.00 0.00
Paid Daily 0.04 0.04 0.04
Paid Hourly 0.08 0.07 0.06
Paid Yearly 0.02 0.02 0.02
Observations 3748 3389 3194
Note: Observations are restricted to those who earned positive values of regular pay and bonuses.
For “experienced” worker groups, two criteria are used: those whose length of tenure is longer than
X years and those whose tenure is longer than three years, where X represents the average length
of years it takes for workers to feel they are experienced in their field (by industry). The CPI is the
annual industry-level consumer price index in Table 3.1.A.
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Table 3.2: Layoff Regression (Probit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: All Workers Experienced Workers
Involuntary Leave=1 Tenure> X Years Tenure>Three Years
Price -0.0052 -0.0055 -0.0046 -0.0043 -0.0037 -0.0030
(0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0016)
Non-union Worker 0.0011 0.0011 0.0015 0.0015 0.0019 0.0019
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Male 0.0003 0.0003 0.00002 0.00002 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
High School -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.0035 -0.0034 -0.0058 -0.0057
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Junior College -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0022 -0.0021
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006)
University -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0025 -0.0025
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Graduate School 0.0041 0.0040 0.0109 0.0110 0.0015 0.0016
(0.0097) (0.0094) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0056) (0.0057)
Experience 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Experience2/100 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0010
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Tenure -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Tenure2/100 0.0012 0.0012 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Married -0.0062 -0.0061 -0.0056 -0.0056 -0.0033 -0.0033
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0046)
Number of Children 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
ln(Firm Size) -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Payment-Type Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.1264 0.1267 0.1694 0.1697 0.1683 0.1707
Observations 4638 4638 3686 3686 3410 3410
Note: Marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean are reported. Standard errors, clustered at
industry levels, are in parentheses under the regression coefficients. For “experienced” worker groups,
two criteria are used: those whose length of tenure is longer than X years and those whose tenure is
longer than three years, where X represents the average length of years it takes for workers to feel
they are experienced in their field (by industry×occupation). The dependent variable is an indicator
function that takes a value of 1 if the individual was laid off or left his/her employer due to the
reason on the firm’s side during year t. Individuals who were working at the beginning of year t are
used for the sample. All explanatory variables represent information reported at the beginning of
year t. The reference group for the education dummy variables is “Junior High School.” The CPI
is the industry-level consumer price index during January of each year. The base year of the CPI is
2005, and the CPI for January 2005 is fixed at 100 for each industry.
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Table 3.3: Regular Pay Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: All Workers Experienced Workers
ln (Regular Pay) Tenure> X Years Tenure>Three Years
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Price 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Non-union Worker 0.448 0.676 0.430 0.496 0.162 0.585
(0.408) (0.208) (0.436) (0.140) (0.432) (0.118)
Price·Non-union Worker -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 -0.006
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Male 0.578 - 0.581 - 0.581 -
(0.029) (0.025) (0.025)
High School 0.032 - 0.025 - 0.041 -
(0.022) (0.024) (0.023)
Junior College 0.093 - 0.097 - 0.122 -
(0.031) (0.033) (0.037)
University 0.201 - 0.184 - 0.204 -
(0.033) (0.039) (0.039)
Graduate School 0.387 - 0.384 0.405 -
(0.082) (0.078) (0.072)
Experience 0.030 0.066 0.030 0.062 0.029 0.060
(0.003) (0.013) (0.002) (0.018) (0.003) (0.016)
Experience2/100 -0.058 -0.062 -0.061 -0.054 -0.057 -0.051
(0.008) (0.014) (0.006) (0.024) (0.005) (0.021)
Tenure 0.018 0.012 0.019 -0.073 0.020 -0.070
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.175) (0.004) (0.174)
Tenure2/100 -0.013 -0.035 -0.014 -0.058 -0.017 -0.090
(0.005) (0.023) (0.007) (0.046) (0.007) (0.036)
Married -0.016 -0.024 -0.007 -0.029 -0.000 -0.031
(0.030) (0.024) (0.030) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022)
Number of Children 0.011 0.014 0.010 0.009 0.014 0.009
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
ln(Firm Size) 0.035 0.017 0.033 0.020 0.033 0.027
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.018)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Payment-Type Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.641 0.055 0.640 0.054 0.624 0.058
Observations 3751 3751 3389 3389 3197 3197
Note: Standard errors, clustered at industry levels, are in parentheses under the regression co-
efficients. For “experienced” worker groups, two criteria are used: those whose length of tenure
is longer than X years and those whose tenure is longer than three years, where X represents
the average length of years it takes for workers to feel they are experienced in their field (by
industry×occupation). The reference group for the education dummy variables is “Junior High
School.” The CPI is the annual industry-level consumer price index in Table 3.1.A.
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Table 3.4: Bonus Pay Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: All Workers Experienced Workers
ln (Bonus Pay) Tenure> X Years Tenure>Three Years
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Price -0.005 -0.002 0.001 0.007 0.0002 0.006
(0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003)
Non-union Worker -3.281 -0.806 -1.879 -0.084 -1.693 -0.083
(0.772) (0.221) (0.885) (0.146) (0.946) (0.182)
Price·Non-union Worker 0.032 0.008 0.018 0.0004 0.016 0.0004
(0.008) (0.002) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.002)
Male 0.712 - 0.700 0.720
(0.079) (0.080) - (0.088) -
High School 0.160 - 0.142 0.133
(0.038) (0.041) - (0.049) -
Junior College 0.260 - 0.268 0.265
(0.069) (0.060) - (0.057) -
University 0.458 - 0.426 0.416
(0.046) (0.047) - (0.050) -
Graduate School 0.773 - 0.726 - 0.751 -
(0.172) (0.176) (0.167)
Experience 0.017 0.086 0.017 0.104 0.025 0.118
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012)
Experience2/100 -0.057 -0.129 -0.062 -0.151 -0.073 -0.170
(0.015) (0.031) (0.016) (0.047) (0.021) (0.043)
Tenure 0.058 0.075 0.048 0.146 0.039 0.125
(0.008) (0.023) (0.007) (0.089) (0.015) (0.090)
Tenure2/100 -0.065 -0.174 -0.037 0.107 -0.022 0.187
(0.009) (0.072) (0.009) (0.060) (0.022) (0.086)
Married 0.109 0.140 0.117 0.096 0.126 0.100
(0.044) (0.120) (0.050) (0.131) (0.035) (0.134)
Number of Children -0.011 -0.025 -0.012 -0.009 -0.010 -0.013
(0.038) (0.043) (0.041) (0.045) (0.042) (0.046)
ln(Firm Size) 0.118 0.024 0.123 0.041 0.127 0.041
(0.036) (0.018) (0.037) (0.013) (0.037) (0.012)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Payment-Type Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.562 0.049 0.562 0.029 0.549 0.026
Observations 3751 3751 3389 3389 3197 3197
Note: Standard errors, clustered at industry levels, are in parentheses under the regression co-
efficients. For “experienced” worker groups, two criteria are used: those whose length of tenure
is longer than X years and those whose tenure is longer than three years, where X represents
the average length of years it takes for workers to feel they are experienced in their field (by
industry×occupation). The reference group for the education dummy variables is “Junior High
School.” The CPI is the annual industry-level consumer price index in Table 3.1.A.
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Figure A.3.1: Graphical Explanation of p2t+1/4 + C and U(pt+1)
Note: Figure A.3.1 depicts p2t+1/4+C and U(pt+1) as functions of pt+1. When the curve, p
2
t+1/4+C,
is above U(pt+1), γ
∗
t+1(pt+1) = 0 is satisfied, and performance-based layoffs do not occur. Even if
U(pt+1) is allowed to vary with pt+1, as long as the utility function of unemployed workers is a
concave function of pt+1, i.e., as long as U
′(pt+1) ≥ 0 and U ′′(pt+1) ≤ 0 are satisfied, performance-
based layoffs do not occur for sufficiently large pt+1.
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CHAPTER IV
Labor-Market Responses to Standard Hours
Reduction: Evidence from Japan (with Daiji
Kawaguchi and Hisahiro Naito)
4.1 Introduction
Dismal labor-market outcomes after the financial shock of 2008 revived an argu-
ment that favored work-sharing policy. Proponents of work-sharing policy argue that
the exogenous reduction of hours worked creates employment through the substitu-
tion of hours for employment. Previous studies in labor economics, however, cast
doubt on work-sharing policy, pointing out two major challenges. The first challenge
is the increase of hourly wage as a consequence of the reduction of standard hours.
The second challenge is the effect of a production scale-down induced by increased
labor cost, which may overwhelm the substitution effect from hours to employment.
Regarding the first challenge, in many historical cases, the reduction of standard
hours reduced hours worked but did not reduce weekly or monthly wages of existing
workers enough to keep the hourly wage constant. For example, when labor unions
and employer federations agreed to reduce standard hours from 40 to 35 per week in
Germany during period from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, they typically agreed
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not to reduce weekly or monthly pay (Hunt, 1999).1 When the French government
reduced the standard hours from 40 to 39, the law prohibited employers from reducing
weekly or monthly pay (Crepon and Kramarz (2002)). Other studies also report an
increase in the hourly rate associated with the reduction of standard hours in Europe,
where pay is largely determined through union-employer bargaining and the reduction
of weekly or monthly wages faces strong resistance.2 Skuterud (2007) offers unique
evidence by analyzing the case of Quebec, Canada, which reduced the standard hours
of non-unionized workers from 44 to 40 between 1997 and 2000 without prohibiting
employers from cutting weekly or monthly pay. Even in this setting, he did not find
an increase of employment in Quebec compared with neighboring states. Since his
evidence is not completely free from interregional equilibrium effects, an evaluation
of a national policy that covers a wide range of workers in a flexible wage-setting
economy is still needed to fully assess the validity of work-sharing policy.
This paper contributes to the literature by assessing the impacts of Japan’s ex-
ogenous reduction of standard hours from 48 in 1988 to 40 in 1997 on labor-market
outcomes. Studying Japan’s case is valuable because wages are determined flexi-
bly in a decentralized employer-employee negotiation. Moreover, the Japanese wage
is known to respond flexibly to exogenous shocks, because bonus payments comprise
around 25 to 33 percent of total annual compensation (Steinberg and Nakane (2011)).
Firm-specific human capital resulting from labor-market friction is often pointed out
as an important feature of the Japanese labor market (Hashimoto and Raisian (1985)).
1This agreement was what a labor union finally won after a protracted strike, and it is true
that there was a great compromise on the side of employers in reaching the agreement. Instead
of accepting the demands of the labor union, employers obtained greater flexibility in the use of
standard hours. For example, after the agreement, standard hours no longer had to be spread
evenly over each day of the week, and could vary from week to week as long as they averaged to the
agreed-upon number over a certain number of months. Additionally, standard hours were allowed
to vary across employees as well as long as they averaged to the agreed-upon number (Hunt, 1999).
2Nymoen (1989) for Norway, Pencavel and Holmlund (1988) and Skans (2004) for Sweden, Es-
tevao and Sa (2008) and Chemin and Wasmer (2009) for France, Raposo and van Ours (2008) for
Portugal. Apart from the work-sharing argument, Hamermesh and Trejo (2000) analyze the effect
of introducing an 8-hours-per-day limit for men in 1980 on top of a pre-existing 40 hours-per-week
limit in California.
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Consequently, both employers and employees have strong incentives to protect their
relation, and hence future returns on their investments in specific human capital, by
adjusting wage compensation, including bonus payments (Hashimoto (1979)). Al-
though Japanese labor law prohibits employers from cutting compensation without
workers’ consent unless employers experience hardship (and courts apply strict crite-
ria to recognize the hardship), many unions/workers’ representatives and employers
agree to contracts so that the bonus payment depends on the firm’s performance. In
this institutional setting, the bonus payment may well be adjusted to the reduction of
standard hours so that the hourly wage is kept constant. Several studies examine the
effect of scheduled hours, which are voluntarily determined by individual labor con-
tracts, on hours worked in the Japanese context using macro data (Brunello (1989),
Niimi (1998) and Saito and Tachibanaki (2002)), but none of these studies explicitly
examine the impacts of the reduction of standard hours. Moreover, isolating the pol-
icy impact from macroeconomic business cycle effects was difficult in these studies
because they relied on macroeconomic data.
Figure 4.1 presents the time series of the average of standard hours weighted by
workers’ composition by industries and establishment sizes for mining, construction,
manufacturing, and public-utility industries. The figure also includes the average
hours worked of workers in these four industries. Both of the two series decline over
the 1989-2002 period in the same way, but this does not necessarily imply the policy
effects on average hours worked because the decrease in hours worked also coincided
with a recession of the Japanese economy from 1991.3 With this concurrent time
trend, it is difficult to draw a conclusion about the policy impact on the observed
reduction in hours worked. To overcome this difficulty, we exploit the heterogeneous
timings of the reduction in standard hours across industries and establishment sizes
to examine how the reduction in standard hours affected labor-market outcomes of
3See Motonishi and Yoshikawa (1999), Hayashi and Prescott (2002) and Kobayashi and Inaba
(2006) for descriptions and explanations of the prolonged stagnation.
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interest.
To preview the results in this paper, an analysis based on the Basic Survey of
Wage Structure shows that standard hours had a moderate effect on hours worked.
The most-preferred specification indicates that about 31 percent of the reduction in
hours worked between 1989 and 2002 is explained by the reduction in standard hours.
In addition, the reduction in hours worked was not followed by a decrease in either
monthly wages or annual bonuses of existing workers. As a result, overall labor cost
per hour increased, and we do not see any evidence of job creation. These results are
similar to those in Europe, where pay is largely determined through union-employer
bargaining and the reduction of weekly or monthly wages faces strong resistance.
Thus, we can conclude that the idea of work-sharing did not work even in Japan,
where the wage setting is flexible because of decentralized wage negotiation and bonus
payments.
The rest of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the legal setting
of Japanese standard hours and its historical change. Section 4.3 describes the data
set. Section 4.4 explains the estimation strategy. Section 4.5 evaluates the effects
of standard hours on hours worked, wage, and employment. Section 4.6 adds an
estimation of hourly wage rate and interprets the results based on existing theory.
The last section concludes and derives implications.
4.2 Legal Institution on Standard Hours in Japan
The Labor Standard Act (LSA) in Japan prohibits employers from employing
workers exceeding daily and weekly standard hours. The current standard hours
are 40 hours per week and 8 hours per day (LSA Section 32). Employers can set
the work hours beyond these legal limits only under an agreement with a workers’
representative that represents the majority of employees (LSA Section 36). Overtime
under this agreement must be compensated by a wage premium of at least 25 percent
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(LSA Section 37).45
By the early 1980s, Japan had accumulated a current-account surplus, and the
Japanese government faced diplomatic pressure to reduce it. In response, the Japanese
government attempted to reduce hours worked by reducing standard hours.6 Stan-
dard hours were historically set at 48 per week. In December 1985, a study group
organized by the Ministry of Labor published a report that suggested 45 hours per
week and 8 hours per day as new standard hours. Following the issuance of this
report, the Central Labor Standard Commission, which consisted of representatives
of the public interest, employers, and employees, started to discuss revising the stan-
dard hours. After numerous meetings among the three parties, the commission finally
recommended that standard hours be set at 46 per week for the time being, followed
by 44, and eventually reduced to 40. In addition, the recommendation requested
a lenient moratorium period for small- and medium-sized firms, reflecting the opin-
ion of employers’ representatives. The gradualism reflected in this recommendation
represents a compromise between representatives of employers and employees. In ac-
cordance with this recommendation, the LSA was revised in 1987 and implemented
from April 1, 1988.
This revision set the standard hours at 46 per week immediately after April 1,
1988, but this change did not affect many workers, because establishments with 100
or fewer employees in many industries were exempted from this change. An addi-
4Regardless of whether it is regularly scheduled overtime or not, any work hour that exceeds the
standard hours must be compensated by the overtime wage premium. In the case that the scheduled
work hours set by each firm is below the legal standard hours, hours that exceed the firm-specific
scheduled hours but are still within the legal standard hours do not need to be compensated by the
overtime premium.
5See (Sugeno, 2002, Chapter 3 Section 5) for an overview of the Japanese legal system on standard
hours. (Hamaguchi, 2004, Chapter 12 Section 2) describes the legal process of reducing the standard
hours between 1987 and 1997. Umezaki (2008) also describes the process of the LSA revision by
interviewing two government officials who played a central role in the 1987 LSA revision.
6Unlike other counties such as France and Germany, work-sharing was not the direct goal of
reducing standard hours in Japan. Instead, diplomatic pressures, mainly from the US, which suffers
a significant current account deficit against Japan, drove the Japanese government to start this
attempt.
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tional revision of the Cabinet order in December 1990 further reduced it to 44 from
April 1, 1991. The LSA was further revised in 1993 to implement 40 hours per week
from April 1994. In this reduction process, particular moratorium periods were given
to industries with long work hours and smaller establishment sizes, mainly because
Japan’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which represents the interests of owners
of small- and medium-scale businesses, actively lobbied for lenient moratorium peri-
ods for small businesses. The resulting transition is summarized in Table 4.1. The
moratorium periods ended by March 1997, by which time the standard hours had
become 40 hours per week uniformly across industries and establishment sizes with
only a few exceptions.7
Another important legislation that may have affected hours worked was the Tem-
porary Act for the Promotion of Work Hour Reduction (Jitan Sokushin Ho) enacted
on September 1, 1992. The Act was effective for five years and offered three legal pro-
visions. First, the Act promoted the formation of an establishment-level committee,
consisting of employer and employee representatives, for work-hour reduction. The
agreement in the committee that is submitted to a local labor standard office becomes
a legally binding contract as a usual labor agreement (Roushi Kyoyaku). Second, the
Act provided an exemption from the application of the Antitrust Act for employers
to collude in an effort to reduce the hours worked. This exemption was provided
because of the perception that establishments had exceedingly competed for quick
service, and this excessive competition had resulted in long hours worked. Third,
the law established a subsidy up to 3 million yen (about 30 thousand US dollars) to
promote labor-saving capital investment for establishments with up to 300 regular
employees. The subsidy was paid only to establishments that implemented projects
that aimed to achieve the goal of reducing hours worked, in order to compensate
for two-thirds of their expenses. Hence, the subsidy was not allowed to be used for
7Exceptions apply to small establishments that usually hire less than 10 employees in commerce
and service industries.
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compensating workers directly (Ida (2005)).
Since the subsidy policy covers only establishments that hire 300 or fewer employ-
ees, the policy impact estimated in this study partly includes that of the Temporary
Act for the Promotion of Work Hour Reduction. Standard hours are longer for es-
tablishments that hire 300 or fewer employees, and therefore, our estimates for the
impact of standard hours on hours worked is attenuated by the Temporary Act for
the Promotion of Work Hour Reduction.
4.3 Data
The data set used in this study is micro data from the Basic Survey on Wage
Structure (BSWS), compiled annually by the Japanese government between 1989 and
2002. This survey is conducted in June of every year and includes workers randomly
sampled from almost all regions and industries in Japan except for agriculture. The
data set includes about 1.5 million workers randomly sampled from 60-70 thousand
establishments for each year. The survey covers all establishments with 10 or more
employees in both private and public sectors and establishments in private sectors
with 5 to 9 employees.
Establishments are randomly sampled in proportion to the size of prefectures, in-
dustries, and the number of employees from the Establishment and Enterprise Census
(EEC hereafter), which lists all establishments in Japan.8 Human-resource managers
of randomly selected establishments are asked to extract workers’ information from
their payroll records according to the given instructions for random sampling, includ-
8This list is revised every 2-5 years. Of the years relevant to our analysis, the lists were revised
in 1986, 1991, 1994, 1996, 1999, and 2001. The establishments included in the BSWS 1989-1992
are randomly sampled from the 1986 EEC list, the 1993-1995 establishments are from the 1991
list, the 1996-1997 establishments are from the 1994 list, the 1998-2001 establishments are from
the 1996 list, and the 2002-2003 establishments are from the 1999 list. Although about one half
of the establishments are sampled in two consecutive years when establishments are sampled from
the same list, only about 1/10 of establishments are sampled at the time of the list revision. The
establishments included in the sample are significantly replaced at the times of the list revision:
1993, 1996, 1998, and 2002.
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ing the sampling probability, which depends on the establishment’s size and industry.
The main variables used in this analysis are scheduled hours worked and overtime
hours worked, scheduled monthly payment, overtime payment in June, bonus payment
of the previous calendar year9, full-/part-time status, type of worker (production
worker or non-production worker), as well as the firm’s attributes, including the
number of regular workers (Joyo Rodo Sha)10, and industry.
Managerial workers are exempt from standard hours (LSA Section 41),11 but the
legal definition of managerial workers is rather vague and the exact identification of
exempted workers from the statistical occupation code is impossible. Thus, we keep
those workers who are potentially exempted workers in the sample. To examine the
effect of this sample selection, we check the robustness of our results by restricting
the sample to production workers in a subsequent analysis.
The timing for the reduction of standard hours differs by industry and establish-
ment size. Thus we identify the number of standard hours that applies to a specific
worker in a specific year by the information of industry and establishment size that
a specific worker works for. Although this is a key step in the empirical analysis, the
legal industry classification in the Labor Standard Act and the statistical industry
classification in the BSWS do not overlap for many industries. Thus, to avoid the bi-
ases that might arise from mismatching a worker and a number of standard hours, we
restrict our analysis to workers who are in manufacturing, mining, and construction
industries, because legal and statistical industrial codes perfectly overlap for these
three industries.
9The definition of each term is in the Appendix.
10Those workers who satisfy one of the following three criteria are classified as regular workers:
1. on contracts that do not clearly specify a contractual time period, 2. on contracts that last more
than a month, or 3. on contracts that last less than a month, but on which the workers worked 18
or more days in the last two months. This classification includes part-time workers if one of the
criteria above is satisfied.
11Agricultural workers and workers in charge of continuous watch services (i.e., security guard,
school or apartment janitor) are also exempted. These workers are not included in the analysis
sample in this study.
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Discontinuity in standard hours serves as a “key” in our estimation, and we esti-
mate the local average policy effect across discontinuity points at establishment sizes
of 100 and 300.12 In this estimation, we eliminate establishments with less than 30
workers from the sample because this contributes to reducing a computational burden
but does not affect our estimation; there is no discontinuity in standard hours at the
establishment size of 30 among the industries in our sample.
As was confirmed in Section 4.2, the fraction of establishments that were affected
by the policy change had been very restricted prior to 1991, and hence the revision in
1991 was actually the first “effective” implementation of the standard-hour reduction.
For this reason, we treat the years 1989 and 1990 as the control group among the
available sample years. The subsequent reduction of standard hours took place in
April 1991, April 1993, April 1994, and April 1995, before a complete transition to 40
hours per week in April 1997. Therefore, the time between 1991 and 1996 is treated
as transition period. In addition, the “after” policy-change period, 1997-2002, is
included to allow for lagged policy effects.
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics of the analysis sample. The average of
standard hours, weighted by the number of employees, decreased from 46.86 in 1989
12It is true that there is also a discontinuity point at establishment size of 9, but in this paper,
we do not consider the policy effect across this discontinuity point. The reasons for this are as
follows: first, the discontinuity in the standard hours at establishment size of 9 occurs only from
April 1994 to March 1995, and hence it can be thought that omitting the policy effect among
these small establishments would not make a great difference in the results. Second, in order to
estimate the policy effect around the discontinuity point at establishment size of 9, it is necessary
to include establishments with 9 or fewer employees in the sample. However, there is a technical
concern about including establishments with 9 or fewer employees in the sample due to the fact
that a different sampling rule is applied to this small establishment size. The sampling rule for an
establishment with 10 employees or more and for an establishment with 5-9 employees is as follows:
1) Establishments with 10 employees or more: Private establishments and establishments of public
corporations under Specified Independent Administrative Institutions or the Local Public Corporation
Labour Relations Law. 2) Establishments with 5-9 employees: Private establishments that belong to
firms with 5-9 employees. According to these sampling rules, firm size is also included as one of the
sampling conditions for establishments with 5-9 employees, while it is not included for establishments
with 10 or more employees. As a result, establishments with 5-9 employees are more likely to be
characterized by information unique to small-scale firms than those of similar sizes but with the
number of employees just above 10, because these establishments with 10 or more employees in the
sample could belong to large firms as well, while it is not possible for those with 5-9 employees,
according to the sampling rules.
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to 40.00 in 2002. Weekly hours worked also decreased from 44.58 in 1989 to 40.54
in 2002. Although the hours worked decreased during the period, monthly scheduled
cash earnings and annual bonuses increased. (For the earnings data in Table 4.2,
nominal values are reported.) Most of the increase in monthly earnings and annual
bonuses occurred during the first three years of the sample period in response to the
rapid increase in price of goods during Japan’s bubble economy that lasted from the
late 1980s to the beginning of 1991. (The increase in hourly wage rate reflects both
effects of the reduced work hours during the sample period as well as the increase in
monthly earnings stated above.)
Figure 4.2 compares the distribution of hours worked (= scheduled hours worked
+ overtime hours worked) in 1989 and 2002. The 1989 distribution of hours worked
was bimodal, peaking at 42 and 48 hours, but the 2002 distribution became almost
unimodal, peaking at 40 hours. The 2002 distribution shifted to the left and was
less dispersed than the 1989 distribution. This evidence reflects the fact that the
variation in the initial standard hours among industries and firm sizes vanished after
1997 because of the uniform standard hours of 40 hours per week.
4.4 Estimating Local Average Policy Effects
4.4.1 Identification
Challenges in estimating the average policy effect are two-fold. First, the reduction
of standard hours coincided with the macroeconomic downturn starting from 1991.
Second, the policy change was partly endogenous, because the moratorium period was
given to establishments with 100 or fewer employees, or establishments with 300 or
fewer employees in industries characterized by long hours worked.13 As confirmed in
13Since our sample does not include employees in establishments with 30 employees or less, only
the establishment sizes of 101 and 301 serve as thresholds in the analyses. The threshold applied
differs across industries and years (e.g., 101 for the manufacturing sector and 301 for the construction
sector in 1989). If establishments with 30 or fewer employees were included, establishments with 10
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Table 4.1, the standard hours are heterogeneous across industries and establishment
sizes. LSA categorizes establishments into five groups, based on the number of people
they employ, as follows: 1-9 employees, 10-30 employees, 31-100 employees, 101-
300 employees, and 301+ employees. During the moratorium period, establishments
that fall into a larger-size category were likely to have shorter standard hours. To
isolate the policy effect from these potentially contaminating factors, we estimate the
following econometric model:
yjts = αhjts + f(s) + β Tt +Dj δ +DjTt ζ + Tt g(s) +Djh(s) + ujts (4.1)
where f(s) = φ1s + φ2s
2 + ... + φps
p, g(s) = γ1s + γ2s
2 + ... + γps
p, and h(s) =
η1s+ η2s
2 + ...+ ηps
p. yjts is the outcome of interest (hours worked, wages, and em-
ployment) of industry j (33 categories), year t (1989,...,2002), and establishment size
s (31,32,...). Standard hours are denoted as h̄jts defined by industry, establishment
size, and year, as tabulated in Table 4.1. Tt is a time trend term corresponding to year
t. For the industry dummy variables, 33 industry categories from mining, construc-
tion, manufacturing, as well as electricity, gas, heat supply, and water industries are
used. Dj is a vector that contains industry dummy variables, and δ, ζ, η1, η2,..., and
ηp are coefficient vectors that contain coefficients estimated for industry j (2,..,33).
The continuous function f(s) captures the effect of establishment size on hours
worked. It is expected that the dummy variables Dj capture the heterogeneity across
industries, and Tt captures macroeconomic shocks. The effect of industry-specific and
size-specific macroeconomic shocks are expected to be captured by DjTt and Ttg(s),
respectively, and size-industry effects are also controlled for by Djh(s). The coeffi-
cients of f(s), g(s), and h(s) are allowed to differ below and above the discontinuity
point.
Including these variables circumvents the problem arising from the policy endo-
employees would also serve as a threshold.
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geneity resulting from the political process of policy implementation because they
control for the heterogeneity in hours worked that differ by industry, year, and size.
The policy effect, α, could differ across discontinuity points, industry, and year, but
the specification assumes a single parameter. We intentionally employ this single-
parameter specification because we are interested in the local, average policy effect
across discontinuity points, industries over years to learn the policy’s aggregate im-
pact on the Japanese economy.
The dependent variable, yjst, is the cell mean of individual observations yijst within
an industry j, establishment size s in year t. We collapsed individual data in this way
to avoid overstating the precision for α̂ that is caused by a potential misspecification
of the regression function. This aggregation captures the effect of standard hours on
labor-market outcomes, because standard hours are defined over industry and size
of establishment. Since the precisions of the cell means are different, reflecting the
number of individual observations for each cell mean, all of the regression analyses use
the number of observations in cell j divided by the average number of observations
in a cell as the weight (Lee and Card (2008)).
The standard hours h̄jst discontinuously change with respect to establishment size
at 100 and 300 employees within a specific industry in a specific year. Thus the above
regression model estimates the local, average treatment effect of standard hours across
industries over years via the regression discontinuity design.
4.4.2 Choice of Regression Function
The continuous functions f(s), g(s), and h(s) with polynomial order p are es-
timated in Equation (4.1) using observations around discontinuity such that s ∈
[100− b, 100 + b] or s∈[300− b, 300 + b], where b is the bandwidth of the local linear
regression. We choose the combination of the polynomial order p and the bandwidth
b that minimizes the mean squared error of the prediction by cross-validation (Lee
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and Lemieux (2010)). The cross-validation value is calculated as follows, using all
observations in the neighborhood of the discontinuity points.14
CV (p, b) = (1/N)
∑
sjt
(ysjt − ŷsjt(p, b))2, (4.2)
where p is the polynomial order and b is the bandwidth of the local linear regression
model to predict ŷsjt(p, b). The combination of p and b that minimizes this cross-
validation function is chosen as the most-preferred functional form. The result of the
cross-validation using hours worked as ysjt is reported in Table 4.3. In this case, the
combination of p = 1 and b = 90 is chosen as the most-preferred function. Although
we do not present all the results here, we implemented the same cross-validation for
the other dependent variables.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Possibility of Establishment-Size Manipulation
Before estimating the effect of standard hours on labor-market outcomes, we ex-
amine whether there are any signs of manipulation of establishment size to avoid the
strict standard hours. As shown in Table 4.1, establishment sizes of 100 and 300
serve as the thresholds at which standard hours change.15 Thus, these two thresholds
could potentially give establishments an incentive to reduce the number of employees
to below the thresholds so that they could enjoy longer standard hours.
First, we explore the possibility of endogenous establishment-size decision by look-
ing at simple statistics. Table 4.4 shows that the fraction of each size category is stable
over time. In particular, the fraction of establishments with 100 or fewer employees
14For the discontinuity around 100, the lower bound is set at the 95th percentile of observations
between 31 and 100, and the upper bound is set at the 5th percentile of observations between 101
and 200. The upper and lower bounds around 300 are similarly set.
15Note that employees in establishments with 30 or fewer employees are not included in our sample.
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did not increase during policy changes, i.e., 1992 and 1996, and thus does not support
the view that firms manipulated employment to escape stricter regulations.
Next, we examine changes in the distribution of establishment size around the
two thresholds, 100 and 300. Figure 4.3 reports the histogram of establishment size.
If establishments manipulated their size to avoid stricter regulations for larger estab-
lishments, we should observe a disproportionately larger number of establishments
with size 100 than 101 and more with 300 than 301.
It is not surprising that we observe a spike at 100 because it could serve as a
round number; thus it is possible that some firms reported their establishment size as
100 even though their real size is a little larger or smaller than that. If the spike at
100 became larger when establishments with 31-100 employees faced longer standard
hours than larger establishments with 101 or more employees, however, it would offer
evidence that firms intentionally decreased their number of employees a little to enjoy
longer standard hours. We will conduct an additional analysis to test this possibility,
because it is difficult to conclude based only on Figure 4.3 whether the spike at the
thresholds became larger during the policy changes. The estimated model is:
lnyjts = σ1I(s∈[101, 100 + b]) + σ2I(s∈[301, 300 + b])
+k(s) + τ Tt +Dj ξ +DjTtν + Tt l(s) +Djm(s) + ujts (4.3)
where k(s) = κ1s + κ2s
2 + ... + κps
p, l(s) = λ1s + λ2s
2 + ... + λps
p, and m(s) =
µ1s + µ2s
2 + ... + µps
p. The original observation units are establishments, and they
are collapsed to year× industry×size cells. The dependent variable is the logarithm
of the number of establishments within each cell. I(s ∈ [101, 100 + b]) is a dummy
variable that takes a value of one if the establishment is on the right side of the
threshold of 100; similarly, I(s ∈ [301, 300 + b]) is a dummy variable that takes a
value of one if the establishment is on the right side of the threshold of 300.
The estimation sample includes observations with establishment size, s ∈ [100 −
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b, 100 + b] and those with s ∈ [300 − b, 300 + b]. Results with b=3, 5, and 10 are
reported in Table 4.5. A linear function is chosen as the optimal function for k(s),
l(s), and m(s) by the cross-validation method.16
If establishments manipulated the number of employees to avoid stricter standard
hours, the estimates of σ1 and σ2 should be negative. In Table 4.5, however, neither
of these estimates is significantly negative with any bandwidth, which means that
we do not see any evidence of firms’ manipulation of employment in response to the
change in standard hours.
4.5.2 Effect on Hours Worked
Now, we come back to the estimation of Equation (4.1) using hours worked as a
dependent variable. The estimation result is reported in Table 4.6. Although results
using a linear trend term, year−1989, are reported in Table 4.6, we also tried using
a trend-term of functional forms, such as a logarithm, logistic, and polynomials and
found that the results illustrated in Table 4.6 are robust against the functional forms
of trend terms. Columns 1 through 4 suggest that a 1-hour reduction of standard
work hours reduces weekly hours worked by 0.16-0.18 hours. By examining the re-
sults in Table 4.6, we can see that this result is robust against the combinations of
interaction terms. The estimates in Column 4 in Table 4.6 are used to draw Figure
4.4. Establishments that hire 100 or fewer employees were subject to standard hours
of 43.25, on average; 101 to 300 employees, 42.64 hours; and 301 and more, 41.75
hours. This discontinuity of standard hours creates a discontinuity of hours worked
16In this regression, the conventional heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error is used. It is
known that the conventional heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error in the cell -weighted re-
gression proposed in Lee and Card (2008) is equivalent to the clustered standard error formula in
the micro-level regression. Thus, the robust standard errors used in the cell-weighted regression can
be interpreted as standard errors clustered at year×industry×size category (by one). For the sake
of consistency, in the remaining regressions in which the observation units are establishments, the
standard errors are clustered at year×industry×size category (by one). In these micro-level regres-
sions, changing the clustering level in standard errors (e.g., to year×industry) did not change the
significance/insignificance of the result.
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at establishment sizes of 100 and 300.
The size of the estimated coefficient, 0.158, implies that an 8-hour reduction of
standard hours between 1988 and 1997 contributed to reducing the hours worked
by 1.264 hours. Mean hours worked in 1989 was 44.58 hours (Table 4.2), implying
that the law contributed to reducing the hours worked by 2.84 percent. The average
hours worked was reduced by 4.04 hours between 1989 and 2002 (Table 4.2); thus
the legislative change explains about 31 percent of the reduction of hours worked.
Section 4.6 discusses the reason for this modest change in hours worked.
To address the concern that the sample includes the exempted workers discussed
in Section 4.3, we estimate the hour equation using only production workers that do
not include the exempted workers. The results are robust among the four columns
in Table 4.6, and in Figure 4.5 we visually illustrate the result of Column 4 in Table
4.6. The results are similar to those in Figure 4.4 obtained from all workers, while
the estimated policy effect for production workers is larger than that for all workers.
4.5.3 Effects on Wage
Previous studies of Continental Europe report that the reduction of standard
hours reduced hours worked, while it did not reduce weekly or monthly wage. We
now examine if this was the case for Japan.
There are several reasons to have a prior expectation that wages in Japan adjusted
flexibly to the reduction of hours worked. First, wage determination is decentralized
in Japan. The unionization rate was 25.9 percent in 1989 and declined monotonically
to 21.5 percent in 2002. Japanese unions are organized at each company and union-
employer wage negotiation takes place at the company level. Consequently, there is
no standardized industry or occupation wage that applies to nonunion workers. The
statutory minimum wage was defined over hourly rate of pay or daily pay for 8 hours,
but not over weekly or monthly wage, and thus it does not affect our discussion.
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Second, the majority of Japanese employees receive bonus payments, typically
twice a year in summer and winter. According to Table 4.2, the average annual
bonus amount reported in 1989 was 902,294 yen (about USD 9,022.94). The total
annual bonus payment amounted to 3.5 times the employee’s monthly salary in 1989,
on average. As is mentioned in Section 4.1, the Japanese bonus amount is known to
be relatively flexible because Japanese workers typically recognize that the amount
can fluctuate depending on firms’ performance (Hashimoto, 1979; Kawaguchi and
Ohtake, 2007).
To examine the effect of standard hours on monthly wages, the log of cash earnings
in June are regressed on standard hours.17 Figure 4.6 draws the result of the local lin-
ear regression of the most-preferred specification at the discontinuity points. Workers
in larger establishments earn higher monthly wages, on average, but the regression
line is almost continuous at establishment sizes of 100 and 300. The estimated effect
of standard hours on monthly wages is virtually zero, and it is not statistically sig-
nificant. Table 4.6 also suggests that this result is robust against the combinations of
interaction terms. Although the reduction of standard hours reduced hours worked,
it did not decrease monthly wages.
Next, to assess the impact on the annual bonus amount, the log of bonus payments
is regressed on standard hours. The annual bonus payment of the previous calendar
year is reported by respondents in the survey. Since Japanese employees typically
receive bonuses twice a year (summer and winter), the reported bonus amounts in the
survey represent, in most cases, the sum of the summer bonus and the winter bonus.
Note that any revision of standard hours occurred in April and that the bonuses
are paid after April. Thus, in the regression, the log of annual bonus payments of
the previous calendar year is regressed on standard hours after April in the previous
year. According to Table 4.6, after we control for size-time effects, the coefficient of
17Bonus is not included in this variable.
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the standard hours becomes insignificant. Figure 4.7 draws the result of Column 4
in Table 4.6. The mean log annual bonus amount increases as the establishment size
increases, and the discontinuous changes in the bonus amount at the establishment
sizes of 100 and 300 are virtually zero.
These results from Table 4.6 and Figures 4.6 and 4.7 suggest that even in Japan,
where wages are determined relatively flexibly, neither monthly wage nor bonus pay-
ments responded to the reduction in standard hours in a significant way. This evidence
suggests that the reduction of standard hours increased overall labor cost per hour.
These results are exactly the same as the findings in many European countries, where
pay is largely determined through union-employer bargaining, and the reduction of
weekly or monthly wages faces strong resistance (Hunt (1999) for Germany, Crepon
and Kramarz (2002), Estevao and Sa (2008) and Chemin and Wasmer (2009) for
France, Nymoen (1989) for Norway, Pencavel and Holmlund (1988) and Skans (2004)
for Sweden, and Raposo and van Ours (2008) for Portugal).
4.5.4 Effects on Employment
Whether or not the reduction in standard hours contributed to work-sharing has
been a topic of research interest in many countries, and in this section we also examine
it.
The BSWS is not designed as a panel study and basically cannot capture the
change in the number of employees over time. It, however, allows us to recover the
number of employees in each industry, establishment size, year cell using the frequency
weight that tells how many individuals an observation in the sample represent. In
addition to this measure for the overall employment, this survey also includes in-
formation on the number of workers who are directly recruited from schools at each
establishment. Utilizing these measures of employment, we examine how employment
changed in response to the reduction in standard hours.
155
First, we regress two different measures of the total employment: ln (Number
of employees)18 and the share of the total number of employees among cells (%) on
standard hours andother covariates. The original observation units are individuals,
and they are collapsed to 33 industries×3 size categories (31-100, 101-300, 301+)×14
years cells.19 If the work-sharing argument applies, shorter standard hours should
increase employment.
Table 4.7 reports the regression results, and it returns insignificant estimates for
the coefficient of the standard hours in all the columns. This analysis in which em-
ployment is regressed on standard hours using repeated cross-sectional data, however,
is likely to suffer from the bias caused by reverse causality because standard hours
vary depending on the number of employees in an establishment. Accordingly, a pos-
itive employment shock could increase the likelihood of an establishment to be in a
size category with lower standard hours, which would bias the estimates downwardly.
Thus, there is a possibility that insignificant estimates illustrated in Table 4.7 would
have been significantly positive without the endogeneity bias.
To circumvent this obvious reverse causality, we next utilize information on the
number of workers who are directly recruited from schools at each establishment. The
number of workers directly recruited from schools captures the change of employment
most sensitively, because the adjustment cost is presumably minimal.20 Table 4.6
shows the results of regressions in which the ratio of the number of newly hired workers
to the number of existing workers is regressed on standard hours.21 According to this
18The number of employees in each cell is calculated by summing up the frequency weight within
a cell.
19The reason we did not take a regression discontinuity for this regression is that in a regression
discontinuity model, the X axis is establishment size with a bin width of 1 and the Y axis is the
total number of employees at each size, i.e., (the number of establishments at each size)×(the
establishment size). If we use the establishment size with a bin width of 1 as X, X almost overlaps
with Y because the number of establishments at each size is very small. Thus, in Table 4.7, we
collapsed the data into larger cells and used the total number of employees within each cell for Y.
20Reflecting this fact, how new hiring from schools is adjusted to exogenous changes, such as
recession or an aging society, has been the subject of many studies. Here, we examine the adjustment
of hiring new graduates in terms of the change in standard work hours.
21The reason for using the fraction, and not the number of newly hired workers from schools,
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table, after we control for size-time effects, the coefficient of standard hours becomes
insignificant.
Figure 4.8 visually confirms the result of Column 4 in Table 4.6. Note that es-
tablishments that hire no school graduates are also included in the sample to capture
behavioral changes, such as stopping or starting hiring from schools, among establish-
ments. The fraction of establishments with no hiring from schools is large, particularly
for establishments with less than 100 employees (61% for establishments with 31-100
employees, 29% for 101-300, and 12% for 301+). Reflecting this fact, Figure 4.8
shows the fraction of newly hired workers from schools increases as the establishment
size becomes larger. If we exclude firms with no hiring from schools, the figure in-
dicates the opposite trend (i.e., the fraction of new employees are smaller for large
establishments because the number of existing employees are larger for these estab-
lishments.) In either case (with or without hiring of new school graduates), however,
the estimated coefficient implies that the reduction of standard hours did not affect
recruitment from schools.
All information combined, although the reduction of standard hours reduced the
total hours worked, neither monthly wage nor bonus payments of existing workers
decreased in response to the policy change. As a result, the overall labor cost per
hour increased, and we do not see any evidence of job creation. This implies that
the idea of work-sharing did not work even in an economy where wages are flexibly
determined.
4.5.5 Effects on Full- and Part-time Compositions
An unintended consequence of the reduction of standard hours may be to encour-
age firms to substitute full-time workers with part-time workers. Firms incur fixed
is that there is a possibility that the same reverse causality problem (the regression with total
employment) might occur when using the number of new hires. (Since new hires increase depending
on the number of existing employees, we used the fraction of newly hired workers from schools within
each establishment, instead of its number.)
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costs to employ full-time workers, such as social security co-payments, recruitment,
and firing costs, including retirement allowances. The reduction of hours worked by
a full-time worker increases the fraction of fixed costs per hour. Since the fixed cost
for a part-time worker is lower for various reasons, such as the exemption from social
security payments or less commitment to long-term employment, the reduction of
standard hours may create an incentive for firms to substitute full-time workers with
part-time workers.
To assess whether the reduction of standard hours led to this unintended conse-
quence, the fraction of part-time worker is regressed on standard hours. Table 4.6
indicates that the effect of standard hours on the fraction of part-time workers is
insignificant, and this result is robust against the combinations of interaction terms.
Figure 4.9 reports the result of the local linear regression of the most-preferred spec-
ification estimated around the discontinuity points (Column 4 in Table 4.6). The
larger an establishment, the lower is its fraction of part-time workers. The estimated
coefficient, however, does not suggest the discontinuity of the fraction created by
the discontinuous change of standard hours. Therefore, the claim that the reduc-
tion of standard hours increased the fraction of part-time workers is not empirically
supported.22
4.6 Why hours did not respond much
The analysis in Section 4.5.2 reveals that the legislative change explains only about
31 percent of the reduction in hours worked. This change in hours worked appears
22We recognize that this regression might suffer from an endogeneity problem that arises from
the definition of part-time workers. Since part-time workers in Japan are defined as those whose
scheduled workweek is less than that of regular employees, the cut-off hours are equal to standard
work hours in many cases. Thus, the cut-off hours declined over the period with the reduction in
standard hours, which could cause the endogeneity in this estimation, and it is possible that the
coefficient of standard work hours is upwardly biased. Since even with this potential upward bias
the estimates are not significantly positive, we cannot deny the possibility that the reduction in
standard hours increased the fraction of part-time workers only from this study. More consideration
should be given to this topic in future studies.
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to be somewhat modest. We recognize this small response of weekly hours worked as
evidence that reflects the fact that the fraction of firms affected by the policy change
was originally restricted. The policy affected only firms with an initial workweek
longer than the revised standard hours. It is also expected that firms in which the
average workweek was originally longer than the initial standard hours would not
decrease the workweek significantly in response to the policy change, since they were
already willing to pay overtime prior to the policy change.23 In our sample, 16% of
all the establishments in 1989 initially set the workweek shorter than 40 hours/week.
Thus, for these firms, the policy change would have no impact. In addition, 27% of
establishments in the sample originally set the workweek longer than 48 hours; these
establishments can be considered as those that do not mind paying overtime, and it
is likely that the policy change did not matter for them.
Considering that nearly one half of the sample comes from the group for which the
policy change is unlikely to be effective, it is easier to understand the small estimates
in Section 4.5.2. In other words, there is a possibility that the workweek dropped
largely for firms that actually decreased it, but this effect was attenuated by the large
number of firms that were not affected by the policy change. Therefore, the small
estimate in Section 4.5.2 does not necessarily imply that the change of the workweek
within the same firm was small.
While acknowledging this fact as the principal reason for the moderate estimated
impact, in this section we further explore the possibility that the fixed job model by
Trejo (1991) can explain the reason for it.
Trejo (1991) presents the following two types of theoretical models: the fixed
wage and the fixed job models. In the fixed wage model, the straight-time hourly
wage rate is exogenously given. In response to the change in standard hours, firms
choose the combination of the number of employees and the weekly hours worked by
23These differences in choosing work hours above or below standard hours depend on the difficulty
of substituting hours for employment and the quasi-fixed cost of employment.
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each employee, given fixed capital and an exogenous output level. In the most relevant
case in which the initial number of standard hours does not bind but the number of
revised standard hours does, this model predicts that cost-minimizing firms move to
a new kink at the revised standard hours, i.e., 40 hours in the firm’s cost function.
In this case, firms reduce work hours through the substitution effect (between hours
of work and employment) and the scale effect. In the fixed job model, firms and
workers agree on a set of weekly work hours and earnings, and both are indifferent
to the possible combinations of straight-time and overtime wage rates, as long as the
same weekly work hours and earnings are attained. Thus, regardless of the initial
levels of the agreed-upon work-hour and earning sets, the straight-time hourly wage
rate can be adjusted in accordance with legislative changes in overtime premiums and
standard hours. Such adjustments maintain the initial levels of weekly work hours
and earnings. Thus, if this fixed-job model is valid in our data, the modest change
in hours worked could be attributed to the flexible adjustment of the straight-time
hourly wage rate. Mathematically, weekly earnings Y can be written as:
Y = w[h̄+ p(h− h)] (4.4)
where w represents the straight-time hourly wage rate, and p denotes the overtime
premium rate.24 In the fixed job model, w is adjusted to achieve the same combina-
tions of weekly earnings, Y , and weekly work hours, h. During the policy changes,
standard hours h decreased. Hence, if the Japanese labor market is explained by the
fixed job model, w should decrease in response to the reduction in standard hours,
h, for the same Y and h to be realized. To test if this model is applicable here, we
estimate the following model:
lnwi = αhjts +Xiβ +Dsφ+ ρ Tt +Dj δ +DjTt ζ + TtDsγ +Djsη + ui (4.5)
24The Labor Standard Act in Japan requires p ≥ 1.25.
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The dependent variable is the log of the straight-time hourly rate of individual i in
industry j, year t, and establishment size s. In this paper, we adopt the setting used
in Trejo (1991). Equation (4.5) is estimated at the individual level, with explanatory
variables, such as female variables, weekly hours worked and its square, educational
dummy variables, and potential years of experience and its square. The reason weekly
hours are included as X in the equation above is that validating the effectiveness of the
fixed job model necessitates comparing the straight-time hourly rates of individuals
who work the same number of hours per week. Trejo (1991) states that the above-
mentioned wage equation is neither a labor-demand nor a labor-supply function, but
rather the type of equilibrium wage-hour locus described by Lewis (1969) and Rosen
(1974). Since wage rates vary with hours of work in the hedonic equilibrium context,
weekly hours and its square are included, as X in Trejo (1991).
Table 4.8 shows the regression results. In all specifications, the coefficient of
standard hours is significantly negative, indicating that the reduction in standard
hours is accompanied by an increase in the straight-time hourly wage rate. This
result rejects the fixed job model that predicts a reduction in the hourly wage rate in
response to a decrease in standard hours.25
4.7 Conclusion
This paper examined the effect of reducing standard hours on hours worked, wages,
and employment based on Japanese data. The number of weekly standard hours
25Note that the estimated coefficients of standard hours in Table 4.8 do not directly suggest that
the fixed wage model is also rejected in our data. The model above regards straight-time hourly
wage rates as a control variable and also compares them among workers who worked the same hours.
Therefore, the model setting employed here itself does not fit the idea of the fixed wage model in
which hourly wage rates are assumed to be exogenous. Unfortunately, our data do not contain the
necessary information to test the validity of the fixed wage model, because testing the model requires
information about the employer’s quasi-fixed employment costs (Barkume (2010)), and it has been
shown that having this information is essential to test the model (Ehrenberg (1971) and Ehrenberg
and Schumann (1982)). If we interpret the modest change in hours worked within the framework
of the fixed wage model instead, factors such as large fixed costs, a small-scale effect, and a small
substitution between capital and labor could explain the change.
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declined from 48 in 1988 to 40 in 1997.
We exploit the discontinuity of standard hours by establishment sizes and the
gradual phase-in of stricter standard hours by establishment size and industry to
estimate the policy impacts on hours worked, wages, and employment. The analysis
applying a regression discontinuity design revealed that the reduction of standard
hours modestly reduced hours worked. About 31 percent of the reduction of hours
worked between 1989 and 2002 is attributable to the policy change. This reduction
of hours worked was not associated with a decrease of either monthly wage or bonus
payment. As a result, overall labor cost per hour increased, and we do not see any
evidence of job creation.
The analysis of Japan’s nationwide policy change adds new evidence to the liter-
ature that the work-sharing policy did not work even in an economy where wages are
flexibly determined.
Appendix: Definitions of Terms Used
Standard Hours : Legal limits posed on weekly work hours by the Labor Standard
Act. Employers can set the hours worked to exceed these legal limits only under
an agreement with a workers’ representative that represents the majority of
employees. Overtime under this agreement must be compensated by at least a
25 percent wage premium.
Hours Worked : Calculated as ”Actual number of scheduled hours worked + Ac-
tual number of overtime hours worked.” In order for this to be comparable with
the standard hours regulated at a weekly level, ”hours worked” in this paper
refers to hours worked by employees per week.
Scheduled Cash Earnings : Amount of contractual cash earnings, not including
overtime allowance. This amount is composed of earnings in cash only, not of
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earnings in kind.
Overtime Allowance : Allowances paid for overtime worked.
Monthly Wages : Scheduled Cash Earnings+Overtime Allowance
Straight-time Hourly Wage Rate : Hourly wage rate for scheduled hours worked.
In the data, this is calculated as (Scheduled Cash Earnings - Commuter Al-
lowance - Regular Attendance Allowance - Family Allowance) / Scheduled
Hours.
Bonus Payment : The majority of Japanese employees receive bonus payments in
addition to their regular salary, typically twice a year in summer and winter.
The bonus payment refers to the total bonus amount they receive during the
period from January 1 to December 31. The survey is carried out annually in
June, and respondents report the annual bonus payment for the previous year.
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Figure 4.1: Weighted Average of the Standard Hours and Hours Worked in
4 Industries (Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, and Electricity, Gas,
Heat Supply, and Water), 1989-2002
Note: Observation units are individuals. The average standard hours and hours worked in each year
are calculated from microdata of Basic Survey of Wage Structure. Sample is restricted to workers in
establishments with 30 or more employees in four industries: mining, construction, manufacturing,
and electricity, gas, heat supply, and water.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Hours Worked, 1989 and 2002
Note: Observation units are individuals. The density of each work hour is calculated from microdata
of the Basic Survey of Wage Structure. Sample is restricted to workers in establishments with 30 or
more employees in four industries: mining, construction, manufacturing, and electricity, gas, heat
supply, and water.
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of Establishment Size, 1989, 1992, 1996, and 2000
Note: Observation units are establishments. The density of each establishment size is calculated from
microdata of the Basic Survey of Wage Structure. Sample is restricted to workers in establishments
with 30 or more employees in four industries: mining, construction, manufacturing, and electricity,
gas, heat supply, and water. The bin width used in the figures is one.
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Figure 4.4: Impact of Standard Hours on Weekly Hours Worked, 1989-
2002
Note: Observations units are year×industry×size. The estimates are obtained from Column 4 in
Table 4.6. The dots in the figure are the predicted values obtained after controlling for confounding
factors. (They are the predicted values from the regression of y on establishment-size dummies
with bin width of 5, a time-trend term (T ), industry, and industry×T . The sample means of T and
industry dummy variables are substituted throughout all the size levels to plot the dots.) The red
line refers to the estimated equation at the discontinuity:
The conventional heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. The
sample means of standard hours, which are 43.25 for 31-100, 42.64 for 101-300, and 41.75 for 301+,
and sample means of T and industry dummy variables are substituted to draw the curve in Figure
4.4. Each variable except for standard hours is fixed at its sample mean throughout all the firm-size
levels, and only the standard hours were allowed to change at the thresholds of firm size. Thus, the
magnitude of discontinuities in the figure corresponds to the coefficients estimated in Column 4 in
Table 4.6.
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Figure 4.5: Impact of Standard Hours on Weekly Hours Worked by Pro-
duction Workers, 1989-2002
Note: The same note applies as in Figure 4.4 except for
Estimated equation at the discontinuity:
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Figure 4.6: Impact of Standard Hours on Log Monthly Wages, 1989-2002
Note: Monthly wages are calculated as scheduled cash earnings plus overtime allowance. The real
values, calculated as nominal wages divided by the consumer price index (CPI), are used. The same
note applies as in Figure 4.4 except for
Estimated equation at the discontinuity:
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Figure 4.7: Impact of Standard Hours on Log Annual Bonus, 1989-2002
Note: The real values, calculated as nominal bonus amounts divided by the consumer price index
(CPI), are used. The same note applies as in Figure 4.4 except for
Estimated equation at the discontinuity:
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Figure 4.8: Impact of Standard Hours on the Ratio of the Number of
Newly Hired Workers to the Number of Existing Workers, 1989-2002
Note: The dependent variable is (the number of newly hired workers)×100/ (the number
of existing workers) for each establishment. The minimum value of the dependent variable
is zero. Observation units are establishments. The estimates are obtained from Column 4
in Table 4.6. The dots in the figure are the predicted values obtained after controlling for
confounding factors. (They are the predicted values from the regression of y on establishment
size dummies with a bin width of 5, a time-trend term (T ), industry, and industry×T . The
sample means of T and industry dummy variables are substituted throughout all the size
levels to plot the dots.) The red line refers to the estimated equation at the discontinuity:
Standard errors, clustered at year×industry×size category (by one), are reported in parentheses.
The sample means of standard hours, which are 43.25 for 31-100, 42.66 for 101-300, and 41.73 for
301+, and sample means of T and industry dummy variables are substituted to draw the curve in
Figure 4.8. Each variable except for standard hours is fixed at its sample mean throughout all the
firm-size levels, and only the standard hours were allowed to change at the thresholds of firm size.
Thus, the magnitude of the discontinuities in the figure corresponds to the coefficients estimated in
Column 4 in Table 4.6.
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Figure 4.9: Impact of Standard Hours on Fraction of Part-time Workers
(%), 1989-2002
Note: The real values, calculated as nominal bonus amounts divided by the consumer price index
(CPI), are used. The same note applies as in Figure 4.4 except for
Estimated equation at the discontinuity:
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Table 4.1: History of Standard Hours by Industry and Establishment Sizes Included in the Analysis Sample
-1988/3 1988/4- 1991/4- 1993/4- 1994/4- 1995/4- 1997/4-
1991/3 1993/3 1994/3 1995/3 1997/3
Manufacturing
1-9 48 48 46 46 46 44 40
10-30 48 48 46 46 44 44 40
31-100 48 48 46 46 44 44 40
101-300 48 46 44 44 44 44 40
301+ 48 46 44 44 40 40 40
Mining
1-9 48 48 46 46 46 44 40
10-30 48 48 46 46 44 44 40
31-100 48 48 46 46 44 44 40
101-300 48 48 46 44 44 44 40
301+ 48 48 46 44 44 44 40
Construction
1-9 48 48 46 46 46 44 40
10-30 48 48 46 46 44 44 40
31-100 48 48 46 46 44 44 40
101-300 48 48 46 44 44 44 40
301+ 48 46 44 44 40 40 40
Note: The numbers in the first column (1-9, 10-30, 31-100, 101-300, and 301+) represent establishment sizes, i.e., the number of employees in each
establishment. The legal industry classification in the Labor Standard Act (LSA) and the statistical industry classification in the Basic Survey of
Wage Structure (BSWS) do not overlap for many industries. Thus, to avoid the biases that arise from mismatching between a worker and a standard
hour, we restrict our analysis to workers who are in manufacturing, mining, and construction industries because legal and statistical industrial codes
perfectly overlap for these three industries. The industry category in Table 4.1 is that used in the LSA. The “manufacturing” category in the LSA
includes both the manufacturing industry and the “electricity, gas, heat supply, and water” industry in BSWS. Thus, although the industry category
names used are different between the LSA and the BSWS, it is still possible to perfectly identify the standard hours that apply to a specific worker
for the three industries above.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Analysis Data, 1989-2002, 4 Indus-
tries: Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, and Electricity, Gas, Heat
Supply and Water, All Employees in Establishments with 30 or More Em-
ployees, 1989-2002
Sample Total 1989 1992 1996 2000 2002
Standard Hours 42.55 46.86 44.85 42.52 40.00 40.00
(2.79) (0.99) (0.99) (1.93) 0.00 0.00
Hours Worked 41.57 44.58 41.84 41.12 41.13 40.54
(7.35) (7.87) (7.28) (7.11) (7.14) (7.04)
Scheduled Hours Worked 38.18 40.17 38.58 37.90 37.76 37.33
(5.37) (5.67) (5.59) (5.24) (5.02) (5.03)
Overtime Hours Worked 3.39 4.41 3.27 3.22 3.37 3.21
(4.52) (5.15) (4.34) (4.33) (4.57) (4.47)
Monthly Scheduled Cash Earnings 2787.63 2287.28 2611.57 2883.95 3004.04 3003.08
(100 yen ≈ 1 USD) (1369.87) (1142.81) (1288.43) (1389.54) (1409.23) (1405.64)
Monthly Overtime Allowance 317.58 327.31 293.12 316.61 336.41 324.70
(100 yen ≈ 1 USD) (437.06) (415.58) (413.12) (438.81) (462.78) (457.02)
Annual Bonus in Previous Calendar Year 11296.43 9022.94 11288.99 11783.71 11158.88 11104.16
(100 yen ≈ 1 USD) (9360.74) (7815.31) (9597.12) (9445.77) (9199.96) (9307.42)
Straight-time Hourly Wage Rate 17.21 13.40 15.92 17.93 18.63 18.88
(100 yen ≈ 1 USD) (10.20) (7.76) (9.15) (11.32) (10.17) (10.51)
Establishment Size 525.23 547.92 579.14 505.14 462.61 450.61
(1192.51) (1304.22) (1387.01) (1099.40) (1016.09) (974.16)
Fraction of Newly Hired Workers 2.45 3.10 3.04 2.39 1.52 1.46
from Schools (%) (3.59) (4.30) (4.08) (3.47) (2.60) (2.51)
Fraction of Part-time Workers (%) 5.26 5.24 5.22 4.93 5.87 6.27
Establishment Size: (%)
301+ 37.04 35.63 36.48 37.18 35.47 34.94
101-300 24.40 23.95 23.67 23.57 24.43 24.28
31-100 38.57 40.42 39.85 39.25 40.10 40.77
Industry Distribution: (4 categories) (%)
Mining 1.01 1.42 1.21 0.95 0.93 0.84
Construction (3 categories) 9.45 6.99 6.88 8.28 13.24 12.35
Manufacturing (22 categories) 82.43 86.94 87.31 83.28 78.34 78.80
Electricity, Gas, Heat supply, 7.10 4.66 4.61 7.49 7.49 8.01
and Water (4 categories)
Observations 6221155 459642 454879 463382 436067 399720
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. All monetary compensation is denominated in 100
yen (approximately one US$). The industry category in Table 4.2 is that used in the Basic Survey
of Wage Structure. Sample is restricted to workers in establishments with more than 30 employees
in 4 industries: mining, construction, manufacturing, and electricity, gas, heat supply, and water.
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Table 4.3: Cross-validation Functions and Optimal Bandwidth for Local
Linear Regressions of Hours Worked on Size of Establishment
Values for Cross Validation
Bandwidth Linear Quadratic Cubic Quartic
10 16.406 24.488 226.465 12786.800
20 15.422 157.439 170.463 195.530
30 14.876 15.836 18.101 3538.984
40 14.632 15.621 19.072 25.056
50 14.565 14.971 16.406 21.587
60 14.484 14.855 16.706 20.742
70 14.405 14.949 24.053 4645.501
80 14.386 14.651 18.252 132.341
90 14.365 14.572 17.876 143.322
100 14.371 14.538 15.567 35.797
The optimal combination of
a bandwidth and a polynomial function Linear, Bandwidth=90
Note: A result that has the minimum CV is chosen as the optimal combination of a bandwidth
and a polynomial function. The value of cross validation is given as CV (p, b) = {Σs,j,t(ysjt −
ŷsjt(p, b))
2}/N , where ŷsjt(p, b) is predicted from the local linear regression of a polynomial order, p,
and a bandwidth, b, and N is the number of observations within 5 percentage points of each cutoff
point on either side of the discontinuity (bandwidth b).
Table 4.4: Distribution of Establishments among Establishment-Size Re-
gions (1989, 1992, 1996, and 2000)
Establishment Size Year 1989 1992 1996 2000
301+ 22.4% 22.7% 23.9% 22.7%
101-300 25.2% 25.1% 24.9% 25.5%
31-100 52.4% 52.2% 51.2% 51.8%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Note: Observation units are establishments. The distribution of establishments among 3
establishment-size regions (31-100, 101-300, and 301+) is calculated from microdata of Basic Sur-
vey of Wage Structure. Sample is restricted to establishments with more than 30 employees in 4
industries: mining, construction, manufacturing, and electricity, gas, heat supply and water.
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Table 4.5: Impact of the Reduction in Standard Hours on Firm’s Employment Decision, 1989-2002
Dependent Variable: ln(Number of Establishments)jts (1) (2) (3)
Bandwidth (b) 3 5 10
I(s ∈ [101, 100 + b]) 0.003 0.080 0.161
(0.043) (0.039) (0.034)
I(s ∈ [301, 300 + b]) 0.085 0.095 0.082
(0.059) (0.053) (0.042)
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes
k(s) Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Trend Yes Yes Yes
Trend×l(s) Yes Yes Yes
m(s)×Industry Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.452 0.411 0.353
N 2554 3990 7591
Note: The original observation units are establishments, and they are collapsed to year×industry×size cells. The dependent variable is the logarithm
of the number of establishments within each cell. I(s ∈ [101, 100 + b]) is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the establishment is on the
right side of the threshold of 100; similarly, I(s ∈ [301, 300 + b]) is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the establishment is on the right side
of the threshold of 300. Cell size-weighted regressions, using (the number of observations in cell j)/(the number of total observations/the number of
cells) as a weight (Lee and Card (2008)), are performed. The conventional heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The estimation sample includes observations with establishment size, s ∈ [100 − b, 100 + b] and those with s ∈ [300 − b, 300 + b]. Results with b=3,
5, and 10 are reported in Table 4.5. A linear trend term, calculated as year-1989, is used in the regressions. A linear function is chosen for k(s),
l(s), and m(s) by the cross-validation method. The coefficients of these continuous functions are allowed differ among 4 establishment-size regions:
31-100, 101-200, 201-300, and 301+. In the regression, I(s ≥ 201) is also included, and hence a gap in the number of establishments between the
regions around s=101 and 301 is allowed. A constant term is also included. Samples are restricted to establishments with more than 30 employees in
4 industries: mining, construction, manufacturing, and electricity, gas, heat supply and water.
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Table 4.6: Impact of Standard Hours on Weekly Hours Worked, Earnings,
and Employment, 1989-2002
Dependent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Weekly Hours Worked 0.179 0.176 0.153 0.158
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
R2 0.317 0.323 0.323 0.340
N 58616 58616 58616 58616
Weekly Hours Worked by Production Workers 0.232 0.227 0.208 0.207
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
R2 0.242 0.245 0.246 0.262
N 52533 52533 52533 52533
Log Monthly Wages 0.001 0.001 0.0004 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.616 0.622 0.622 0.634
N 61749 61749 61749 61749
Log Annual Bonus 0.003 0.004 -0.0001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.522 0.528 0.529 0.544
N 61527 61527 61527 61527
Number of Newly Hired Workers from School×100/ -0.084 -0.081 -0.007 -0.008
Number of Existing Workers (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
R2 0.053 0.057 0.062 0.068
N 135174 135174 135174 135174
Fraction of Part-time Workers (%) 0.040 0.033 0.032 0.018
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
R2 0.314 0.324 0.324 0.346
N 61749 61749 61749 61749
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
f(s) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Trend No Yes Yes Yes
Trend×g(s) No No Yes Yes
h(s)×Industry No No No Yes
Note: For all the estimations except for that of the fraction of newly hired workers from school,
observation units are year×industry×size. The conventional heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors are reported in parentheses. In these estimations, cell size-weighted regressions, using (the
number of observations in cell j)/(the number of total observations/the number of cells) as a weight
(Lee and Card (2008)), are performed. A linear trend term, calculated as year−1989, is used in the
regressions. For the estimation of the fraction of newly hired workers from school, observation units
are establishments, and standard errors are clustered at year×industry×size category (by one). For
all the estimations, the sample includes observations with establishment size, s ∈ [100 − b, 100 + b]
and those with s ∈ [300−b, 300+b]. The combination of the polynomial order (p) and the bandwidth
of the local linear regression (b) is the one that attains the minimum value in the cross-validation
from the specification of Column 4. The coefficients of the continuous functions f(s), g(s), and
h(s) are allowed to differ among 4 establishment-size regions: 31-100, 101-200, 201-300, and 301+.
In the regressions, I(s ≥ 201) is also included, and hence a gap in the number of establishments
between the regions around s=101 and 301 is allowed. A constant term is also included. Samples
are restricted to establishments with more than 30 employees in 4 industries: mining, construction,
manufacturing, and electricity, gas, heat supply and water. Monthly wages and annual bonus are
corrected for inflation.
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Table 4.7: Impact of Standard Hours on Total Employment, 1989-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable ln(Number of Employees)jts Share of Total Employees among Cells
Standard Hours -0.021 -0.054 0.042 -0.005 -0.009 0.005
(0.023) (0.074) (0.022) (0.007) (0.017) (0.003)
Constant 7.815 9.400 3.886 0.200 0.408 -0.225
(1.163) (3.662) (1.082) (0.319) (0.821) (0.142)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Size No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Size×Industry No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.881 0.884 0.995 0.703 0.705 0.998
N 1345 1345 1345 1345 1345 1345
Note: The original observation units are individuals, and they are collapsed to 33 industries×3 size categories (31-100, 101-300, 301+)×14 years cells.
The dependent variables are the log of the total number of employees in each cell for Column 1-3 and the share of the total number of employees
among cells (%), i.e., (the number of employees in each cell)jts×100/(the total number of employees in the sample) for Columns 4-6, respectively.
The number of employees in each industry, establishment size, year cell is recovered using the frequency weight that tells how many individuals an
observation in the sample represent. The conventional heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. For these estimations,
cell size-weighted regressions, using (the number of observations in cell j)/(the number of total observations/the number of cells) as a weight (Lee
and Card (2008)), are performed. Out of the total number of the cells, i.e., 1386 cells, 41 cells are dropped from the sample because of no observation.
Samples are restricted to establishments with more than 30 employees in 4 industries: mining, construction, manufacturing, and electricity, gas, heat
supply, and water.
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Table 4.8: Impact of Standard Hours on ln(Straight-time Hourly Wage
Rate), 1989-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard Hours -0.0038 -0.0036 -0.0022 -0.0018
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Female -0.4950 -0.4943 -0.4941 -0.4890
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Hours -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0009
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Hours2/100 -0.0136 -0.0136 -0.0135 -0.0130
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Experience 0.0402 0.0401 0.0401 0.0403
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Experience2/100 -0.0605 -0.0604 -0.0604 -0.0606
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
High School 0.0548 0.0546 0.0544 0.0555
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Junior College 0.2414 0.2409 0.2405 0.2424
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
University 0.3056 0.3052 0.3052 0.3059
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Constant 2.6545 2.6532 2.5783 2.6013
(0.0265) (0.0342) (0.0355) (0.0371)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Trend No Yes Yes Yes
Trend×Size No No Yes Yes
Size×Industry No No No Yes
R2 0.658 0.659 0.659 0.664
N 6221155 6221155 6221155 6221155
Note: Observation units are individuals. The dependent variable is the log of straight-time hourly
wage rate. Straight-time hourly wage rate is calculated as: (Scheduled Cash Earnings−Commuter
allowance−Regular attendance allowance−Family allowance)/Scheduled Hours. Earnings data
are corrected for inflation. Observation units are individuals. Standard errors, clustered at
year×industry×size category (by one), are reported in parentheses. Samples are restricted to workers
in establishments with more than 30 employees in 4 industries: mining, construction, manufacturing,
and electricity, gas, heat supply, and water. The reference group for the education dummy variables




Using the theoretical and empirical tools from labor economics and public fi-
nance, this dissertation explores new evidence related to several topics that affect the
Japanese labor market.
Chapter II examines how the 2004 tax reform in Japan affected labor supply
of married women. This chapter uses quantile difference-in-difference estimations
and the relatively new decomposition techniques, the Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux
decomposition and the DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux decomposition, to explore the
effect this tax reform had on the distribution of work hours and incomes. These
analyses found that the 2004 tax reform in Japan contributed to increasing work
hours (and hence the incomes) of low-income married women. However, the tax
reform resulted in the conventional kink at 1.03 million yen in the household budget
line becoming more conspicuous, making it a more attractive income choice than
before. Due to this change in the household budget line, the annual income of some
of the medium- to high-income married women decreased to 1.03 million yen when
they experienced both the 2004 tax reform and an increase in their husbands’ incomes.
As a result, the decrease in incomes caused by a large negative husband’s income effect
offset the increase in income among the low-income women, which resulted in a slight
decrease in the average income among married women.
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Chapter III provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effect of performance-
based layoffs on wage rigidity in the context of performance pay. If the presence of
the threat of performance-based layoffs is considered, high wages can be a device to
induce workers to deliver high levels of work effort in both the preceding periods and
in the current period. This gives firms an incentive to raise the future regular pay
so as to maintain the workers’ current efforts, which results in the downwardly rigid
regular pay of experienced employees under the threat of performance-based layoffs.
Together with the finding that layoffs are more likely to occur during recessions,
the theoretical implication regarding the regular pay provides an explanation for the
downward rigidity of regular pay during recessions. Although this is the result of the
fixed component of wages, when we consider the performance-based component of
wages, the outcomes are different. The firms are discouraged from maintaining their
workers’ current incentives at a higher level due to the lower value of productivity
during recessions, which results in the bonus that increases or decreases wages pro-
portionally to the output price. Thus, firms base wages less on workers’ performance
during recessions by paying lower bonuses. As a result, wages during recessions be-
come both “downwardly rigid” and “rigid” (inflexible) with respect to performance.
The empirical results obtained from the Japanese panel data set supported these the-
oretical implications. In particular, this type of explanation for wage rigidity can be
applied to unionized workers whose layoff decisions are likely to be performance-based
in countries such as Japan where performance-based pay has been widely employed.
Chapter IV utilizes the regression discontinuity approach to explore the impact
of Japan’s reduction of weekly standard working hours (from 48 hours/week in 1988
to 40 hours/week by 1997) on labor-market outcomes. This analysis exploits the
discontinuity of standard working hours, based on establishment sizes, and the gradual
phase-in of stricter standard working hours, based on establishment size and industry,
to estimate the policy impacts on hours worked, wages earned, and employment. The
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analysis applying a regression discontinuity design revealed that the reduction of
standard working hours modestly reduced the number of hours worked. About 31
percent of the reduction in the number of hours worked between 1989 and 2002 is
attributable to the policy change. This reduction was not associated with a decrease
of either monthly wage or bonus payment. As a result, overall labor costs per hour
increased, and we do not see any evidence of job creation. Thus, even in Japan,
where wages are determined flexibly, we observed evidence that is similar to what has
been found in European countries, such as Germany and France, where pay is largely
determined through union-employer bargaining.
These three chapters provide new information about the Japanese labor market
that is useful for evaluating policies concerning spousal exemptions, wages, and stan-
dard working hours. Although the focus of this dissertation is on the Japanese labor
market, the discussion and the approach adopted in these chapters can also be ex-
tended to cases in other countries. It is hoped that, in future studies, the approaches
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